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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Origins of the Pales t inian Question 
The land of Pale s t ine has been the object of conf licting claims 
by numerous peoples and religions for millennia . This  smal l , arid place 
generally consi s ting of terri tory east and we s t  of the Jordan River 
has been ruled and cove ted by Jews , Chris tians , and Muslims . Each 
now po s sesses his torical , cultural , and religious at tachments to the 
land . The Jewi sh claim to Pale s t ine rest s  on their conque s t  of the 
" promised land " in 1451  B .  c. E. and their 1 500-year occupancy which 
ended wi th the Diaspora in 7 1  A .  D .  Chri s tian occupation during the 
crusades and the importance of the land that Je sus walked also  give s 
Chris tians some claim to the area , part icularly the holy sites . The 
Arabs assert , however , more recent property rights based on their 
control of the area from the seventh to the twentieth century . S ince 
Israel ' s  rebirth as a state in 1 948 ,  Arabs and Jews have fought four 
major wars and numerous minor engagement s over rights to Pale s t ine . 
During the late 1 9 th century , nationali sm unified peop les in 
Wes tern countries ,  and Jews dreamed of reuni ting their peop le . "A 
land wi thout a people for a people wi thout a land , "  was the slogan 
adop t ed by the early Zioni s t  leaders to promo te massive Jewi sh fmmigra­
tion to Pales tine in the early 1 9 00s . l But the ancient Jewi sh home land 
lThe phrase adopted at the Firs t Zionist  Congress in Basle , Swi tzerland 
1897 . Cited by Nadav Safran , Israel , The Embattled Ally (Massachuset t s : 
Belkamp Pres s ,  1 9 78 ) , p .  2 0 . 
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was not vacant When modern Jews returned . For centur ies , the land had 
been inhabi ted by Arabs . Ironically .the recons t i tution of a Judaic 
s tate di splaced much of the Arab population . Now after four ma jo r  
Arab-I sraeli wars the Arabs o f  Pale s t ine are " a  peop le wi thout a land . "  
About four million Pale s t inian Arabs live throughout the world 
today , mos t  of them out side the state of I srael which was created when 
the Uni ted Nations part i tioned Pale s t ine in 1947 . When the Jews 
declared sta tehood a year la ter , a civil war broke out during wh i ch the 
Jewi sh national i s t s  def eated the Palestinian Arabs and the armies of 
seven surrounding Arab states . The Arabs refused to accep t the 
exist ence of I srael and des i red to '' throt tle it at bi rth . .. z 
Approximately a million Palestinian Arabs live in the We st  Bank and Gaza 
S trip regions , occupied by Israel since the 1967  war . The res t  of the 4 
mil lion have taken refuge among neighboring Arab state s . The Uni ted 
Nations Relief Works Agency repo rted about 1 . 6 million Pale s t inian Arabs 
reg i s tered as refugees in 1 9 7 7 . Many were di splaced for the second time 
in 196 7 . The victims of repea ted Arab defeats , living in bi t terne s s  and 
of ten in poverty , and lacking a terri tory to call their own , these 
peop le have captured the attention of the world . 
Responsibili ty fo r the creation of the Palestinian problem 
is a ma tter of perspective , depending large ly on the allegiance of thos e 
involved . Those sympathetic to the I sraeli s argue that the Pale s t inians 
could have had a national home land in 1 948 and that the I sraeli s 
2Golda Meir , " Israel in S earch of Las ting Peace , "  Foreign Affairs 5 1  
(Apr il 1 9 7 2 ) : 451 . 
accep ted the establi shment of a Palestinian state and were ready to live 
in peace wi th it . 3 According to this grou p ,  the neighboring Arab 
s tates , however , invaded Pales t ine in order to crush Israel . The 
Pales tinians , cons equently , were the vi ctims of the outside Arab 
states . A totally di fferent Arab vi ewpo int maintains tha t in 1 9 48 
Zioni s t  underground forces  attacked Arab towns and vi llage s  in order to 
drive out all non-Jewi sh inhabi tant s . 4 
Mos t  diplomat s  believe that i f  the Pale st inian issue is reso lved , 
peace will come to the Middle Eas t . 5 On the other hand , Golda Meir 
sugge s t s , " There can be no greater mi s take in assessing the current 
s i tua tion in the Middle East than to as sume that the conf li ct cont inue s 
because of a specific poli tical Arab grievance : the plight of the Arab 
refugees . " 6 Meir po int s ou t  that the hatred and reluctance of the Arabs 
to accep t  Israel ' s  very exi s tence is the principle crux of the problem . 
There were no refugees prior to the war of_1 9 48 . Nevertheles s ,  the 
unreso lved Palestinian issue has become so intense that the search for 
peace in the Middle Eas t , according to many di plomats , necessi tates the 
3Pale stine was divided up into a propo sed Jewi sh state and a proposed 
Arab state by the u. N .  General As sembly in 1 947 .  
4Fawaz Turki , " Portrai t of A Palestinian S tate , "  Toward Peace in 
Pale s tine , ( Washing ton , D . C . : Pales t ine Information Office , 1 9 8 1 ) ,  
p .  3 2 . He recoun ts  the events of his family ' s run from Haifa north to 
Lebanon . 
5The Camp David Framework for Peace in the Middle East and the Uni ted 
Nations Resolutions 3 38 ( 1 9 7 3 ) and 2 42 ( 1 967 ) are bas ed on the so lving 
of the Pale s tinian Que s t ion as a prerequi site for final Middle Eas t 
Peace . See Appendices A and D .  
6Meir , " In Search of Las t ing Peace , "  p .  45 1 .  
5 
formation of some sort of Pale s tinian entity as a prerequi s i te to s tabi­
l i ty in this region of the world . 7 
Compet i tion for this reg ion has affected states great di s t ance s  
from the Middle Eas t . Thi s  struggle for dominion today has threatened 
to embrace the super-powers . "The search for a just and las ting peace 
in the Middle Eas t is one of the highe s t  priori ty items on the foreign 
po licy agenda of our country , "  said Uni ted S tates Secre tary of S tate 
Cyrus R. Vance , in 1976 . President Jimmy Carter said , " To le t this 
opportuni ty [for a set tl ement] pas s could mean di sas ter not only for 
the Middle Eas t , but perhaps for the international poli tical and eco­
nomic order as well . .. a 
Carter and Vance expres s ed a de s ire to help arbi trate a so lut ion 
but stressed the Uni ted S tates ' unwil lingness to impos e  a set tlement on 
Arabs and I sraeli s ;  however ,  fo rmer Under Secretary of State George Bal l 
emphasized the neces s i ty for our country ' s  leadership in this arena : 
What the Uni ted S tates does about the Middle Eas t 
would be the acid tes t  of po li tical courage and deci s i­
veness . If America should permi t Israel to continue to 
rej ect inflexibil i ty any sugge s tion of a return to earlier 
boundaries and the creation of a Pale stinian state , and to 
refuse even to negot iate about Jerusalem , we should be 
acquiescing in a po li cy hazardous not only to I srael but 
for America and the res t  of the world . That would not be 
responsible conduct  for a great power . .. g 
7 "Ent i ty " throughout this paper wi l l  be used to signify the bas ic idea 
of Pale s tinian area , whether it wi l l  be in the form of federal , 
binational , or separate parti tioned state . 
Bcongress ional Quarterly , Inc . ,  The Middle East (Washington D . C . :  
Congres sional Quarterly Inc . ,  1 979 ) ,  p .  3 .  
9George w. Ball , "How to Save I srael in S pite of Herself , "  Foreign 
Affairs 55 (April 1 9 7 7 ) :  471 . 
President Carter was the firs t president to recognize that the 
concept of a Palestinian homeland was a central issue in the 
Arab-Israeli conf li c t . "The Framework fo r Peace in the Middle Eas t , "  
6 
concluded at Camp David S ep tember 1 7 , 1 9 7 8  by Egyptian President Anwar 
Sadat and Israeli Prime Minis ter Menachem Begin , es tabli shed steps  to 
implement self-de termination of the occupied terri tories , the Wes t  Bank 
and Gaza . 10 The next five years pro duced no vi sible autonomy fo r the 
Palest inians . Following the I sraeli invas ion of Lebanon and the sub-
s equent fo rced evacuat ion of the Pale s tinian Liberation Organiza tion 
( PLO ) army from Beiru t , Pre s ident Reagan introduc ed in November 1 9 82 an 
ini tiative for a Pales tinian home land in the form of a Wes t  Bank ent i ty 
in loos e  confederation wi th Jordan . 
The I sraeli realiza tion of statehood is well documented . J .  c.  
Hurewi tz present s the most comple te account of the event s  leading up 
to and including Israeli independence in the Struggle for 
Pales tine . 1 1  Ne tanel Lorch ' s I s rael ' s  War of Independence focuses on 
the poli tical and mili tary aspect s of the 19 48 War including each major 
engagement . 12 In  Israel , the  Embattled Ally, Nadav Safran produces  a 
well respected po li tical view from the standpo int of Israeli-American 
relations through 1 9 7 8 . 1 3  Addi tional ly ,  Richard F .  Nyrop edi t s  an 
10see Appendix A fo r the key provi sions fo r the Framework of Peace . 
1 1J .  c.  Hurewi tz , The S truggle for Pales tine (New York : w. w. North 
and Co . ,  1 9 50 ) . 
1 2Ne tanel Lorch , Israel ' s  War o f  Independence (Har t ford : Har tmore 
Hous e , 1 9 6 1 ) . 
13Nadav Safran , Israel , the Embattled Ally ( Cambridge : Balknap Pres s , 
1 9 7 8 ) .  
7 
accurate social , his to r ical , and physical work from the Jewi sh 
pers pective . 1 4 The Pale s t inians , however ,  have not attained a terri-
tory of their own , and a need exi s t s  fo r an examination of their 
si tua tion . This paper consequently addresses the Pales t inian que s tion 
wi thin the context of po li tical space . 
A binding agreement by all concerned parties is essential to 
creating a Pales tinian poli tical area . Befo re this can occur , a careful 
analys is of the terri to ry which might comprise that state and the po ten-
tial boundaries Which may def ine it mus t be carried out . Thi s  analys i s  
would facili tate stabil i ty and limi t fr ic t ion between peoples . Stephen 
B .  Jones addresses  this la t ter aspect in his handbook fo r statesmen , 
treaty edi tors , and boundary commis sioners . He present s four stages in 
preparation of a boundary : ( 1 )  the po li tical decisions on the al loca-
t ion of terri tory , ( 2 )  delimitat ion of the boundary in a treaty , ( 3 ) 
demarcation of the boundary on the ground , and ( 4 ) adminis tration of the 
boundary . 1 5 
Jones sugge s t s  that terri torial al loca tion and boundary-making 
can only be accompli shed properly when the area ' s  "general situa ti on" is 
understood . The condi tions in any given locali ty ,  both phys ical and 
1 4Richard F .  Nyrop , ed., Israe l , A Country S tudy ( Washing ton , D .  c., 
The Amer ican Univers i ty Press , 1 9 7 9 ) .  
1 5s tephen B .  Jones , Boundary Making (Washing ton D . C . : Carneg ie 
Endowment fo r International Peace , 1945 ) ,  p.  5 . There is di fference 
of opinion wi thin the field of po li tical geography regarding the 
meaning of the words "delimi tation" and "demarcation" . The firs t 
refers to the choice of a boundary si te and its  defini tion in a 
t reaty . The second is a field operation perfo rmed by a commi s sion to 
survey and make final ad j ustments to the boundaries . 
8 
cultural , are so unique that terri torial al locat ion and boundary delimi-
tation can only be accompli shed as a result of customized research . 
I t  is a fact that a boundary even in the earlie s t  stage of 
t erri torial allocation , is a structure-to-be , a future 
functional feature of the inhabi ted earth , tha t requires 
that so much of so many kinds of info rmation be brought to 
a focus on each problem . The bes t  means of insur ing that 
this info rmation is complete , signi ficant , and up-to-da te , 
and , also , of bring ing the information quickly to a sharp 
focus , is to make field observations at the earli e s t  
pos sible stage . 1 6  
The firs t step prior to field obs ervat ion , therefo re , i s  the 
nece s s i ty fo r statesmen and diplomat s  charged wi th es tabli shing some 
form of Pales tinian ent i ty , to gain a thorough unders tanding of the 
Pale s tinian general situa tion . The purpo se of this paper is to provide 
a synthesized geographic analysis of selected aspects of the Pales tinian 
que s tion as part of the first stage of boundary making . This s tudy wi l l  
aid the reconnaissance commis s ions , tasked wi th de t ermining boundaries , 
particularly if its members are unfamiliar wi th this region . 
This paper wi l l  examine three facets of the Pale s tinian struggle 
for poli tical area . The firs t po in t  of study is the his torical deve lop-
ment of Palest inian nat ionali sm and id enti ty from the turn of the twen-
t ieth century . The second concerns the Pale s tinian socie ty and assesses 
the affects of its dis tribution , repres sion , cleavage and cohes ion on 
attempt s  to fo rm a coherent socie ty . Finally , the study wi l l  conclude 
wi th an examination of several terri torial alternatives such as a bina-
t iona! Arab-Israeli state , a to tal Pales tinian Arab state , and repar-
t i tian into separate Arab and I sraeli states . These three aspect s are 
1 6Ibid , PP• 6-7 . 
interrela ted ; by unders t anding them , thos e entrus ted wi th the task of 
solving the complex , il lusive problem of a Pale s tinian poli t ical area 
wil l  grasp the nature of Pales t inian territoriali ty and be more pre­
pared to develop effec t ive , feasible so lut ions . 
9 
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Geographic Boundary S tudies and Functions 
Diplomatic his to ry is replete wi th example s  of state-making in 
the absence of a general unders tanding of the land or its people . 
Impat ient monarchs and minis ters have of t en es tabli shed mili tary , po li­
t ical , or natural barriers in an at tempt to delineate the boundaries of 
a state . Errors in judgement and hardships among peoples were of t en the 
produc t . The boundary-making process doe s  no t imply going to a map and 
arbi traril y  drawing a circumference around an area and declaring the 
birth of a state . In fact , the concep ts  of delineating a state area by 
e s tabli shing either mi l i tary , po li tical , or natural barriers is old and 
result s  in numerous errors in judgement and hardships to communi ties 
throughout the world . In order for reconnais sance commi s s ions to be 
success ful , it is crucial for its members to appr ecia te the nature of 
boundary studies and particularly the func tions perfo rmed by the s tate 
wi thin the area defined by boundaries . 
World War I and the tide of nationali sm which followed changed 
the international boundary pic ture signi ficantl y .  More nations were 
created and more boundaries were drawn during this period than during 
any other time in his tory . In the Middle Eas t alone the European powers 
divided the O t toman Empire into numerous mandates admini s tered by 
European powers . Geographers have examined boundaries as a facet of the 
s tate , primarily to prevent the mi stake s of the pa s t . Po s s ib ly their 
mos t impressive contribution to terri torial alloca tion and boundary pre­
delimi ta tion was "The Inquiry"  of the Uni ted S tates Government under­
taken in 1919  in preparation for the Paris conference . The study was 
1 1  
enormous and of great value to the peace conference; however ,  much of 
the info rmation was encyclopedic and statistical in fo rm and lacked 
cohesion and geographical analysi s  in terms of data interrela tionships . 
The work , nevertheless , served as a model fo r subsequent boundary 
problems and has influenced this study of the Palestinian Problem .  The 
topics are li s ted in Appendix B . 17 
S tudies of boundaries have changed since World War I .  Early 
views of  boundaries emphasized their nature in terms of being "good" or 
"bad " from a poli tico-mili tary perspective . Many statesmen 
erroneously claimed that the best boundary was one that could separate 
diverse peop'!es and prevent fr iction . The roos t  familiar concep t was the 
"natural boundary" . Many diplomats believed rivers , deserts and moun-
tains were the "best "  boundaries . Jones maintained , however ,  that 
" there are no intrinsically good or bad boundaries . " 18  This is not to 
sugges t that natural features should no t be examined or analyzed in the 
boundary-making process .  The examination of natural features , however , 
must be considered in terms of each particular situation . The result of 
the natural barrier mentali ty among statesmen led to many problems . In 
192 1 , Winston Churchil l , then Bri tish colonial secretary , convened a 
high-level conference in Cairo to subdivide the Pales tine Manda te into 
two parts : one for a Jewish national homeland , the other fo r Arabs . 
The conference delimited the two entities along the Jordan River - Gulf 
17 "The American Geographical Society ' s  Contribution to the Peace 
Conference , "  Geographical Review 7 ( 19 1 9 ) :  4 .  
I 
18Jones , Boundary Making , p .  3 .  
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of Aqaba line ( the mo s t  obvious ) ,  thereby causing a spli t in juri sdic­
tion of the watershed of the Jordan19 . This la ter precipi tated nume rous 
armed confrontations between I srael and Jordan . 
S tatesmen have also considered moun tains to be good barriers to 
movement and settlement of peop le , hence making them a boundary op tion . 
However this may be convenient but is not always true . Deserts  and 
swamps may pose more serious obs tac les to surface circulation . De sert 
peop le s  of ten traverse toward mountains fo r the wa ter they af fo rd . 
Settlers may seek mountains for the same reason , or fo r power , minerals 
or timber , as in much of the Middle East . Moun tains in arid reg ions may 
form the homelands of unified peoples and therefo re const i tute po or 
s i tes fo r boundaries . The League of Nations commi ss ioned the Iraq-Syria 
inves t igation in 19 32  to decide wh e ther the mountains known as Jebel 
S inj ar should be divided or given enti rely to one country or the other . 
The commission unanimously recommended that the mountains should be 
allocated as a uni t bas ed upon ci rcula tion patterns of the people who 
lived there . 20 The assumption that a natural barrier reduces frict ion 
i s  unfounded• For example ,  mo s t  of the boundary separating Canada and 
the United S tates , is a geome tric line rather than a natural obs tacle . 
I t  is one of the wo rld ' s  mos t peaceful and cooperative lines be tween two 
s tates . 
Frict ion actually arises when po li t ical sys tems and boundaries 
are inappropriately superimpos ed upon exi sting cultural areas . The 
19Robert Rhinehar t ,  Jordan A Country S tudy, Richard Nyrop , ed . 
(Washington , D .  c., The American Univers i ty , 1 9 80 ) , p .  2 1 . 
20Jones , Boundary Making , P• 9 8 . 
13 
demarcated boundaries throughout the Middle East are good example s  of 
the Wes tern powe rs ' unfamiliarity wi th the human geographical land scape . 
For ins tance , the Supreme Allied Council , mee t ing in San Remo , Ital y ,  in 
April , 192 0 ,  part i tioned the Arab wo rld into manda tes to be admini stered 
by-Bri tain and F rance . In the Syrian Manda te , the French sought to 
increase their streng th by supporting and separating the religious  
group s . Using religion as  boundary cri teria , France orig inal ly planned 
to es tablish four sectarian states : an Alawi te state in the north , a 
Sunni Muslim state in the center , a Druze state in the sou th, and a 
Chris tian state in the area of Mount Lebanon . The firs t three even-
tually merged to form a federal S yr ia leaving the Chris tian s tate of 
Lebanon wi th a precarious balance of religious  minori ties that continue 
to confro�t each other . 2 1  Modern Syria still cla ims Lebanon and hopes 
to incorporate i t . The fact of the ma t ter was that France tried to 
superimpose new boundaries in Syr ia based on Western ideas of organiza-
tion . Their unfamiliar i ty wi th the Arab culture demons trated by the 
delimi tation of their manda te into a Christian state (Lebanon) and a 
Muslim state ( Syria) i s  a classic example of judgemental errors due to 
misunders tanding the general si tuation . Another case of inappropr iate 
boundaries Which caused fr ic tion was the Uni ted Nations General Ass embly 
plan fo r parti tion of Pale s t ine in 1 9 47 (Map 2 ) . This delimi tation con-
s isted of a ludicrous fragmentation of geographic areas proposed fo r 
bo th a Jewi sh and a Muslim state . More will be said on this la ter . 
2 1Laraine N .  Carter , Syria a Country S tudy , ed . Richard F .  Nyr op , 
(Washing ton , D . C . : American Univers i ty ,  1 9 7 9 ) , p .  22 . 
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As a result of the numerou s  conflicts which ensued as a result of 
inappropriate location of boundarie s , po li tical geographers took a hard 
look at the concept of boundaries . A shift  of emphasi s was necessary . 
Before World War I I  they focused on boundary classificat ion and type . 
Nicho las Spykman introduced the concep t of boundaries as "points of con-
tact of terri torial powe r  structures " as op pos ed to the tradi tiona! 
approach which characterized them as lines of demarcation between legal 
systems . 22 S pykman contended that the posi tion of a boundary could 
become a quanti fiable index to the power of the separated countrie s . 
s .  Whittemore Boggs ' cla s s i f ication of boundary type s during the same 
period consi sted of phenomenologi cal criteria such as physical , 
geometr ical , anthropogeographical , and complex types . 23  Richard 
Hartshorne proposed a sequencia! cla s s i fica tion . Borrowing from Wil liam 
Morris Davis '  geomorphological language , he applied eros ion terms to 
boundaries according to their rela tionship wi th the cultural landscape 
at the time of their establi shment . He said that boundaries may be 
an tecedent or subsequent to periods of occupation . 24 An antecedent 
boundary precedes development of the cultural landscape . The 49th 
parallel boundary between Canada and the Uni ted S tates was subsequent to 
2 2Nicho las , J .  Spykman , "Frontiers , Secur ity and International Organiza­
t ion , "  Geographical Review 32 ( July 1 9 42 ) :  437 .  
2 3s .  Whit temore Boggs , International Boundaries (New York : AMS Pre s s , 
Inc . ,  1 9 66 ) ,  pp . 25-2 6 . 
24Richard Hart shorne , " Sugge s t ions on the Terminology of Poli tical 
Boundaries , "  Annals , AAG 26 (March 1 9 36 ) :  56-57 . 
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Indian occupation but antecedent to farming . 25 The Belgium-France boun-
dary wa s  subsequent to agricultural set tlement but antecedent to 
indus try . Furthermore , a boundary along a natural barrier is said to be 
consequent upon that barrier . The 1 9 2 2  boundary in Upper S ile s ia wa s  
ins t i tuted after indus try so i t  i s  superimpos ed on the indus trial 
area . 2 6  This was the firs t cla s s i ficat ion of boundaries by funct ion 
rather than phys ical type . By the end of World War I I , the emphasi s  
shif ted completely from cri teria fo r drawi ng boundaries to the func-
t iona performed by them . 
This shi ft away from the nature of a boundary to the funct ions 
performed wi thin and across the boundary enables the scho lar to mo re 
accurately assess current problems and provide reali s tic so lutions . A 
list of boundary funct ions today could almos t  duplicate a li s t  of human 
activi ties : mail service , telephone connections , natural ga s  pipelines , 
road networks , recreational locations , telev�s ion viewing , and money 
coinage , to name several . The increasing influence of government in all 
phases of life , make s boundary func tions increas ingly sharp . As the 
s tate continue s to as sume an increasing number of functions , peop le 
become more and more conscious of its pr esence , its  func t ions , and its 
institutions . 2 7  For example ,  King Hus sein of Jordan , and the Bri t i sh 
2 5Landsat pho tographs clearly reveal the divergent land-uses between 
the Canada-u . s .  boundary at tr ibuted to es tabli shing the bOundary 
antecedent to farming . 
2 6  Ibid . P• 56 . 
27Hans w. Weigert , ed., Principles of Political Geography (New York : 
Appleton-Century-Crof ts , Inc . ,  1 9 57 ) ,  p .  1 1 0 .  
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before him , ins t ituted a po licy of almo s t  to tal recrui tment ( a  mili tary 
func tion) wi thin the ranks of the nomadic , uncohesive Beduin tribes in 
order to build a national consc iousness . Similarly , the Pales t inian 
Liberation Organization (PLO ) , as an ins t i tution , became a nat ionali s tic 
ral·lying point to the people in the Wes t  Bank and Gaza even though no de 
jure boundaries fo r a Pales tinian state have been drawn ( a  belonging 
funct ion) . In the 19 50s the I sraeli government required all immigrant s 
to live and wo rk on the Jewi sh agr icultural cooperat ive s .  In order fo r 
crop produc t ion to be success ful , the government required the Jewi sh 
settlers to utilize the Jewi sh National Fund and the Zioni s t  
Organization in which to sell their  produc t s  ( a  trade funct ion ) . 28 
Boundary-making , therefore , is no longer linear , bu t areal in 
nature . Merely s tudying the face ts of terrain in order to locate lines 
which may fo rm barriers of minimum fr ict ion between people canno t bring 
succes s  to the Pales tinian di lemma . The fo rma tion of any Palestinian 
entity , whether it becomes a sovereign state or a canton unde r  another 
government , cannot be reali zed wi th the old assessment of a linear 
feature ( boundary) or even zones ad jacent to it . The answer mus t be 
inves tigated by a regional method which can cons ider all the func t ioning 
ingredients ( cultural , economic , and po li tical ) wi thin a given area or 
region . Jones ma intains that as a me thod leading di rectl y  to the di s-
covery of boundary sites , the reg ional method probably wi l l  not be sue-
cess ful . He sugge s t s , however , that since the concep t has proven i t s  
28norothy Wil lner , Nation-Bui lding and Community in Israel (New Jer s ey : 
Princeton Unive rsi ty Press , 1 9 6 9 ) ,  pp . 303-3 79 . 
18 
value in scho larly studie s  both as a me thod of analysi s  and of synthe s i s  
of info rmation , it can contr ibute significantly to recommendat ions of 
field and of f ice inves t igations ; hence , the regional method is a useful 
tool in this paper as a preliminary step fo r reconnais sance 
commis s ions . 29 
2 9Jones , Boundary Making , p .  20. 
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The Palestinian Region 
Members of reconnai s sance commis s ions mus t  be able to view 
Pales tine on a regional bas i s . Their obs ervations should be from an 
ext rinsic standpo int in order to be both di scerning to actual fact and 
objec tive during decision making . The regional concep t can provide this 
means of object ivi ty if the cri teria de f ining the region are clear . To 
do thi s , regions may be based on the "homogeneity of the geographical 
landscape or on coherence of organization . 30  For example ,  homogenei ty 
of landscape may be a space defined by the Arabic language or the Sunni 
Muslim religion . A space def ined by its  organization ( functioning ) 
could be the indus trial trade area of Haifa Bay in Northern I srael . The 
challenge to the reconnaissance commi s s ions wi l l  be their abili ty to 
discern a Pale s tinian ent i ty in a space which has Arab and I sraeli 
overlapping or compe ting regi onal criteria . 
The Palestinian problem can be limi te� on an areal basi s  to the 
four countries containing the ma jority of Pales tinians : Israel , 
Lebanon , Syria and Jordan (Map 3 ) .  Since the Arab peoples Who call 
themselve s Palestinians do no t po s sess an actual state , but are sca t­
tered into many settlement po cke t s , it is necessary to define a concep t 
of Pale stinian territoriali ty .  
The terri torial principle is the innate command , according to 
Robert Ardrey , in The Terri torial Imperative , to defend one's property . 
He demons trates in numerous examples , mankind to be as terri torial ly 
30Jones , Boundary Making , p .  3 . 
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pos sessive as the animal world . 3 1 The contest  between Israeli and Arab 
is not due to natural and his toric enmi ty , bu t specif ically for space . 
Ardrey de scribes the Jew prior to 1 948 as nothing other than a de-
terri to rialized man po s sessing the personali ty of a bundle of manneri sms 
that preserved his identi ty fo r 2 000 years of Diaspora . 
I f  a territorial interpretat ion of the I sraeli and the 
Pale s tinian carries validi ty , then certain theoretical consequences 
should be evident . Ardrey li s ts several pr inciples Which lend credibi-
lity to the territorial pr inciple in Palestine . 
Firs t , a terri tory is a defended area . To defend 
i t  one mus t  have hos t ile neighbors . The Arab League , 
happily for the Jew , presented • • •  the oppo rtunity to 
make legi timate his territory in the strictest  biological 
s ense . 
Second , if civilized man is to respect someone 
else ' s  ti tle to a terri tory , he needs evidence • • • •  He 
needs • • •  to see the propr ietors in de fense of their 
land slaughter a maximum number of their fellow human 
being s . 
Third , aqui s i t ion and defense of a territory have 
brought the usual enhancement of energ y to the I sraeli . 
I t  did . The Promi sed Land wa s  as unpromising a collec­
t ion of rocks , gravel , malarial swamps ,  and out-and-out 
desert as the Medi terranean li ttoral can provide • • •  Yet 
a people who for 2000 years had been denied ownership 
o f  land , had lived almo s t  entirely in towns and lacked 
both farming tradi tion and experience , have made them-
selves very nearly self-suf ficient on food supply and are 
captur ing one European marke t af ter ano ther wi th their 
agr icultural exports . 32  
Ardrey concludes by explaining that the Arab ' s  persis tent de si re 
to expel the I sraeli s from Palest ine wi l l  actually work , as in nature ,  
3 1Robert Ardrey , The Territorial Imperative (New York : Dell Publi shing 
Co . , 1 9 66 ) ,  p .  2 5 2 . 
3 2Ibid . ,  pp . 305-3 1 3 . 
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t o  create a stronger ,  mo re de termined I sraeli commi tment to retain their 
new terri tory . The same is also true of the Palestinians . Now they are 
the de- terri torializ ed people striving for a place . The que s tion of 
cultural uni ty and sense of purpos e  for the Pale s tinians as a peopl e  is  
a major factor in their abili ty to ei ther extricate the I sraeli s or pe r-
sist  in carving out a terri tory of their own somewhere in the 
Pale s tinian region . 
The concept of spacial control can also be expanded in two dif-
ferent ways . The American anthropo logi s t  Lewi s Henry Morgan in 
his classic 1878 work , Ancient Society,  saw two fundamentally di s tinct 
sorts of organization in the early development of man ' s  control of area : 
personal control and terri torial control . 
The first , in the order of time , is founded upon persons , 
and upon relations purely personal , and may be di s tinguished 
as a society • • •  The second is founded upon territory and 
property , and may be di s tinguished as a s tate • • •  Poli t ical 
society is organized upon terri to rial areas
1 
and deals 
wi th persons through terri torial relaeions . 3 
These two concep ts between personal and terri torial government contra s t  
in the Middle Eas t . Rule over men , regnum , is di fferent from rule over 
terri tory , dominium . 34 The trad i tional Arab socio-po li tical organization 
arose out of "group feeling " , asabiyah , suppo rted by kinship and tribal 
allegiance . Israel rules over the Wes t  Bank territory by its mili tary 
dominance ; however , the PLO rules over the Wes t  Bank peop le through a 
3 3Lewis H .  Morgan , Anci ent Society ( New York : Henry Holt Company , 1 8 7 8 ) ,  
P •  2 1 8 . 
34Edward F .  Bergman , Modern Poli tical Geography ( Dubuque : William c .  
Brown Company , 1 9 7 5) , p .  42 . 
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combination of  fear and iconography . 35  Even the King of Saudi Arabia ,  
a terri torially def ined state , governs through personal rela tions . The 
Saudi family ' s  rule is through approximately 5 , 000 male members in every 
tribe and corner of the kingdom .  Kenne th Boulding has sugge s ted 
adopting a worldwide regnum poli t ical sys tem "wherein po li tical un i t s  
claim jur i sdic tion over a def ined s e t  of citizens Wherever they might 
be , ins tead of territory no ma t ter Who is in it . " 36 The Pale s tinian 
region in 1983 , therefo re , can be de fined terri torial ly in both of the 
ways men tioned above . In the sense of the rule over terri to ry , the 
Pales tinian region is characterized by the four governmen ts  Wh ich control 
their respective states . In the sense of rule over men , the 
Pale s tinian reg ion is al so charac terized by the stateless Arabs who 
live in these four states and pers i s tently lay claim to parts of I srael . 
Given a cultural concept of terri toriali ty fo r the Pales tinian 
peop le living in set tlement pocke t s  wi thin the countries , Israel , 
Lebanon , Syria , and Jo rdan , I loosely def ine this as the Pales t inian 
region . 
For the purpo se of analys i s  and synthesis , this study fo cus e s  on 
the Pale s tinian reg ion and examines characteris tics of functional un i-
formi ty in terms of both homogenei ty ( language ,  common his tory , land-
use , family cus toms , religion , poli tical expectation , etc . )  and organ!-
zation ( drainage , movement , trade , circulation , government , and mili tary 
35Jos eph Alpher , "Why Begin Should Invi te Arafat to Jerusalem , " Foreign 
Affairs ,  6 0  ( Summer 1 9 82 ) :  1 1 1 6 . 
36Kenneth Boulding , " National Images and International Sys tems , "  Journal 
of Conflict Resolution 3 ( 19 59 ) :  123 . 
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securi ty . )  The following que s t ions of functional unifo rmi ty wi l l  be 
answered in the chapters ahead : Who are the Pale s tinians ? What is 
their common his to ry? Where do they live ? Wh ere do they des i re to 
live? Is there any di s tinction between Pales tinians and other Arabs ? 
What· binds them toge ther as a cultur e ?  Given nation-s tate status , what 
locat ion would provide op timum viabil i ty within the framework of the 
poli t ical si tuation of the reg ion? 
Reconnaissance commis sions and statesmen should understand that 
the fo rmation of poli tical area within the Pale stinian region involve s  
two bas ic as sumptions . The firs t is almo s t  axiomatic , wi th the prece-
dent being set numerous times this century , that out s ide forces wi l l  
mos t likely play an important role i n  the arbi tration/decis ion-making 
process . The Uni ted S tates and mo de rate Arab countries presently re tain 
this res pons ibility . The other assumption invo lve s the idea of self-
de termination . According to Jame s Downs , self-de termination is one of 
the ideas Which , unfo rtunately , has been accep ted rather uncri tically by 
people all over the world ( particularly the Middle Eas t )  wi thou t We s tern 
at tempts to eXport it . Downs maintains that the idea now is almo s t  
sacred , "Everyone has the right to self de termination , but no one yet 
has been able to set exact boundaries within which tha t right may be 
exerci sed . " 37 Jones ins i s t s  that the greate s t  di fficulty with self-
de termination in pract ice is that it make s "nationali ty the basic cri-
terion fo r territorial divi s ion in a world suf fering fr om too much 
37Jame s F .  Downs , Cultures in Crisis (London : Collier MacMillan 
Publi shers , 1 9 7 5 ) ,  p .  8 8 . 
na tionalism . " 38 Practical ly speaking , while cultural and lingui s t ic 
boundaries are seldom clear-cut , poli tical boundaries mus t be . 
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The debate over the idea of self-de termination has been rendered 
irrelevant today due to its acceptance in world society . National self­
determination was an expression of principle dur ing the Paris Conference 
of 1 9 1 9 . Woodrow Wilso n ' s Four teen Po ints contained broad sup po r t  fo r 
the self de termination concept ,  especially right s  of smal l nat ions . 
The pr inciple was la ter reiterated in the thi rd article of the Atlant ic 
Char ter of August 1 4 , 1 9 4 1 . In the 1 9 80s , self-de termination continues 
to be accep ted particularly because of  the turbulence and mi sery in 
areas where self-government has been denied . Reconnais sance commi s s ions 
will obviously need to cons ider the po li t ical des i res of the inhabi tants 
before allocating terri tory . 
As tensions over territo ry increase in this region over the unre­
solved Palestinian is sue , the need fo r knowledgeable , sens i tive sta­
tesmen is imperative . The ideas fo r es tabli shing a Pales tinian ent i ty 
must be carefully placed in light of the his torical , cultural and spa­
cial contexts . The reader mus t be caut ioned not to view thi s paper as a 
complete  his tory or an analysi s  of the Palestinian si tuation in order to 
make immediate judgement on a specific place fo r a homeland in the 
Middle Eas t . As a preliminary framework , however , this study can fo rm 
the infras tructure as a briefing fo r diplomat s  and those sent to this 
area as inves t igators . 
The firs t aspect to establish this framework and to depict the 
3�Jones , Boundary Making , p .  2 7 . 
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setting , is  the historical deve lopment of the Palestinians . The next 
three chap ters examine the vola tile period from 1 9 00 t o  the pr esent . 
Two major themes are interwoven throughout these chapters , the growth of 
Pale s t inian identity and national i sm ,  and the al location of poli tical 
space by out side fo rces . 
Those unfamiliar wi th the sho r t  but complex his tory of the 
Pale s tinians can best \Ulderstand the "general situat ion" by examining 
three di s tinct phases of their national sentiment. The first period is  
from shortly befo re World War I to the creation of the Israeli state in 
1948 .  The second identi fiable phase of Pale s tinian national maturation 
takes place from their disastrous los s  dur ing the firs t Arab-Israeli war 
in 1948 to the June 1967  Arab- Israeli War which caused massive di s place­
ment of people and los s  of terri tory . Dur ing the last phase from 1 9 6 7  
to  the present , the refugee s  began t o  crys talize into "Pales tinians " .  
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CHAPTER II 
FROM SYRIANS TO PALESTINIANS 
The current Middle Eas t  milieu is the produc t of his to rical pro-
ceases . Any effo rt  to reso lve current di f ficult ies wi thou t  an 
unders tanding of the pas t is doomed to failure . The creation of a 
pos s ible Pales tinian state requi re s  an awareness of the evo lution and 
nature of the Palestinian national identity .  
The basis fo r Pale s tinian identi ty can be traced through a common 
language , culture , and his tory prior to and fo llowing the emergence of 
I srael in 1948 . Befo re the twentieth century this Who le reg ion at the 
eastern end of the Medi terranean wh ich included the contempo rary states 
o f  Syria , Lebanon , Jordan and I s rael , was cal led S yr ia , a name given by 
ancient Greeks to the geographical land bridge that links three con-
tinents . His torians and poli t ical geographers refer to the term Greater 
Syria to deno te the area in the pre s tate period . The region was a 
marchland separat ing empires from all three continents and contribu ted 
to the theological background fo r mo s t  of the world . The his to rian 
Philip K .  Hi t ti noted : 
Especially because of the inclusion of Pales tine and 
Phoenic ia wi thin its ancient boundaries , it has made 
more signi ficant contribution to the moral and spiri tual 
progres s  of mankind than any other comparable land . 
Small as it  appears on a map or a globe , its  his torical 
impo rtance is boundless , its inf luence universal . "! 
A recurring theme in this reg ion ' s  his tory was the Eas t�We s t  
cultural interac tion . Phoenic ians compe t ed wi th the Greeks fo r trade 
1Philip K .  Hitt i , His tory o f  Syria (New York : McMillan , 19 5 1 ) ,  p .  1 .  
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dominance ; Greeks vied fo r powe r  wi th the Persians ; and Romans fought 
for control agains t the indigenous people.fo r centur ies . Dur ing the 
medieval period this compe t i tion intensi f ied as the religious po int of 
view became entangled in the que s tion of rights to the land . 
Chris tian Byzantines contended wi th Moslem Arabs , and later European 
crusaders fought wi th Muslim Arabs fo r land they al l held sacred . 2 
By the time wes tern powers divided the region after World War 
I ,  eighteen di fferent empires held dominion over the area . They were 
desert peoples , Hebrews , As syri ans , Neobabylonians , Greeks , Egyptians , 
Seluecids ,  Syrians , Romans , Hasmoneans , Romans , Byzantines , Muslims , 
Seljuq Turks , Chris tian crusaders (England and France ) ,  Mamluke s 
(Egyp t ) , Ottoman Turks , and Bri t i sh/French . This his toric dominat ion 
by fo reign powers over the people of Pales t ine fo r millennia creat ed 
an abso lute mis trus t  and hatred fo r the ou tsider . Viewed as we s tern 
foreigners , the European Jew who migrated into Palestine in five 
major waves during the las t  century became no t only the catalys t but 
the sustaining factor for Arab Nationali sm and unity .  
2carter , Syria, A Country S tudy , p .  4 . 
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Arab Nationalism and Zioni sm 
In the las t  two decades of the nineteenth century , two separate 
movements developed that were to  effect all the Middle Eas t , 
Pan-Arabism and Zionism. Both aimed at uni ting their peoples into a 
national homeland . They were to converge geographically in the land 
of Pales t ine where some hoped to achieve their expectations in a 
spirit of mutual accommodation . However , they were to prove incom-
patible . This is a major po int of this study . 
Arab nationalism and Z ionism de rive their origin from the 
worldwide his torical period in which the dominant characteris tic was 
the poli tical phenomenon known as nationali sm . Mos t  historians agree 
that thi s  phenomenon in its earli e s t  forms ad vanced more speedily in 
we s tern Europe than in the res t of the wo rld , taking place in the high 
Middle Age s  ( ca .  eleventh-fourteen th centur ies ) . This early fo rm of 
na tionali sm became known in the Wes t  as feudali sm and was charac-
terized according to Marc Bloch as an "interp lay of evo lving poli ti-
cal , economic and social arrangements , the to tal culture of the Middle 
Age s • .. 3 One lord commanded the loyalty and obedi ence of a small 
number of people generally at the provincial level far away from 
emperors and po pe s . Wi th improved communication and transportation 
( e .g . , roads and bridge s )  feudal societies declined , and major lords 
or king s increased their dominion over numerous provincial areas . As 
a result of increased commerce from di s tant places and the invention 
3Marc Bloch , cited by Boyd c. Shafer , Nationalism : Its Nature and 
Interpreters . ( Washing ton , D . C . :  AHA Pamphle t ,  1 9 7 6 ) ,  p .  19 . 
of  the pr inting pr ess , some would sugges t  that di fferences among 
people became mo re noticeable . A new poli tical organizat ion con-
sequently evolved , that of monarchical rule known as e tatisme ( ca .  
fifteenth-eighteenth centur i es ) . The further improvement of road s , 
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harbo.rs , and ships coupled wi th new bureaucracies ,  cour t s , and admi-
nis trative sys tems facili tated the age of nations and national i sm ( ca .  
1 789 to the present ) .  
In the twelve centur ies fo llowing the Arab conque s t s ,  Pale s t ine 
. " virtually dropped ou t of his to ry . " 4 Throughout the O t toman era from 
1 51 7  until the end of World War I ,  Pales tine was cons idered by the 
Constantinople government to be an unimportant backwa ter of the 
Turki sh empire . In 187 5 , a smal l  group of We s tern-or iented Muslim and 
Chris tian Arab intel lectual s in Beirut urged the study of Arab his tory , 
literature , and language in order to revive Arab identi ty . Secre t 
publications aroused an Arab consciousnes s by expos ing harsh O ttoman 
rule . At the same time a Jewi sh revival in Europe called fo r the 
return of the Jews of the Diaspo ra to their his toric home land . 5 Several 
Jewish intellectuals ,  impre ssed by the spread of nationali sm among 
Europeans , wrote  books and articles advocating Jewi sh nationali sm .  In 
4non Peretz , The Pale s tine S tate (New York : Kennika t Pres s , 1 9 7 7 ) ,  
P• 4 • 
5The Diaspora refers to Jews living in the scat tered communi ties 
out side Israel . The Jews have been scat tered in three major 
dispers ions : The Babylonian captivi ty 586 B . C . , after the de s truct ion 
o f  the 2nd Temple by the Romans in 7 0  A . D . , and the Bar Kokhba War in 
A . D .  1 32-1 35 . Josephus in 7 0  A . D . gives an eyewi tness accoun t of 
almo s t  1 , 000 , 000 Jews taken to all part s  of the Medi terranean in 
slavery . When the wo rd is applied in the lowercased fo rm ,  i t  usually 
pertains to non-Jews , such as Palestinian Arab refugees . 
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1 882 , Leo Pinsker , a Russ ian phys ic ian , publi shed his work ,  
Auto-Emancipation , wh ich expres s ed the view that Jews would neve r be 
able to integrate wi th the societies  they lived in because the 
societies were so thoroughly ant i-Seme tic . Borrowing from Pinsker , a 
journali s t  named Theodor Her z le , in his book , The Jewish State , argued 
that even if Jewi sh separatene s s  in religion and social cus tom were to 
disappear , the Jews would cont inue to be treated as unrespected 
s trangers . Herzl believed that a Jewi sh state could be founded as a 
"new Swi tzerland . " 6 
As a result of his book ' s favorable reaction among Jewry , Her z l  
convened the First Zioni s t  Cong r e s s  a t  Basel , Swi tzerland i n  1 8 9 7 . It s 
aim was the creation of a Jewi sh homeland in Pales tine , one secured by 
.public law . At the end of the congress  Herzl wrote in his diary : " In 
Basel I founded the Jewi sh State . If I were to say this aloud I would 
mee t  wi th general laughter ; but in another five years , and certainly in 
another fifty years , everyone wi l l  be convinced of this . . . .. 7 He wa s  
wrong by a year . 
Arab nationali s t s  also cal led fo r the rees tabli shment of Arab 
ident i ty . However , not all Arabs in the region shared identical sen­
t iments . Arabs from Jerusal em , Jaf fa , Nablus ,  and other Pales t ini an 
towns , regarded themselve s  as Syrians , not Palestinians . In 1 9 0 5  
Naj ib Azuri , a Pales tinian living i n  Pari s ,  publi shed a book enti tl ed 
Le Reveil de la Nation Arabe wh ich demanded a renewed Arab empire from 
6Nadav Safran , I srael The Embat t led Ally, p.  20 . 
7Peretz , The Palestine Stat e , p .  4 . 
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Mesopotamia to the Medi terranean . He introduc ed fo r the firs t time 
the inevitability of future Jewi sh-Arab confr ontation in the Middle 
Eas t . While nationalism wa s gaining momentum among both Arab and Jew ,  
entrenched in Palestine at the turn of the twentieth century wa s  the 
Ottoman Empire . The conflict between Arabs and Turks made the claim 
for terrf tory more complex , but m re importantl y ,  became the catalys t 
which trans fo rmed the Syr ian Arabs into Pales tinian Arabs . 
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The Ot tomans and World War I 
Syrian nat ionali sm developed jus t prio r to World War I in 
response to harsh . Turki sh policies . Though fellow MUslims (Turks are 
not Arab ) , the Cons tantinople government tried to centali ze admi-
nistration by intensi fying the " turki fication" of we s t ern Middle Eas t . 
Sultan Abdul Hamid I I  ( 18 76-1 9 09 ) ,  some time s known as Abdul Hamid the 
Damned , earned the reputation as the mo s t  oppr essive Ot toman sul tan in 
modern his tory . 8 Taxes became heavy and opponents di ed quickly .  He 
tried to obtain the loyalty of his sub ject s by ins tilling Pan- Islamic 
ideas and by completing the Hejaz Railway between I s tanbul and Medina 
in  1908 . However ,  the Sultan ' s  cruelty , coupled wi th that of his 
deputy in Acre , known in Syr ia as "The Butcher , "  set the stage for the 
emergence of an Arab identi ty . World War I set in mo tion events that 
began to congeal Arab National i sm .  
Arab oppo s i tion to the nationalizing po licies of the O t tomans 
s howed itself in two di fferent ways . One deve loped among intellectuals 
in  Cairo , Beirut , and Damascus . Demanding limi ted autonomy wi thin the 
O ttoman Empire , they fo rmed poli tical commi t tees that fo rmula ted the 
ideas of a new Arab nationali sm .  One such commi t tee was the Young 
Arab Society . 9 These po li tical groups were so on fo rced to operate as 
c landestine societies , especially where their obje ct ive became Arab 
Bcarter ,  Syria A Country S tudy , p .  2 0 . 
9Jamiyat a1 Arabiya al Fatat . This should no t be confused wi th the 
contemporary PLO organization , Al Fatah . 
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independence . The desert tribes of  Jordan and the Arabian Peninsula 
became the other fo rm of oppo s i tion to O t toman centrali zation . These 
nomadic tribes had a strong his to ry of resentment to fo reign control . 
The link between the urban intellectual commi t tees and the 
desert· tribesmen was Hus sein ibn Ali , the grand shari£ and amir of 
Mecca . He was the heredi tary cus todian of the Muslim ho ly places . 
Hussein , head of the Hashemite branch of the Quraysh tribe , claimed 
desc ent from the Prophet . 10 
Hus sein ' s two sons Abdullah and Faisal contacted the Arab 
national i s t s  in Syr ia and negot iated the so-called Damascus Pro tocal . 
The nationalists , who acknowledged Hussein as the "Father of the 
Arabs , "  accepted the Hashemi tes as spoke smen fo r the Arab cause in 
return fo r the promise to deliver them from the Turks . In February , 
1 91 4 ,  Abdullah vi s i ted C airo and inquired abou t the po s s ibili ty of 
Bri ti sh suppo rt  if his father should organiz e  a revolt agains t the 
Turks . Lord Ho ratio Ki tchener , the senior of ficer in Egypt wa s  non-
commi tal since Turkey was a fri endly powe r . When war broke out in 
Augus t ,  Ki tchener returned to Bri tain to become Secretary of State fo r 
war . In Cairo , Sir Henry MacMahon ,  Bri tish High Commi s sioner , became 
Ki tchener ' s successor and ma intained ext ensive ties wi th Hussein . In 
a let ter to MacMahon in July 1 9 1 5  Hus sein claimed the Arabian 
Peninsula , Palestine , Lebanon , Syr ia , and I raq fo r his future kingdom . 
1 0aobert Rinehart , Jordan, A Country S tudy , ed . Richard F .  Nyrop 
( Washing ton D . C . : American Univers i ty ,  1 9 8 0 ) ,  p .  1 7 . 
In his reply MacMahon declared British suppo rt  fo r po s twar Arab 
independence . l l  
3 6  
On the morning of May 6 ,  1 9 1 5  ano ther event happened that created 
uni ty wi thin the Arab peoples and had far-reaching ef fect s .  Jamal 
Pasha·; the O t toman governor of Syria tight ened his contro l by ruthle s sl y  
a t tacking and arres ting many members o f  the underground A l  Fatat . That 
morning , twenty-one Arabs were hanged in the city square s of Damascus 
and Beirut . Martyrs '  Day remains a national ho liday in Syria and 
Lebanon . 1 2  
In May 1 9 1 6 , the British and F rench concluded the secret 
Sykes-Picot agreement which formulated a po s t-war Arab state in Arabia 
and approved an accord for the internationalization of Jerusalem . 
Es sentially the arrangement carved up the Middle Eas t between these two 
powers , this only six months after vaguely promis ing Hussein an Arab 
kingdom . 1 3  
The O t toman Empire ' s  alliance wi th Germany threatened the 
geopoli tical left flank of Bri tain ' s  route to India through the Sue z  
Canal . When the Gallipo li campaign against Turkey failed ( a  frontal 
assault into central Turkey , )  Bri tain decided on a campaign from the 
South14 ( Map 5 ) . 
llibid . 
l 2car ter , Syria, A Country S tudy , p .  2 0 .  
1 3Richard F .  Nyrop , ed., Israel A Country S tudy , p .  3 1 . 
l 4wil liam B .  Quandt ,  The Poli tics of Palestinian Nationalism (Los 
Angeles : Universi ty of California Press , 19 7 3 ) ,  p .  7 .  
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In June 191 6 , Hussein launched the Arab revo lt agains t the O ttoman Empi re 
and , by October , proclaimed himself "King of the Arabs . " 1 5 Bri tain 
provided supplies , money , and ad vi so rs to help the Arab fo rces led by 
Abdullah and Faisal . T .  E .  Lawrence , Lawrence of Arabia ,  became one 
of the bes t  known adviso rs . 
Wi th Bri tish suppo r t , Hussein drove the Turki sh garrison out of 
Mecca in the opening weeks of the Arab revolt . Faisal ' s  forces cap-
tured Al Aqabah in July 1 9 1 7  and the Bri tish expedi tionary fo rce , 
under General S ir Edmund Allenby , entered Jerusalem in December . For 
Hussein , the campaign was a war of libera tion in which the Bri tish 
were actively cooperating wi th the Arabs . For the Bri tish command , 
however , the Arab army wa s  merely a supporting fo rce in the major 
Allied offensive in Pales tine . The Arabs were to draw Turkish at ten-
t ion to the Eas t Bank while Allenby concentrated on the re sis tance on 
the Wes t  Bank and Galilee in preparation fo r a strike on Damascus . In 
Sep tember 1918  the Bri tish army decis ively defeated the Turks at 
Megiddo . 1 6  Lawrence cap tured Daraa opening up Faisal ' s  oppo rtuni ty to 
cap ture Damascus . The O t toman gove rnment consented to an armis t ice on 
Octo ber 1918 , bringing the wa r  to a conclus ion in the Middle Eas t .  
The Hashemi te Family brought great honor , ird , to the Arabs of 
1 5The Allies cons idered him to be king of Hejaz , only . The eas tern 
peninsular Arabs , the Saudi s ,  rej ected the title. 
1 6Megiddo , located in cont emporary Israel , is a location of countl ess 
his to rical bat tles fought throughout milennia . Interes tingly , it  
forms the roo tword fo r the word Armaged don , a byword used through the 
c enturies to depict the ho rrors of war . Bibli cal escha tologi s t s 
maintain the final world bat tl e  wi l l  center here because of its 
s trateg ic approach to Jerusalem . 
3 9  
Pales tine and gave them a sense of un i ty .  It  is significant that 
Bri tain did much of the fighting we s t  of the Jordan Which became the 
Jewish state . The Arabs did much of the fighting eas t of the Jordan 
which became the Hashemi te Kingdom of Jordan . Arab nationali sm wa s  
fur ther stimulated when Bri tain recognized the national aspiration of 
another group , the Jews . 
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The Balfour Declarat ion 
In November 1 9 1 7  British Foreign Secretary Ar thur James 
Balfour wrote a le t ter to Zioni s t  leader Lord Lionel Rothschild con-
cerning the Jewi sh que s t  for a homeland . The le t ter became known as 
the Balfour Declaration and cons i s ted of one sentence : 
Hi s Maje s ty ' s Government view wi th favor the es tabli sh­
ment in Pales tine of a national home fo r the Jewi sh 
people , and will use their bes t  endeavours to facili tate 
the achievement of this object ; it being clear ly under­
s tood that no thing shall be done wh ich may prejudice 
the civil and religious rights of the exi s t ing nonJewi sh 
communi ties in Pales tine , or the rights and po li t ical s tatus 
enj oyed by Jews in any other coun try . 1 7  
This declaration laid the founda tion fo r the Jewi sh state . 
Although painstakingly worded , both sides  interpreted it di fferently .  
I t  contained two incompatible po ints , the es tabli shment in Palestine 
o f  a national home fo r the Jews and the pr eservation of the rights of 
the exi s ting Arab population . The Jewi sh communi ty in Palestine grew 
from 5 6 , 000 divided and bickering people , sca t tered in two dozen 
set tlements at the end of World War I ,  to a "disc iplined embryonic 
nation of 700 , 000 t hat was able to wi ths tand the combined assault of 
all the surrounding Arab states in 19 48 . " 18 This document also inten-
s ified the almo s t  abso lute hatred between Arab and I sraeli which 
remains af ter six decades . Although the Arabs had achieved a degree 
1 7Let ter from Arthur J .  Balfour to Lord Ro thschild approved by the 
War Cabinet  on 2 November 1 9 1 7  c i ted by Do reen Ingrams , Pales tine 
Papers, 1 9 17-1922 (New Yo rk : George Braz i l ler , 1 9 7 3 ) ,  p .  18 . 
1 8safran , Israel the Embat t led Ally, p .  2 4 � 
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o f  uni ty by ous ting the Turks , there exis ted no so lid Arab . nationa­
l i s tic sentiment throughout Pales tine . The Arab intellectual commi t­
t ees Which nego tiated wi th Hussein were few . Hus sein himself wa s  an 
outsider . The bond wh ich would unite the Arabs wa s  not internal , but 
s olely
. 
dependent on the hatred toward their common enemy , the Jew . 
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Post Wor ld War I Boundary Delimitation Polit ics 
The poli tical agreements signed after the war and the mecha­
nisms those agreem�nt s created bo th promo ted Arab nationali sm and 
s tifled it . At the Versail les Peace Confe rence , Woodrow Wilson asked 
that Arab claims to independence be given consideration , and the great 
powers asked Faisal to spe ak for Arab interes t s . He met wi th Chaim 
Weizmann of the Zioni s t  Organization and signed an agreement (wr i tten 
in Engli sh wi th T .  E .  Lawrence serv ing as his interpreter and advi ser ) 
pledging mutual cooperation under the Balfour Declaration . Faisal , 
however , wro te in Arabic on the document that he agreed in pr inciple 
to the provis ions , " Provided the Arabs shal l obtain their independence 
as demanded • • •  I shal l concur in the above artic les . Bu t if the 
s lightest modi fication or departur e  were to be made , I shall not then 
be bound by a single wo rd of the present Agreement . .. 19 B ecause Arab 
independence never ma terialized , mo s t  Arabs have held the agreement to 
be invalid . 
An American group called the King-Crane Commis s ion , appo inted by 
President Woodrow Wilson , inve s tigated the di spo s i tion of Ottoman terri­
tories and the assignment of mandates . After ext ensive boundary 
surveys in Palestine and S yr ia , the commi s s ion repo rted intense op po­
s i tion to the Balfour Declara tion among the Arab majority . They 
advi sed agains t permi tting unlimi ted Jewi sh migration or creati� a 
separate Jewi sh state . The commis sion submi tted its repo rt in 
1 9rngrams , Pales tine Papers , 1 9 1 7-1 922 , p .  5 5 . 
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Augus t 1 9 1 9 ; however , the conference did not consider it  and placed 
Bri tain in charge over Pale s t ine , the Eas t Bank , and Iraq . France 
became the manda tory powe r  over S yria and Lebanon . 20 
Hussein and his sons oppos ed the concep t of a manda te on the 
ground that Art icle 22 of the League of Nations Covenant adop ted at 
Versailles had endorsed Wilson ' s  pr inciple of self-de termination . The 
Arab leaders maintained that this artic le logically sup po rted the cause 
of Arab independence in Pales tine . Because Hus sein had been promised 
a realm , he had pledged his support fo r Jewi sh set tlement . Now that 
this promise had been denied , the Arabs felt betrayed . 
European rej ection of Arab independence and fear of Zioni s t  
aspirations , prompted the General Syrian Congress , i n  1920 , to 
proclaim independence wi th Fai sal as its King . Iraq also announced 
i t s  independence and proclaimed Faisal ' s  bro ther , Abdulla , as its 
King . The League of Na tions Council rejected bo�h pronouncements . 
France Lmmediately dispa tched troops and quelled the rebel lion by 
force , prompting Faisal ' s  exile . Thi s  failure to establi sh an inde-
pendent Arab state led to a un i fied desire by Arab leaders to reorient 
their Palestinian po li tical att ention . The Arabs began to unders tand 
European aspirations fo r economic colonies mo re clear ly . A reorien-
tation of the Hussein! famil y' s terri torial goals also was caused by 
the compet ing Arabs from the eas tern Arabian Peninsula . This pres sur e 
came as a result of the religious awakening among the eastern Arab 
20Rinehart ,  Jordan a Country S tudy ,  p .  19 . The King-Crane Commi s s ion ' s 
report was no t made public un til 1 9 22 . 
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Muslims known as the Wahhabiah2 1  ( Map 6 ) . 
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This reorientation toward cohes iveness became evident in the demands 
o f  the Third Arab Congr ess at Hai fa in 19 2 1 . This Congress di s pa tched 
a Muslim-Chri s tian de lega tion to London which emphasized the 
following : ( 1 )  fo rma tion of a national governme�t responsible to a 
parliament elected by the native po pula tion , Muslim , Chris tian , and 
Jewish;  ( 2 )  aboli tion of the Jewi sh national home pr incipl e ;  ( 3 ) 
cessation of Jewi sh immigration until the national government is 
formed , and decides on immigration po licy; ( 4 )  admini s trat ion of 
Pales tine to be governed according to prewar O t toman law , not the 
21J .  c. Hurewi tz , Middle Eas t  Pol i t ics : The Military Dimension (New 
York : Council on Foreign Re la t ions , 1 9 6 9 ) ,  p .  2 43 . The Wahhabi 
religious awakening wa s carried ou t by the Saud family . This 
conservative Muslim belief swep t  over all of Arabia and so on 
threa tened the Hussein! domination of the Hejaz . The Wahhabi 
denounced the numerous gods and saints which krept into the Muslim 
fai th . 
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pos twar Bri tish regula tions ; and ( 5 ) uni f ication wi th neighboring Arab 
s tates . 2 2  The Arabs contended , perhaps fo r the firs t time in a spirit 
of  uni ty , that it wa s  unjus t  to allow a minority to overrule a 
majority . They ma intained that the Arab occupat ion of Palestine from 
the seventh to the twentieth century presented a mo re valid his torical 
claim to the region than that of Zionism . The Arabs fur ther sugge s ted 
that Europe and America , in at tempting to correct soc ial jus tice in 
Europe , did so at Arab expense . The unified Arab Congress beli eved 
that the World War I pledge s to them were fo rmal agreement s and 
superior to the Balfour le tter Wh ich led to the Manda te . 23  Under 
unif ied Arab pressure , the Bri tish Colonial Office made preparations 
to delimit the boundaries of Pales tine . 
Several propo s als fo r boundaries we re presented by Jewi sh repr e-
s entatives and B ri tish di ploma t s . In November ,  1 9 1 8 , the Zioni st  
Organization propo s ed boundaries of  a Jewi sh homeland to the Foreign 
Office (Map7 ) fo r the attention of the Peace Conference : 
• • • In the No rth , the northern and sou thern banks 
o f  the Li tany River ,  as far north as la ti tude 3 3° 4 5 ' .  
Thence in a southeas terly direction to a point jus t south 
of the Damascus territo ry and close and west of the Hed jaz 
Railway . 
In the Eas t , a line close to and we s t  of the Hed jaz 
Railway . 
In the South , a line from a point in the neighbor­
hood of Akaba to E l  Arish . 
22Muslim-Chr is tian Delega tion statement , handed to the Colonial 
Secretary in London , Augus t 1 2 ,  1 9 2 1  ( CO 733/ 1 4 ) , cited by Le sch , The 
Politics of Pale s tinian Nat ionalism , p .  1 6 . 
2 3Nyrop , Israel a Country S tudy , p .  3 2 . 
In the Wes t , the Medi terranean Sea . 
The de tails of the delimi tation should be decided 
by a Boundary Commis sion , one of the members of Which 
s hould be a repre sentative of the Jewi sh Counc il fo r 
Palestine hereinafter mentioned . 
There should be a right of free access to and from 
the Red S ea , through Ak.aba , by arrangement wi th the Arab 
24 Government • • •  
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The Peace Conference came t� an end wi thout a treaty being signed wi th 
Turkey and wi thout a decis ion on the Pales tine boundaries . 
-
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At the same time , Ormsby-Go re , a British poli tical of ficer in 
Pales tine , sugge sted to the Foreign Office that Pale st ine should 
include those areas where "Jewi sh national consc iousness is expressed in 
the exi s ting Jewi sh colonies , and mus t  no t include any of those  areas 
such as Lebanon , Jebel Druze , or the Plateau of Trans-Jordania , where 
24zioni s t  Organization Propo sals to the British Foreign O f fice 
November 1918 ci ted by Ingrams , Palestine Papers , 1 9 1 7-1 92 2 , pp . 
5 2-53 . 
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the S yrian and
.
Arab consciousne s s  is  dominant . "  He sugge s t ed that the 
northern boundary of Pale s t ine be drawn from the mouth of the L i tani 
River due eas t to the Lake Huleh marshes (Map 8 ) . 
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The eastern boundary should be along the we s tern slopes of the hil ls 
which rise ou t  of the Jordan Valley . He fur ther advi sed making the 
southern boundary a line drawn due eas t  from Rafah to the Dead S ea . 2 5  
2 5ormsby-Gore , Proposal t o  the Foreign Office ( 371/3 39 5 )  Augus t 1 9 18 
ci ted by Ingrams , Pales t ine Papers, 1 9 1 7-1922 , p .  3 8 . 
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As the ba sic decis ions concerning the terri torial al location had 
· not even been concluded , Bri tish Pr ime Minis ter , Lloyd George cal led a 
mee ting on Sep tember 1 0 ,  1 9 1 9 , to di scuss the que s t ion of frontiers . 
Pre�ent at thi s meeting wa s  the Prime Mini s ter , Field Marshal Allenby , 
High Commis s ioner in Egyp t  Major-General S ir John Shea , and other 
representative s from the War O f f ice and the Cabinet . The di scu s s ion 
that  took place (Appendix C )  clearly reveals the British mo t iva t ion fo r 
Pales tine invo lvement -- s tra tegic mili tary pro tect ion fo r the Suez 
Canal and world-wide pre s t ige . 26  
In  March 192 1 ,  Wins ton Churchil l ' s  conference in  Cairo sub-
divided the Palestine Mandate along the Jordan River-Gulf of Aqaba 
Line (Map 9 ) . The eas tern po rt ion was cal led Trans jordan , admi-
nis tered by Arabs wi th Abdullah as amir . A Bri tish memorandum in 
S ep tember 1 92 2 , approved by the League of Nat ions Council , excluded 
Jewish se t tlement eas t of the Jordan . The fur ther truncation of the 
t erri tory orig inally promi sed as a Jewi sh homeland ( three- four ths of 
the orig inal Palestine area was severed fo r Trans jordan ) sought to 
satisfy Bri tish wartime pledge s and stabilize the region . 2 7  
The European al lies ( Bri tain in the case of Pales tine )  thus 
unilaterally drew the boundaries and , in the Arab view ,  retained a 
26Minutes taken 1 0  Sep tember 1 9 1 9  at Mano ir de Clair 
fontaine-Hennequeville , Traville , France , cited by Ingrams , Pales t ine 
Papers, 1 9 17-1922 , pp . 7 5-78 . 
27Meir , " In Search of La s ting Peace , "  p .  4 50 . 
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certain measure of responsibility in reso lving the deep-seated 
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problems . When Britain abdicated this responsibili ty to the Uni ted 
Nations later in 1948 ,  the experience left  a deep bi tterness agains t 
the West  and an inclination toward uni ty due to colonial exploi tation . 
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Between the Wars 
British rule in the period between the world wars created the 
c limate which brought the Palestinian Arab society toge ther at leas t 
in loose form . When the British mili tary turned over the government 
in Palestine to civil servants in 1920 , the population consis ted of 
8 3 , 000 Jews , 589 , 000 Muslims , and 7 1 , 000 Chris tians . In the 1920s , 
the Arab population swelled and moved to ci ties in the we s tern portion 
of the country . As more people became social ly and poli tically 
interdependent , a dis tinguishable stratification of society evolved . 
Three groups composed the Arab society : the "effendi " or governing 
c las s , the urban profess ionals , and the " fellahin , "  or peasant farmer . 
The small  aristocracy of Muslim landowners , known earlier among 
the Turks as the "effendi , "  or notables , dominated Arab society . They 
were weal thy , well educated , and pos sessed a Wes tern sophis tication 
due to their extensive European contacts . Although they played a 
s ignificant part in Pales tinian his tory , traditional rivalries among 
the leading families hindered their cohesion as a poli tically effec­
t ive class . The two mo s t  notable groups or families were the Husainis 
and the Nashashibis . These influencial landowners had assumed 
leadership during the O ttoman years and continued that leadership in 
the Bri tish Mandate . They contro lled the organized po li tical , reli­
gious , and social li fe of the Arab communi ty . 
The next class of influence consis ted of urban professionals 
and businessmen . They controlled the few small industries , owned 
frui t groves in the plains , and operated the local newspapers . This  
5 1  
class general ly cooperated wi th one or another of the notable Muslim 
families . A number of middle class  professionals , phys icians , 
lawyers , edi tors , and government employees , were Chris tian . The two 
non-Arab foes , the British and Jews , lessened the tradi tional social 
dis tance· between Muslim Arabs and Chris tian Arabs . 
The last  group , which const i tuted the majority of Pale stinians , 
were called fellahin or peasant . They worked as hired laborers on the 
estates of the effendi class .  Some owned small agricultural plots . At 
the lowest  social level were the Bedouin desert nomads .  Largely 
pastoral and clinging to desert culture these "badu" consis ted of 
approximately 1 00 , 000 people . Technological and social change s 
decreased their influence and impo rtance to the development of 
Pales tinians west  of the Jordan . 28  
These three component s of  the Arab society remained separated 
throughout the inter-war period . Their failure to bond brought abou t 
rising expectations , poverty , and frustration . The fellahin were 
overwhelmingly rural wi th three-fourths of them living in the 
countryside . 29 The barrennes s  of the soil , antiquated agricultural 
methods ,  outdated land ho lding sys tems , and an ever increas ing popula-
tion growth rate impoverished the fel lahin . 29 In 1939 the 
Johnson-Crosbie report showed that 30 percent of rural families were 
28Peretz , The Pales tine State , p .  6 .  
29The land laws of the MUslim culture has led to extensive fragmentation 
of property . Unlike the European practice of primogeni ture , the Arabs 
continued to divide land among generations of inheritors . Sometimes 
this divis ion resulted in one family cultivating a hundred plots  scat­
tered widely around a village . 
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landless and that they had less than the minimum required caloric 
intake . In contras t  to the fellahin , it  w.as not unusual fo r the 
wealthy Pales tinian families  to own between 3 0 , 000 and 60 , 000 dunams 
( a  dunam � �4 acre ) . In the entire country ,  the 2 50 large s t  landowning 
families- owned about the same amoun t of land as 60 , 000 peasants .  This 
concentration of the land to the hands of the few forced large numbers 
of small farmers and landless peasants to the ci ties to search fo r 
employment .  This resulted in a rapid process of urbanizat ion Where 
the Arab city increased by 85 percent between 1931  and 1 944 . Haifa ' s  
Arab population grew by 87  percent between 1922  and 1 93 1 . Jaffa ' s  
grew by 6 3  percent . The increase in urbanization wa s  too rapid fo r 
the towns to handle and result ed in poverty and di scouraged expec-
tations among the poor . The 1935  Haifa population , fo r example , con­
tained 1 1 , 160 Arab workers living in 2 , 500 gasoline-can huts . 30 
Only the middle class and new indus triali sts  benefi tted economically , 
while the majority lived in poverty and de stitution . It was this urban 
unemployed who contributed to unres t and ul timately to riots . 
Serious rio.ts  began as early as 1 920 and 1921 . The Bri tish 
replied the fo llowing year wi th a new interpretation of the Balfour 
Declaration known as the Churchill White Paper . This document 
excluded Trans jordan from Jewi sh settlement ( See Post WW I Boundary 
Delimitation Poli tics ) .  The paper stated that the Jewi sh communi ty in 
Pales tine was there "as of right , not on sufferance , "  and that its 
30Joel s .  Migdal Pales tinian Society and Politics (New Jersey : 
Princeton University Press , 1980 ) , p .  26 . 
development did not mean the impo s i tion of Jewish nationali ty and 
culture on the previous inhabi tants of the land .3 1 
As a result , seven years of comparative peace ensued in 
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Pales tine . However ,  in 1929 , Arab religious and national feeling re­
surfaced over a conflict involving the Wailing Wal1 .32 Attacks by 
Arabs on the Jewi sh population resulted in two more British inve stiga-
t ive commissions : the Shaw Royal Commission in 1 929 and the 
Hope-Simpson Royal Commission in 1930 . Both recognized that the basic 
problem was the conflicting goal s of Zionism and Arab nationalism .  
They recommended qualifications and restrictions on Jewi sh immigration , 
favoring the rights of Arabs over those  of Jews . 
Once again there w.as a seven-year period of relative peace 
followed by another outbur s t  of Arab violence . The Arab outburst  
occurred primarily because of  their rising fears of becoming a 
minori ty in the area (Table 1 ) . Jewi sh population had increased drama­
tically following Hitler ' s  rise to power .33 In addi tion to natural 
increase and legal immigrations , many illegal �!grants were entering 
the country , aided by the Jewi sh guerrilla band known as the Irgun . 
3 1rngrams , Palestine Papers , 1 9 1 7-192 2 ,  p .  165 . 
32The Wailing Wall or Wes tern Wall  is the only remaining part of the 
2nd Jewish Temple des troyed in A . D .  7 0  by the Roman General , Titus . 
It  became the mos t holy shrine to the Jews wi th worshippers weep ing 
and placing wri tten prayers wi thin the cracks of limes tone . The 
Jews have been denied access  to The Wall fo r 19  centur ies until 
their seizure of Old Jerusalem in 1967 . The wall is ad jacent to the 
Dome of the Rock , ho ly to MUslims . 
33The Jewish Agency submi tted an application for 1 1 , 200 Jewi sh visas in 
the semi-annual immigration schedule April-September 1936 . 
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Table 1 .  Popula tion E s timates fo r Pale s tine , Selected Years , 18 00-1939  
( in thousands )  
Jewish 
Year Jews % Arabs Total 
1 800 5 2 255 260 
1880 . .  24  5 . 3 426 450 
1914  85  1 2 . 4  600 685 
1917  50 7 . 5  610 660 
192 2  84 1 1 . 1  668 752  
*1935 320 25 . 4  941 1 , 26 1  
1939 445 29 . 7 1 , 056 1 , 501  
*note the rapid rise 
Source : Israel A Countrl Studz by Richard Nyrop , ed . 
In order to combat the Jewi sh �igration , strike commi t tees 
formed in the cities of Nablus ,  Jaffa and Jerusalem in November 1935 . 
In the same month the first Pales tinian guerrilla group , a forerunner 
of al-Fatah , was fo rmed . It wa s  led by Shaikh Izz al-Din al-Qas im ,  
who has since been Lmmortali zed as the founder of Pales tinian Arab 
resis tance . Under slogans of mili tant pan-Arabism,  anti-Westernism , 
and anti-Zionism , Qas im organized a revolt combining the landles s  
fellahin and urbari proletariate agains t the British and Jews . 34 
Although the upris ing wa s  quickly crushed by British authorities , he 
helped to create a Pales tinian identity . 
Organized Arab oppo s i tion to the British and Jews generally 
tended to coalesce around the notable families . Membership tended to 
be determined by family ties rather than on individual po li tical 
consc iousness . The Husain! family became the more dominant when one 
34Peretz , The Palestine State , p .  1 6 . 
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o f  them, Haj j Amin ,  became Muft i  of Jerusalem and President of the 
Supreme MUslim Council , the ruling religious and po litical body . The 
pos i tion gave them acces s  to the entire Muslim communi ty and con­
s iderable financial suppo r t . The Nashashibis ,  on the other hand , 
although a less pres tigious family ,  commanded an extensive fo llowing 
in the new , rising middle class .  Ci trus growers , small 
indus trialists , and merchants gave their support  to the Nashashibis , 
whose goal was the capi tal development of the country . They viewed 
compromise wi th the Bri ti sh autho ri ties as the quicke s t  way to indepen­
dence . By the late 1930 ' s  several other parties manifested themselves  
around other prominent families . The Reform Party associated wi th the 
Khalidi family;  the Nat ional Bloc centered around a grouping of 
leaders from the city of Nablus ; and the Congress Execut ive of 
Nationalis t  Youth ( an organization encouraging participation of youth 
in the Nationali s t  movement)  focused around a well-known Ramlah 
family . The Istiq lal ( independence ) Party had a following in Jenin 
and Nablus and was led by Awni Bey , a Jerusalem lawyer . 
The Is tliqlal par ty was the only one that developed a po li tical 
program . Composed of the young Musl im intelligentsia , ( lawyers , 
teachers ,  phys icians and government of ficial s )  the party advocated the 
merger of all Arab states . It s chief aim was immediate and ful l inde­
pendence from the foreign powers wi th Pales tinian unification wi th 
Syria . The party opposed family interests  and feuds because families 
prevented uni ty for liberation . The fo rmation of the Is tliqlal in 
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1932 was a harbinger of conflict wi th the Husainis . 35  Ult ima tely , 
Pales tine contained seven major parties ; all basically agreed on the 
national goal of independence but were divided on the path . 
The part·ies obtained a peak of unity during 1 936 , when miracu-
lously,  ·all the previously divided families and parties joined in an 
economic boycot t  of the Jewish Yishuv ( the entire Jewish communi ty in 
Pales tine) . Gradually the strike developed from sporadic act s  of 
vio lence to open rebellion , especially in the rural hil l dis tric t s  of 
southern and central Pales tine ( later known as the Wes t  Bank) . Here 
armed bands of guerrillas  derailed trains , barricaded and mined road s , 
and cut telephone wi res . They even cut the oil pipeline from Iraq . 
Joined by volunteers from Iraq and Syr ia and led by experienced 
guerrilla leaders , the rebels sniped at urban traffic , Bri tish 
soldiers and police , and assaulted outlying Jewish village s ,  set ting 
fire to fores ts and crops . Arab guerrillas des troyed 1 3  Jewi sh-owned 
factories and workshops valued at more than $ 500 , 000 ; thirty-eight 
o thers located in Jaffa shut down under pressure . 36 
The economic and guerrilla act ion taken agains t the Yi shuv wa s  
s evere . The construction of new buildings  slackened , Arab worke rs on 
Jewish citrus farms left ,  and di fficult ies wi th transportation adver-
s ely effected commerce . The Arab communi ty ,  however , suffered even 
greater losses than the Yi shuv . Jaffa , the most  thriving Arab town , 
3 5 Ibid • , p .  1 5  • 
36J .  c.  Hurewi tz , The Struggle for Palestine (New York : w. w. Norton 
and Company , 1 9 50 ) , pp . 7 0-72 . 
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los t much of  its harbor traffic and most of  its  commercial and 
. industrial enterprise . Coupled wi th dis tress in agriculture , 
unemployment rose  sharply throughout Palestine wi th the interruption 
of touri s t  trade and bus iness .  In the villages , the fellahin not only 
had to give up the Jewi sh lucrative market , but also had to incur the 
cos t s  of billeting the guerrillas . Arab ci trus growers perhaps 
f inanced the rebellion more than any other single group , and wi th 
the approach of the fall  citrus season , they brought pressure on 
the Arab Higher Commi t tee to slacken the resistance . 37 
The hopelessness of the armed conflict and economic posi tion 
reflected the weakening of Arab po li t ical uni ty . The firs t signs of 
intra-communal strife appeared between families when they took the 
opportuni ty to seek revenge among themselves fo r old grievances . The 
murders of Nas ser al-Din Nashashibi , deputy mayor of Hebron , Haj j 
Khalil Taha , chairman of the Jaf fa National Commi ttee and Michel 
Mitrie , head of a Jaffa trade union were examples of this intertribal 
war of revenge . 38 This intertribal warfare typifies the role family 
grievances has played in thwarting Palestinian uni ty . ( See society 
analysis , Chapter V ) . A promise  of a British investigation , finally 
brought a semblance of peace to the country . 
The British di spatched the Peel Royal Commi ssion in 1937 to 
inves tigate this upris ing . The Peel Commission ' s exhaus tive repo rt 
3 7Ibid . 
38Peretz , The Palestine State , p .  1 7 .  
in 1937 , stated unequivocally tha t the Arab grievances about Jewi sh 
immigration and land acquis ition we re correct . The mandatory ' s 
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failure to allow self-governing ins ti tutions , "cannot be regarded as 
legitimate under the terms of the Mandate . "  However ,  the commission 
warned that the obligations to the Jews could only be fulfilled by a 
po licy of British repression agains t the Arabs . The group concluded 
that the Palestinian Arabs we re commi tted to national independence , 
s ince their surroundi ng Arab neighbors had already experienced self­
rule . Equally assertive , the Pales tine Jews were also vigorously 
pursuing the goal of a national home . The Commission considered the Jew 
and Arab posi tions as irreconcilable and the Pales tine Mandate ( begun in 
1 92 3 ) unworkable . 39 Peel recommended parti tion of Palestine into Jewi sh 
and Arab states . 
The Peel Commission recommended that the Jewi sh state comprise 
the Galilee , the Jez reel Valley , and the Coas tal Plain to a po int midway 
between Gaza and Jaffa (Map 1 0 ) . This represented about 20 percent of 
the area of Palestine . The British would maintain a Manda te over 
Jerusalem , Bethlehem and Nazare th ( to protect the Holy Places ) ,  a narrow 
corridor from Jerusalem to the Coas t ,  and the principle heterogeneous 
towns of Safad , Tiberias , Acre , and Haifa . The Arabs would receive al l 
t he rest  of the area which would also include Transjo rdan . The British 
Government is sued a White Paper express ing general agreement wi th the 
findings . 
39Hurewi tz , The Struggle for Palestine , p.  7 3 .  
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• • • irreconcilable conflict  between the aspirations of 
Arabs and Jews in Pales tine • • • canno t be satis fied under 
the terms of the present Mandate , and that a scheme of 
parti tion on the • • •  [ sugge s ted ]  lines • • •  represents the 
best and mo s t  hopeful solution of the dead lock . 40 
The plan came under fire in both houses of Parliament which recom-
mended that the issue be given to the League of Nations . The 
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Twentieth Zionist Congress also rej ected the proposed boundaries , but 
agreed in principal to parti tion . 
Wi th old quarrels weakening concensus , the Palestine Arab 
Communi ty had difficulty weighing the par tition plan . Four days pr ior 
to  the release of the repo rt , the Na tional Defense Party (Nashashibi 
Family) dissociated itself from the Higher Commi ttee , composed of a 
coali tion of religious leaders and wealthy families . The spl i t  occurred 
primarily because Raghib al-Nashashibi , the party ' s  president and 
Adullah , ruler of Trans jordan , favored the partition . Abdulla wa s  alle-
gedly mo tivated to expand his lands , while Nashashibi aspired to high 
office . 
Nevertheless , other Arabs considered parti tion incompatible 
wi th Arab national interes ts . Ob jections to the proposal were 
numerous . The Peel Commis s ion was awarding the most  fertile and deve-
loped part of the country to the Jews4 1 ·. A subs tantial proportion of 
40Bri tish Whi te Paper , 1 9 36-3 7  (md . 5 5 13 , cited by Hurewi tz , The 
Struggle for Palestine , p .  7 6 . 
41The Jezreel Valley , allocated to the Jews , is considered the bread 
basket of Israel . Its development in the firs t 3 decade s of the 
1 900s from swamps and clogged rivers to a productive farm area is 
attributed to the early Jewi sh pioneers and not Arab farmers , whom 
the Jews maintain , let it de teriorate fo r centuries . 
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Arabs were  to be subjected to  Jewi sh rule ;  ye t the holy places and 
many Arab villages  were to be placed under permanent manda te .  In the 
proposed Jewish state , the Arabs held title  to four time s as much land 
as the Jews . Seven-eights of the Arab-owned citrus grove s would also 
be located there . The Arab town of Jaffa would be completely iso­
lated . The Arabs would also have to worry about the Jewi sh expansion 
into the mandate zones . Significantly ,  the Peel Partition Plan , 
although challenged by all three participating groups , was the firs t 
attempt to define a Palestinian state . 
In spite of the opposit ion , the British government approved the 
plan and sent a technical demarcation team to make a detailed plan . 
This team , called the Woodhead Commis sion, tasked wi th the reali ties 
of dividing Arab and Jewi sh lands , reversed the Peel Commission ' s  f in­
ding s  and reported in November 1937  that partition was 
impracticable . 42 They were confronted wi th the problem of either 
relocating large numbers of people or reversing the Peel decision . 
The Bri tish government then returned to the concep t  of trying to 
accommodate both Arab and Jew by calling a summi t to break the 
deadlock .  
Meanwhile , inter-Arab hos tili t ies continued , caused by Husain! 
a ttempts to get all Pales tinians to fo llow their lead . Husain! 
followers executed several hundred fellow Arabs and subjected many 
o thers to intimidation and abduct ion , especially the Nashashibi s .  
42Nyrop , Israel A Country Study, p .  3 5 .  
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Many Arabs left the country . 43 By 1938 , Husaini-organized guerril la 
bands had taken over large areas of the country including Hebron , 
Beersheba , and the Old C i ty of Jerusalem wi th its ho ly places . To 
improve the rebels '  mobility , Arab religious leaders read an edic t  in 
every mosque to abandon the tradi tional red fez and adop t the native 
headcloth or kafiyah wo rn by the fellahin and Bedouin . The kafiyah 
became a symbol for Pales tinian national identity and is stil l  used by 
present day PLO commandos . However , dissention wi thin guerrilla ranks 
coupled wi th the usual po li tical fragmentation weakened the nationali s t  
efforts . The British suppressed the rebellion by the end of the year . 
Many insurectionist  leaders such as Haj j Amin , Mufti of Jerusalem , and 
o ther notables were deported . 
International crisis , in 1939 , overshadowed another conference 
in London . Hi tler had just annexed Czechoslovakia and Bri tish leaders 
realized war was inevitable . In this context Bri tain ' s  pr imary con­
cern was to protect the oil flow from the Middle East which required 
Arab goodwill . The conference failed to achieve Arab or Jewi sh satis­
faction and the White Paper that fo llowed extended British rule over 
Pales tine fo r another ten years . The paper ' s  purpose was to transfo rm 
the Mandate into an independent , predominantly Arab Palestine wi th a 
cons ti tution pro tecting Jewish rights .  In the interim , Jewi sh 
immigration was limited to 7 5 , 000 in the firs t five years , after 
which it would depend on Arab consent . 44 
43Hurewitz , The Struggle for Pales tine , p. 93 . 
44safran , Israel the Embattled Ally,  p .  30 .  
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Britain ' s  issuance of the Land Trans fer Regulations divided 
Pales tine into three zones (Map 1 1 ) . The regulations prohibi ted the 
sale of Arab-owned land to Jews in 6 3% of the land area comprising 
the hill country and the predominantl y Arab subdi s tricts of Jaffa , 
Gaza , and Beersheba . Uncontrolled land transfers could occur in the 
Coas tal Plain ( 5% of the country ) . The res tricted zone limi ted Jewi sh 
purchases only from non-Palestine Arabs ( 31% of the c�untry . ) 45  
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45nurewitz , The Struggle for Palestine , p. 1 36 . 
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As a result of the 1936-3 7 Arab revolt and the subsequent 
Briti sh decisions over the next four ye ars , the sponsors of the Arab 
revolt obtained two major po li tical victories : 1 )  the admission by 
Britain that the Palestine Mandate wa s  unworkable and 2 )  the di smi ssal 
of  the -Peel partition scheme even befo re any attempt was made to bnple-
ment it . The Arabs had learned that the use of violence as a po li tical 
weapon got results , especially when other methods had failed . This had 
far reaching consequences in the Palestinian movement fo r the next 
three decades When extremism would be the only op tion they would pursue . 
Relative calm marked the early 1 940s wi th the Arabs acquiesc ing 
t o  their political victories . During World War I I , Pales tine 
experienced tremendous prosperity . Bri tain expended a great deal of 
money to expand the economy in both agricultural and industrial sec-
tors . However , growing prosperity also brought about indi fference 
among the Arab nationali s t  parties . The Jews had been held back 
causing a decrease in Arab poli t ical act ivism . The war , however ,  
brought some fundamental attitude changes in favor of the Jews among 
the world community . The Yi shuv , the Jewi sh community in Pales tine , 
had made an important contribution to the war effort . 46 The wo rld was 
horrified at  the fantas tic extent of  Jewi sh genocide by the Nazi s .  
46Palestinian Jews provided 3 2 , 000 volunteers fo r the Bri tish fo rces . 
In 1944 their effort was rewa rded by the es tablishment of the Jewi sh 
Brigade Group , an independent fighting fo rmation , which saw service in 
I taly . In 1942 when Rommel wa s  at El Alamein and the Vichy French 
s till controlled Syria , Jewi sh forces were organized in Pales tine to 
carry out resistance in the event the Germans overran the coun try . 
This organized mili tary greatl y gave the Jewish forces an advantage in 
1 948 over the di sunited Arabs . 
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President Truman consequently exerted pressure on the British gove rn­
ment to allow 1 00 , 000 survivors from Nazi extermination camps 
admis sion to Palestine . 47 An American Commission examining the 
Palestinian question recommended their entrance and the British 
government finally agreed , contingent upon the disarming of Arab and 
Jew illegal armies . This wo rld sentiment in favor of the suffering 
Jew reawakened Arab fears of Jewi sh dominance in Pales tine and fo rced 
the British to consider fur ther changes . 
After another commit tee , another plan , and ano ther conference , 
the "question" got nowhere and tension between terroris t organiza tions 
in Palestine increased . The Haganah (Jewi sh underground army under 
Yishuv leadership) participated in sabotage and orchestrated the 
operation of numerous unauthorized �grant ships . The Bri tish 
declared martial law, implaced a curfew , and arres ted Yishuv leaders . 
Another Arab-Jewi sh-Bri tish conference collapsed and the Bri tish 
decided on April 2 ,  1 947 to place the whole Pales tine Problem befo re 
the United Nations . 
47Safran , Israel , the Embat tled Ally , p .  3 1 .  
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United Nat ions Partition 
A special session of the Uni ted Nations General Assembly met on 
May 1 5 , 1947 ,  and appo inted a United Nations Special Commi ttee on 
Pales tine (UNSCOP ) .  The Commission consisted of an eleven-nation 
investigative board composed of Aus tralia , Canada , Czechoslovakia ,  
Guatemala , India , Iran , Netherlands , Peru , Sweden , Uruguay , and 
Yugoslavia . UNSCOP conducted hearing s throughout Palestine for six 
months under tremendous pressure . One major obs tacle was Arab intran-
s igence ; the Higher Committee led by Jamal al-Husaini ordered all 
Arabs to ''abs tain from collaboration [wi th] and desist  from appearing 
before" UNSCOP . 48 Several prote s t  strikes in the Arab comml.Uli ty also 
ensued . Jewish terrorism during this time period increased as  never 
befo re . The British hanged four Jewi sh Irgunists  at Acre priso n ,  and 
less than three weeks later , the Irgun blas ted open the pr ison walls 
releasing 2 5 1  inmates . Five of the Jewi sh terrorists  were captured ;  
three received a death sentence . A few days later the Irgun abduc ted 
two British sergeants and warned that if the sentence agains t the 
Irgunists  was carried out ,  the sergeants would receive the same . 
Britain had given in twice to similar threats earlier in the year , But 
this time they remained reso lute and executed the Irguni s ts in  July , 
1 947 .  The bodies of the sergeants were found by authorities two days 
later .49 
48Lt . Col . Netanel Lorch , Israel ' s  War of Independence (Hartford : 
Hartmore House Inc . ,  1 961 ) , p .  6 
49Hurewi tz , The Struggle for Palestine , p .  29 0 .  
UNSCOP received tes timony in Beirut from six Arab league 
s tates . SO Hamid Bey Franj iyyah , the Lebanese Foreign Minister , 
speaking for the Arab government , warned that "the parti tion of 
Pales tine and the creation of a Jewi sh State would result only in 
bloodshed and unrest  throughout the entire Middle East . .. 5 1  In 
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addi tion to gathering info rmation i n  the region ,  the Commi ttee later 
toured the Jewish Disposses sed Perso ns Camps in Germany and Austria . 
The Committee recommended twelve guiding principles . The fo llowing 
were the most  significant : 
( 1 )  The Mandate should be terminated wi th independence 
granted as early as practicable . 
( 2 )  The poli tical structure  of the new state or states 
should be representative in nature . 
( 3 )  Economic uni ty of Pales t ine is indi spensable . 
( 4 ) The sacred character of the ho ly places must be 
preserved . 
( 5 )  The General Assembly should initiate immediately an 
international arrangement for solving the problem of 
250 , 000 displaced Jews in Europe . 
( 6 )  The so lution fo r Pales tine cannot be considered 
a solution fo r the general Jewish problem . 52  
However , the Commi ttee was divided on the appropriate applica-
50The Arab League was fo rmed in Cairo in 1945 as an outgrowth of a 
vis ion fo r a unified Arab Nation . Or iginal ly composing Transjordan , 
Egypt , Syria , Lebanon , Saudi Arabia , Iraq , and Yemen , it remains 
today an association of sovereign Arab states wi thout any real 
unifying pr inciple other than its  oppo si tion to a Jewi sh State . 
5 1 Ibid , P• 29 5 .  
52uNSCOP , Report I ,  4 2-46 (The Twelve Principles ] ,  cited by Hurewi tz , 
The Struggle for Palestine , p .  29 5 .  
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t ion of these principles . The majority ( delegates of  Canada , 
Czechoslovakia , Guatemala ,  Netherlands , Peru , Sweden ,  and Uruguay) 
recommended partition . The minority ( delegates of India , Iran , and 
Yugoslavia) recommended federali sm . The delegate from Australia 
abs tained . The minori ty believed parti tion unworkable and anti-Arab . 
They suggested a strong central government wi th a bicameral legi sla-
ture . 
The majority plan , po li tical parti tion wi th economic union , 
basically envisioned independent Arab and Jewish states wi th an inter­
nationalized zone of Jerusalem (Map 1 2 ) . The Arab area was to 
comprise western Galilee , the hil l  country of central Palestine ( the 
Wes t  Bank) , wi th the exception of the Jerusalem area , and the Coastal 
Plain from Isdud to the Egyptian border . The Jewish territory wa s  to 
consist  of eas tern Galilee , the northern Coas tal Plain from a point 
south of Acre to one north of Isdud ( including the Arab town of 
Jaffa) , and the Negev Desert . Jerusalem and Bethlehem wi th their 
rural suburbs were to come under a Uni ted Nations permanent 
t rus teeship . Economic un i ty of the country was to continue fo r ten 
years wi th common cus toms , currency , and communications . UNSCOP also 
recommended the formula tion of a joint economic plan in the areas of 
irriga tion , so il conservation , and land reclamation . 53 
The U .  N. General Assembly vo ted on the Pales tine issue af ter 
1 4 meeting s  and 24  days of open discuss ion in which the Arab Higher 
Commit tee and the Jewi sh Agency partic ipated . The Arab states 
53Ibid , pp . 29 7-298 . 
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rej ected both partition and federali sm plans and advocated a uni tary 
Arab Palestine state . The Jewi sh Agency formally accepted UNSCOP ' s  
parti tion plan . After modi f ication , the General Assembly voted in 
favor of parti tion 
·
by a vote of 3 3  to 1 3 . 54 
�efinement of the plan chiefly concerned questions of boun-
daries . The proposed Jewish state was reduced from 6 , 000 to 5 , 500 
s quare miles Which equalled roughly 55 percent of the total Pales tine 
land area . The most  significant territorial changes included the 
transfer to the Arab s tate of the city of Jaffa and 500 , 000 acres of 
Negev land including the ci ty of Beersheba . 55  The resulting Jewi sh 
s tate included not only areas of principle Jewi sh set tl ement ,  but also 
a number of Arab-inhabi ted areas . Consequently,  nearly half of the 
population of the Jewish state wa s  Arab . The Arab communi ty· completely 
rej ected the UN Partition Plan . On the next day , November 29 , 1947 , 
Arab riots and attacks on the Jewi sh communi ty began . 
Many people , including Pales tinian Arabs in the Wes t  Bank today , 
lament their failure to take their "state" when the opportuni ty pre-
s ented itself . J .  Bowyer Bell summed up the Palestinian dilemma that 
seems to pervade the Arab at ti tude : 
In retrospect it is all too easy to po int out the Arab 
blunders , their missed opportuni ties , their intransigence . 
It is only just , however ,  to note that it is easy to 
urge someone else to give up half a loaf of his own 
bread . Surely the Arab argument had much justice . 
Shorn of Biblical quo tations , emo tional references to the 
" final solution , "  and loaded statis tics , the Zionist  
54Nyrop , Israel a Country S tudy, p .  39 . 
5 5Hurewitz , The S truggle for Palestine , p. 302 . 
case looked no stronger ,  and probably somewhat weaker , 
than the Arab case to dis interes ted observers . To the 
Arabs the demand for an Arab Pale stine seemed neither 
novel nor extreme ; i t  seemed just and in accordance 
wi th international practice . That there were two 
competing "right s "  al l agreed ;  but that what had been 
the feebler , the minority , po s i tion could be chosen 
seemed incredible . Whittled down to basics , the Zionis t  
pos i tion wa s  that , given the Pales tine dilemma , they 
would set tle for half  whereas the Arabs unfairly contin­
ued to demand a1 1 . S6 
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The Uni ted Nations Parti tion P lan lef t  no recourse for the Arabs , but 
armed conflict .  
56J .  Bowyer Bell , The Long War : I srael  and the Arabs Since 1 946 
( Englewood Cliffs , N .  J . : Prentice-Hal l ,  19 69 ) , p.  6 7 . 
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The First Arab- I s raeli War , 1948 
The war began on December 1 , 1 9 47 , immedia tely following the UN 
parti tion reso lution . There were two di s tinct phases of conflict , a 
f ive and a half-month civil wa r  between Jews and Pales tinian Arabs , 
and an eight-month international wa r  involving the newly procla imed 
s tate of Israel and its neighbors . In both phases , Arab obje ct ive s ,  
like those a decade earlier , focused on severing communica tion lines , 
i so la ting outlying vil lages , and di srupting urban li fe . Their goal 
was to fo rce the Zioni s t s  to accep t a final set tl ement on Arab term s .  
Internal strife wi thin the Arab communi ty abated wi th the ou t­
s ide challenge of wa r ;  but their struggle for po li tical independence 
only went as far as a mili tary undertaking . The Zionists , on the 
o ther hand , began a well organized trans fo rmation of government ser­
vices and provided fo r securi ty me asur e s  in the event of an Arab 
a ttack . Plans involved ranged from drafting a consti tution and legal 
c ode to establishing a scho o l  fo r di plomatic and administrative per­
sonnel . Jewish leaders also interviewed Arab , Bri tish , and Jewi sh 
people for po ss ible service in a futur e  Jewi sh government . S 7 
The Jews focused thei r  ef fo r ts on ga ining control ove r the terri­
tory allot ted to them by the Uni ted Na tions , preserving intact areas 
o f Jewi sh set tlement in non-Jewi sh zo nes , and keeping lines of com­
munication ( especially to Jerusalem) open . The Arab tactics essen­
t ially were disruptive in natur e ; the Jewi sh plan cal led fo r control 
5 7Hurewi tz , The S truggle for Pale s t ine , p .  3 1 0 .  
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o f  territory . 
The Arabs gained ini tial success  wi th their strateg y of 
random kil ling s and highway ambushe s .  When Jewi sh fo rces reached 
2 0 , 000,  the Jewi sh High Command launched a series of success ful large­
s cale operations to seize Arab-controlled terri tory as signed to the 
Jewish state . When Irguni s t s  and Jewi sh Freedom F ighters massacred a 
hundred women and children in the Jerusalem Arab
· 
suburb of Dayr Yasin 
t he Arabs became demoralized . By the end of May , almo s t  2 00 , 000 
Pales tinian Arabs had fled their home s ,  seeking refuge in neighboring 
c ountries , and creating the great "Pales t inian Problem . " 58 
The British Manda te came to an end on May 1 4 , 1 9 48 . Jewi sh 
forces had achieved their territo rial objective s and defined the bor­
ders of the S tate of Israel until 1 9 6 7 . That same day the Provis ional 
Government under the leadership of David B en Gur ian is sued its 
declaration of independence and announced the creation of the state of 
Israel in the parti tioned area of Pales t ine . As before , the Pales t inian 
Arabs refused to set up a state in the Arab zone . 59 
Wi th the declaration of Israel ' s  s tatehood , the second phase ,  
international war , began . The next day , May 1 5 , 19 48 ,  the regular fo r­
ces of Egypt , Trans jordan , Syria , Lebanon , and Iraq cros sed the boun­
darie s of Palestine . Their invas ion wa s  to tally uncoordinated and 
became chaos . Mutual mi strus t among the partners was so deep that 
Egyp tian and Trans jordanian fo rce s did not even pretend to coordi nate 
5 8rbid . ,  P · 3 1 4 . 
5 9Jordan , A Country S tudy , p .  2 6 . 
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their actions "and indeed they guided their respective operations as 
much by the de sire to frus trate each other ' s  suspected intentions as 
by the requi sites of de feating the enemy . " 6 0  Once the I sraeli s di sc o­
ve red their enemies had no real central command or unified plan they 
direc t ed their effo rt  to defeat the Arab fo rces one at a time . 
Af ter the UN c ease- f ires ( there were four until an armi s tice 
wa s signed ) , the S tate of I srael encompas sed much more terri to ry than 
the original parti tion plan . Jewi sh fo rce s seized Galilee , the Negev 
and hal f of Jerusalem (Map 1 3 ) .  By Spr ing , 1 9 49 , over 40 countries 
including the Big Five recognized I s rael . The part of Palestine 
remaining in Arab hands cons i s ted of the area known today as the Wes t  
Bank ( 2 165  square miles ) held by Trans jo rdan , and Gaza , a narrow s trip 
o f  terri to ry of only 1 40 s quare miles held by Egypt6 1 . 
Abdullah ,  King of Trans jordan , so n of Hus sein , annexed the Wes t  Bank 
and took the title , King of Jordan . In Apr il , 1949 ,  he di rec t ed the 
official name of his country , including the Eas t and Wes t  Banks , be 
changed to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jo rdan . Jerusalem became a 
d ivided ci ty . The Old C i ty ,  The Wailing Wal l , the site of the Jewi s h  
Temple upon which stands the Muslim Mos que (Dome of the 
Rock) 62  remained in Jordanian hands . The I sraelis took control of the 
we s tern part , known as the New Ci ty . 
The period of Pale s t inian hi s tory from the turn of the 1 9 00s 
6 0safran , Israel the Embat t led Ally ,  p .  49 . 
6 1congressional Quarterly ,  ·� The Middle Eas t "  p .  26 . 
6 2Thi rd mo s t  ho ly shrine of the Muslims . 
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through the 1948 Arab- Israeli War had several significant deve lop­
ment s . Jewish and Arab nationali sm developed concurrently in 
Pales tine . A large measure of Arab nationali sm ,  though ini tiated by 
oppressive Turki sh rule �ediately preceding World War I ,  was attri­
buted to the presence of a vibrant Jewi sh colony , the Yishuv . 
Following World War I ,  conf licting boundary claims , national aspira­
t ions , and unkep t Bri tish ag reement s resulted in the creat ion of man­
dates for the region and Arab di senchantment . The Arab reaction be­
tween the wars in the form of riot s  brought some unity among the 
landle s s  fellahin and the urban unemployed . Af ter the suppres s ion of 
each uprising , Bri tish inve s t igative commi ssions sought so lutions by 
recommending major boundary change s . Af ter 27  years of Manda te and 
numerous investigations wi th no accep tible solution , the Bri tish gave 
the whole complex problem to the United Nations . Failure to reach an 
equi table terri torial so lution led to the firs t Arab- Israeli War which 
created the S tate of Israel leaving the Palestinians scat tered wi th 
nothing . 
From 1 900 to 1 948 ,  the Arabs in the region evolved from Syrians , 
wi th no polit ical allegiance , to Pale s t inians wi th a sens e of home­
lessness . A sense of terri toriali ty , or longing for the land , took 
shape by 1 9 48 , yet the ident ity as a uni f ied peop le had def ini tely not 
formed .  It would require the tes t  of suf fering ove r the next two 
decades to develop a Palest inian consciousness as shall be explored 
in the next chapter . 
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CHAPTER III 
THE PALESTINIAN DIASPORA 
Pales tinians Become Refugees 
�uring the Manda te period the Arabs had deve loped at least  a 
loos e identity , calling themselve s  Pale s tinian Arabs . Clearly , 
na tionalism, caused primarily by Bri tain and Jewi sh designs , provided 
the uni fying ingredient . Uni ty of purpo se  however ,  seemed to be 
dwarfed by their refusal , as early as the 1 920s , to accep t self 
government . Even fo llowing the 1 9 48 war , po li tical parties were not 
evident in Arab circle s . Coherent op po s i t ion to the manda te and the 
Jewi sh National Home never deve loped into cooperative poli tical fo rms 
due to rivalries between notable families . An alliance between the 
former Mufti of Jerusalem , al-Haj j  Amin , and the Naz is  did not help 
the Arab image among world op inion . Fur thermore , his reins tatement 
as pres ident of the All-Pale s t ine Gove rnme nt loca ted in Gaza , meant 
"adherence to the original nationali s t  dogma of the exclus ive rights 
to Pale s t ine " and a return to the semi-feudal family power 
e s tabli shment . 1 Defeat in the 19 48 war terminated the Palestine Arab 
movement . It s leadership became di sc redi ted and scat tered throughout 
the Arab states . 
Uni ty among the ad jacent Arab states also suffered . The Arab 
league condemned the Jordanian annexa tion of the West Bank and in 
1951 , Abdullah was as sassinated , repo rted ly by a Palestinian hired by 
luurewi tz , The S truggle for Pales tine , p .  3 1 7 . 
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rela tives of Hajj Amin . Only two countries recognized the Wes t  Bank 
annexa tion , Britain and Paki stan . In Cairo , a coup d ' etat carried out 
by the mili tary , led by Gamal Abdul Nas ser , ove rthrew the Farouq 
monarchy in 19 52 . By 1 9 54 , Syria had undergone four mili tary coups . 2 
Although there is strong deba te ove r exact refugee figures , the 
u . N .  Economic Survey Mis sion fo r the Middle East repo rted that , in 
the summer of 19 49 ,  only 1 33 , 000 Arabs of an original population of 
8 59 , 000 remained . Approxima tely 4 7 0 , 000 Arabs , who abandoned their 
home s , found temporary refuge in the Wes t  Bank and Gaza . For ty percent 
of these crowded into the la ter . Ano ther 2 50 , 000 f led to near-by Arab 
s tate s ; Lebanon received 1 00 , 000 , Jordan 7 5 , 000 , Syria 7 0 , 000 , Egypt 
7 , 000 , and Iraq 4 , 000 (Map 1 4 ) . 3 
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Debate between Pales t inian Arabs and I sraeli s continue s ove r the 
reasons the Arab refugees lef t .  Israeli s general ly place the blame on 
Arab government s which invaded in the firs t place and Arab propagan-
di� ts who broadcasted radio me s s age s fo r Arabs to leave . The Arabs , 
in contras t , explain that the Jews ru thle ssly set out to drive 
hundreds of thousands of Arabs from their home s .  Arab soldi ers had no 
recourse but to order civilian evacua tion to prevent a Jewish take-
over and protect the Pale s t inian civilian popula tion . 4 Regardle s s  of 
who is to blame for the ma s s ive Arab exodus , there are several 
e s tabli shed causes .  
1 .  Some were fo rced phys ical ly from their home s during the 
fighting by Jewi sh fo rces . 
2 .  Some lef t  in panic because they feared Jewi sh acts of 
violence . 
3 . Many lef t  believing Arab propaganda on broadcas ts from Cairo , 
Damascus , Amman , and B eiru t  which promi sed a puni shment to 
any Arab who stayed ( suppo s edly as collaborators ) .  
4 . Many left  because as the Commander of British troop s ,  
General Sir  Hugh Stockwell , put it , "The Arab leaders lef t  
firs t , and no one did anything to stop the ma s s  exodus , 
which became firs t a rush and then a panic . "  
5 .  Many lef t , especially early in the fighting , because they 
believed the war would soon be won by the Arabs , and they 
would be able to return in a short time . 5 
The image of the Pale s tinian became universally one of a 
displaced person . Approximately one- third of the refugees lived in 
camps organized and run by the Uni ted Na tions . Dismal tent ci ties 
became symbols of Palest inian li fe : "mud-soaked in winter , turning to 
4aany A. Hilmy , "Re-Par ti tion of Palestine : Toward a Peaceful Solution 
in the Middle Eas t , "  Journal of Peace Research (May 1972 ) :  135 .  
5Terence Prit tie , The Pales tinians , Michael Curtis , ed . ( New Brunswick , 
N .  J . :  Transaction Books , 1 9 7 5 ) ,  p .  5 4 . 
desert  encampment s in summe r . " 6 The Uni ted Nations Relief  and Works 
Agency for Palestine Refugee s  in the Near Eas t (UNRWA) conve rted the 
f i f ty or so camps to les s  make shi f t  places .  Shelters wi th roof s ,  
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wal ls and floors replaced tent s ;  u t ili ties such as wa ter and electri-
c i ty were introduced ; a network of so cial welfare and child care cen-
t ers , clinics , and feeding stat ions as well as an elementary schoo l  
sys tem were establi shed . Even though these ef fo rt s  brought be t ter 
s ocial condi tions , the di s placed pe rson image worsened . UNRWA medical 
autho ri ties reported a high incidence of psychosomatic il lness 
generated by frustrated expe ctations . The reali ties of everyday refu-
gee li fe coupled wi th the cons tant propaganda , emphasizing a return 
" home , "  deve loped a d.i aspora me ntal! ty among the Palest inians similar 
to that of many Jews li ving in Europe jus t  af ter World War II . 7 
Throughout more than two decades of international ef fo r t s  to 
help so lve the refugee problem , the mere ment ion of "reset tlement " has 
been enough to undermine the proj ect s .  In August , 1949 , Israel 
of fered to take back 1 00 , 000 refugees . The Arab states immedi ately 
rejected the of fer . 8 In 1 9 50 , UNRWA propos ed reset tling 1 5 0 , 000 
Gaza refugees in Libya . Egypt blocked the proposal . In 1 9 51 , UNRWA 
concluded an agreement wi th Egypt to move 7 0 , 000 refugees from the 
Gaza S trip to El Arish in the Sinai . No t wanting to be seen 
6Pere tz , The Pales tine State , p .  2 5 . 
7 Ibid , p .  26 . 
8Immediately following the 1 9 48 war , 7 0 , 000 Arabs who wi shed to rej o in 
their families did so . 
81 
coope rating {by the other Arab state s , such as Syria , Iraq , and S audi 
Arabi a ) , Egypt wi thdrew from the agreement � In 19 52-54 UNRWA tried to 
nego t iate a resettlement pro j e ct for 8 5 0 , 000 refugees living in 
Lebanon and S yria . Even though financing was to come from inter­
nat ional funds , Syria refused . In 1 9 55 ,  a special engineering envoy 
of President Dwight Eisenhowe r , Eric Johns ton , concluded an agreement 
wi th technical experts from I srael , Jo rdan , Syria , and Lebanon for a 
mass ive irriga tion scheme of the Jordan Valley . The plan envi sioned 
reset tlement of 2 40 , 000 refugees , but the Arab League rejected the 
propos al . In 1959 , UNRWA repor ted that its rehabili tation fund of 
$ 2 00 million , set aside since 1 9 52 for homes and jobs for Pale s tinian 
refugees had been unused . 9 I t  is clear tha t the ad jacent Arab states 
viewed the UNRWA wi th suspicion . Po s sibly the record of European 
unkept promises and the ubiqui tous mi s tru s t  of non-Arabs played a key 
role in the uncooperative spiri t of Pales tinian resettlement . Chap ter 
V wil l  explore thi s mi s trus t  in de tail . It is also apparent that the 
develop ing culture of the Pale s t inian had become one of strong grass 
roots  at tachment and nos talgia fo r their los t home land . Although the 
ad jacent Arab states did much to prevent rese ttlement , it seems tha t 
the Palestinians decided to accep t no thing less than the whole of 
Pale s t ine . 
9Pri t tie , The Palestinians , pp . 6 6-6 7 . 
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Pales tinian Ident ity 
Between 1948 and 1 9 6 7  Pale s tinian national consciousness inten-
sified . Mos t  ins titutions had been de s troyed when the Palest inians 
were uprooted . The only so cial ins ti tution lef t  intact was the 
family • In the refuge e  camps the hamula ( clan)  network relayed inf o r-
ma tion and di stributed UNRWA services . Refugees intermarried wi th 
refugees , and so cial and bu sines s contact s grew primarily because of 
family ties . There was li ttle contac t wi th Arabs who were no t 
Pale s t inian . Doctors , welfare workers , ration di stributors , teachers , 
and supervisors in the UNRWA schools we re Palestinian . Slogans , sym-
bols , and flags cons tantly reminded them of their los t land . 10  The 
concep t of the "return" to Pale s t ine was deep and wide spread 
throughout all the camps . Pale s tinian children were taught tha t their 
homeland was a particular vi llage or town and when asked abou t their 
ident i ty ,  they responded wi th the name of the Palestinian town even 
though they had never seen it . 1 1  
The unwelcome at ti tude among the hos t  Arab countries , also sup-
ported the Palestinian consciousne s s . Unlike Indians , Paki stani , 
German and other po s t-19 45 refugee s ,  the Pale s tinians were not sys te­
ma t ical ly resettled in their hos t  countries . 1 2  The only Arab coun try 
lOPeretz , The Palestine State , p .  2 7 . 
l lcongres sional Quarterly, The Middle Eas t , p .  5 .  
1 2Pi t tie in The Palestinians ci tes approximate figures of resettlement 
of other si tua tions accep ted by the world wi th no cry of "return" . 
From India and Paki stan -- 15 million refugees ; from F inland --
400 , 000 ; from C zecho s lovakia -- 1 . 5  milli on ; f rom Poland -- 2 . 8 
mi llion; from Eas t Germany -- 7 . 5 mil li on .  
to extend citizenship to the di splaced Palestinians was Jordan . King 
Hussein critically redressed his Arab counterparts  in an Associated 
Pre s s  article in January 1 9 6 0 : 
" S ince 1 948 Arab leaders have approached the Pales tine 
problem in an irres pons ible manner . They have not 
·looked into the future . They have no plan or approach . 
They have used the Pale s t ine people fo r self ish po li tical 
purposes . This is ridiculous and I could say , even 
criminal . l 3 
Ralph Galloway , fo rmer head of UNRWA in Jo rdan in August  1 9 58 said , 
The Arab S tates do not want to so lve the refugee problem . 
They want to keep it as an open sore , as an af front to 
the Uni ted Nations as a weapon agains t I srael . Arab 
leaders don ' t  give a damn whe ther the refugees live or 
die . l4 
Today , the Pale stinian Arabs have a saying based upon 
outsider ' s  selfish m t ive s , " no peace , no war . "  Keeping the 
Pale s tinian problem unsolved keeps bellige rants at each other ' s  
throa t .  The Arab countries , because of inj ured egoes , wi sh to ter-
minate hos tili ties only to the po int of an armi s tice ins tead of a 
f inal peace . They ma intain that there has been only one war ove r 
Pale s t ine , not four . s .  L .  A .  Marshal l , in the Forward to Lorch ' s  
Israel ' s War of  Independence correctly muses , "Who remembers now tha t 
the refugee problem ,  wi th the as sent of Arab states , was an issue fo r 
set tlement in a final peace and not a bargaining po int at the truce 
table ? " l5 
1 3Ibid , P · 7 1 . 
14Ibid . 
l 5s .  1 .  A.  Marshall , Foreward to I srael ' s  War of  Independence , by 
Ne tanel Lorch (Hartford : Hartmo re House , 1 9 6 1 ) ,  p .  xi ii . 
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Soviet policies also seem to fo cus on po larizing Arab states 
and I srael by maintaining tens ion . Wi th a settlement involving the 
Pales t inian refugee issue , tensi on would aba te and the Arab ' s  "need " 
for Soviet aid would lessen , result ing in a weaker Soviet sphere of 
inf luence . l6 Societal and economi c reasons in the Middle East  als o  
play a par t  in keeping the Pale s t inian " so re"  open . A complete 
a s similation of the 100 , 000 refuge es into Lebanese society would have 
des troyed its delicate poli tical and religious balance . Many Syri ans 
cons ider the Palest inians unruly and unde s irable as ci tizens . 
Grant ing them ci tizenship would be conceding the los s of Pale s tine . 
Egyp t , already overpopula ted wi th mos t of its peop le crammed into 4 %  
o f  the land , could not spare space in the Nile Valley . 
84 
A sense of territoriali ty is expres sed in education and the 
arts . Love fo r the homeland remains deep in Arab consciousness created 
during three de cades of di sperseme nt . Many educ ational tools are 
biased . The Arab identi ty wi th Pale s t ine frequently is emphasiz ed in 
the UNWRA textbooks ( particularly his tory and geography books ) .  A 
Pale s t inian child does not find the term I srael used or printed on any 
map ; ins tead , terri tories cons t i tuting the state of Israel are 
des ignated as the "usurped po r tion of Pale s tine . " 17 
A survey conduc ted by sociologi s t s  from Hebrew Univers i ty among 
I sraeli Arabs during 1967 , reveals a clos e at tachment to the land : 
1 6Hurewi tz , Middle Eas t Polit ics : The Military Dimension , p .  493 . 
1 7Peretz , The Palestine State , p .  2 8 . 
Thi s individual ( or familial ) bond be tween I sraeli Arabs 
and their land was frequently trans fo rmed into a collect ive 
bond . Ho lding on to the land which is a national Arab 
pos session turns the fact of remaining in I srael from a 
rout ine personal attachment into a national aim . 18 
In the li terature created by Israeli Arabs during the las t  20 
years , · there is frequent use of natural symbols ( familiar moun tains , 
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lakes ,  streams ) with a national connota tion . Love fo r a gi rl , for the 
vi llage , and the homeland , are pe rceived by many Israeli-Arab poets  as 
a single , invisible emo tion . The li terature de sc ribes the 19 48 war as 
the des truction of a rural id yll (conceived in romantic and nos talgi c 
image s )  and a separation from a familiar and beloved landscape . Those 
who remain behind mus t wa tch over the inheri tance fo r those who have 
been scat tered . 19  
A yearning to  return to  their home land is evident in the 
li terature of Palestine Arab writers and art i s t s . Poets , singers , and 
authors bring out themes which are not po li tical or material . 
Accordi ng to A .  L .  Tibawi of the Center fo r Middle Eas tern Studies at 
Harvard , repa triation is a deep spiri tual aspiration in the soul of 
every Palestinian in exi le . A po em by Ahmad Fahmi provides an 
excellent example : 
Sons of the fatherland ! 
Do you remember our home s in Safad ?  
Do you remember i t s  dreamy days , 
1 8Yochanan Peres and Nira Yuval-Davi s ,  " Some obs erva tions on the 
Nat ional Identi ty of the I s raeli Arab , "  Human Relations 22 (June 
1 9 6 9 ) : 221-222 . 
1 9rbid . 
I t s  majes tic Jarmaq , 2 0  
The morning s in the heights  of Gali lee , 
The happiness of the days at Dair al-Asad ? 
Do you remember als o  Lydda wounded , and Rumlah ,  
And their people smi t ten by so rrow? 
Do you remember the noble hills
i 
In whose so il the martyrs 1i e ? 2 
Mahmud- al-Hut , who was born in Jaf fa and received his Mas ter of Arts  
f rom the American Univers i ty of  Beiru t , chronicle s the firs t three 
years of the li fe of the refugees . 
0 los t paradise ! You were never too small for us , 
bu t now vas t  countries are indeed too small . 
Torn asunder your people , 
Wande ring under every star . 2 2  
A survey done by sociologi s t s  from the Ame rican Univers i ty of 
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Beiru t  also emphasizes the strong Pale s tinian attachment to their home-
land . Typical expressions refer to children . "Your country is like 
your child You cannot be separated from it fo r a long time . Your 
country is Where you were born and no other country could be dearer to 
your heart . "  The survey al so shows that many infant s born in refugee 
camps received names like Zeeyyz ( name of a refugee camp ) ,  Jihad 
( s truggle ) , Harb (war ) ,  and Aida ( the one who is returning . ) 23  
2 �ame of the high moun tain near Safad . 
2 1Ahlam al ' Audah (Damascus , 1 9 5 7 ) ci ted by A. L .  Tibawi , "Vi sions of 
the Return , the Pales tine Arab Refugees in Arab Poetry and Art , "  
The Middle East  Journal 1 7 (Autumn 1 9 6 3 ) : 5 1 1-5 1 2 . 
2 2Al-Mahz alah al ' -Arabiyyah ( Baghdad , 1 9 5 1 )  ci ted by A. L .  Tibawi , 
"Vi sions of the Return , "  p .  5 1 3 . 
23Peter Dodd and Halim Baraka t ,  " River Wi thout Bridges : A Study of the 
Exodus of the 1 967 Pale s tinian Arab Refugees " , ( Beirut : Ins ti tute fo r 
Pales tine S tudies , 1 9 68 ) ,  pp . 5 9-60 . Ci ted by Peretz , The Palestine 
State , p .  30 . 
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A sense of terri toriali ty or  strong attachment to the land was 
no t the only occurrence that took place as  a result of the Palestinian 
diaspora . During the 1 9 50s and 1 9 60s three so cial and economic change s 
took place throughout the Arab coun tries in terms of set tlement , educa-
t ion , and livelihood . Firs t , as trade and small industries grew , ur ba-
nization took place . Unskil led Pale s tinian tenant farmers left  their 
lands and gravi ta ted toward the ci ties . Refugee camps ad jacent to 
ci ties grew enormously . One refugee camp (Ayn al-Hilwah ) in Southern 
Lebanon quickly grew to 2 5 , 000 . 2 4 S econd , as social norms res tricted 
upward mobili ty to only tho s e  wi th property , education was the one ave-
nue to satisfy ri sing expectat ions . In 1968 , abou t 50 , 000 Palest inians 
a t tended colleges and univers i ties . A phenomenal 80 to 9 0  percent of 
the eligible children par ticipated in primary and secondary school . 2 5  
Third , people ' s  orientation from farm profess ions changed to ci ty 
occupations . Many fo rmer fellahin became lawye rs , physicians , engi-
neers , and technicians . Jus t  as the Jews became the quasi-eli te in 
their Diaspora , many Pales tinians became technicians and prof ess ionals 
and migrated throughout the Middle Eas t , particularly in the oil-rich 
nations . Unable to obt ain ci tizenship in these countries , these 
migrant workers still retain their "Pale s tinian de signation . "  Many 
s end wages back to families in refugee camps .  In 1978 , Kuwait  had 
2 4charles H .  Winslow , "An empirical road to a No rma tive Barrier , "  The 
Middle Eas t  Journal , 34 (winter 1 9 8 0 ) : 25 . 
2 5The average for the Arab world as a who le was only 5 3% in 1968 , 
Peretz , The Palestine State , p .  3 2 . 
250 , 000 Pales tinians , Saudi Arabia 5 0 , 000 , and other Gulf States 
7 5 , 000 . 26 
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26Emile A. Nakhleh , The Wes t  Bank and Gaza (Washington , D .  C . : American 
Enterprise Ins titute fo r Public Policy Research , 19 7 9 )  ci ted in 
Congressional Quarterly , The Middle Eas t , p .  4 . 
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Where are the Leaders ? 
Despite the strong love fo r the land , a high level of education , 
and a large number of professionals , no signif icant poli tical 
leade rship emerged . The Pale s t inians have fo rmed a sense of ident i ty 
but wi thout a catalys t to bring cohes iveness or uni ty-of-purpo se for 
nation-building . Pale stinian Arabs from 1 9 48 to  1967  actually became 
jus t  so many di spersed people , and the mo s t  notable problem during 
this time period was the persis tent lack of social stratification . 
Village s left to own devices 
Deve lopment of au tonomous vi l lage 
ins t i tutions and stratificat ion . 
No central infrastruc ture so 
popula tion remained vi l lage 
bound . 
Insecur ity resulted in con­
centrat ion in mountain vi l lage s .  
M A P 1 5  
Early 1 9th Ce ntu ry Palesti ne 
Arab Social clusterin g  
Source : Migdal , Palestinian 
Soc iety and Politics , p .  1 0-3 5. 
The lack of leadership is explained bes t  by quickly fo llowing 
the change s tha t took place in the struc ture of Palestinian so cie ty 
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before and af ter the 19 48 war . During early Ottoman rule , inhabi tants 
of  Palest ine tended to cluster in inward oriented vil lage s .  Ot toman 
neg lect forced the fe llahin to rely on the vi llage and family sys tems 
for livelihood . Peop le clus tered in hil l and mountain regions , today 
known �s the West  Bank , and reli ed on subs is tence living (Map 1 5 ,  on 
p revious page ) .  Jus t  before World War I s ignif icant change s occurred . 
Power lef t  the tribal shayks and vil lage chiefs and went into the hands 
o f  notable fami lies in the towns , primarily because the inhabi tants 
began experiencing an increas ingly interact ive and economically depen-
dent society . 
Population began a we s tward move 
towa rd the coas tal plain and pro­
minent towns . 
O t toman gove rnment ini tiated a 
c ampaign .to end pr ivate armies 
and unde rmine the local S hayks , 
r�sult ing in increased securi ty 
and populat ion growth . 
British government als o ini­
t iated inves tment po licies that 
encouraged Arabs to seek jobs 
on the coast . 
M AP 1 6  
Late 1 9 th Century - Early 20th 
Century Palest ine Arab 
We s twa rd Orientat ion 
Source : Migdal , Pales t inian 
Society and Politics , pp . 10-3 5 . 
Between the wars the Bri tish , used to we s terniz ed , centralized 
author! ty concepts , es tabli shed po li t ical al liances wi th the notables 
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much as the O t tomans had . The Bri tish gave legi timacy , ins t i tutions , 
and revenues to notables which so lidi fied the la tter ' s  hold on Arab 
po li tical leadership . Large Jewi sh and British inve s tments led to a 
wes tward population shift toward the ci ties on the coas t (Map 1 6  and 
Table . . 2 ) . 
Table 2 .  Growth of Arab Popula tion in Dis trict s wi th More than 2 5 , 000 
Arabs . 
1 9 2 2  1 9 3 1  1 944 
Eas tern Dis tricts* 3 6 2 , 2 3 1 4 1 4 , 935  5 40 , 7 00 
Wes tern Dis trict s** 2 3 5 , 456  340 , 581 5 18 , 7 50 
* Include s Beersheba , Hebron , Bethlehem ,  Je rusalem , Ramalla , Tulkharm , 
Nablus , Jenin 
**Include s Gaza , Jaf fa , Ramle , Haifa , Acre 
Source : Statistical Abs tract of I srael , ( Jerusalem : Central Bureau 
S tatistics , 1 9 79 ) . p .  7 1 6 . 
Wi th this trend to the ci ties came a new urban eli te , but only one 
wi th limi ted so cial control . De spite the new socio-economic ties , a 
coherent pattern of class  strati fication failed to deve lop . Joel s .  
Migdal explains the Palestine social struc ture in the firs t five 
decades of the twentie th century as being an uncoordinated 
joint venture by tho s e  control ling crucial resources . 
Ins tead , poli tical power become s a venture in denying 
others preeminent po s i tions . As long as no leadership 
is suf ficiently entrenched so as to mobilize power in 
exchange for the soc ial resour ces it can of fer , 
po li tics is marked by factioni sm and attempts at 
intimida tion . 27 
27Migdal , Pales tinian Society and Politics , p .  1 0-3 5 . 
Several reasons can expla in why a un i f ied social class  neve r emerge d . 
The presence of bo th British and Jewi sh companies attracted Arab 
workers wi th relatively high wage s and hindered the development 
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of  compe t i tive Arab firms . Another factor inhibi ting the es tabli sh­
ment of an Arab ur ban eli te wa s  the Arab po li tical reaction 88ains t 
the Bri tish and the Jew . Ins tead of having a we ll balanced po li tical , 
social , and economic program , the not ables ( especially the MUf ti ) 
directed all poli tical ef fo r t  agains t the problem of Bri tish rule and 
Jewi sh �igration . Those who sought a di fferent basis fo r 
Pale s t inian poli tics were accused of being trai tors to the 
Pale s tinian people in their struggle agains t ou t siders . 28 
Consequently , ini tiative became stifled and a feed-lo t mentali ty among 
Arabs became the status quo . 
The 1948 War fur ther unde rmined Palestinian leadership . Wi th 
the di spers ion of the Arabs , social control was los t and the small 
economic and social infras tructure in the coas tal areas was des troyed . 
Addi t ionally , the war reversed two trends that had characterized Arab 
society in Pale stine fo r three-quarters of a century , the movement 
from eas t  to we s t  and urbanization (Map 1 7 ) .  
When Abdullah annexed the We s t  Bank he stemme d the centrali zing 
tendencies in Palestinian society begun by the O t tomans and the Bri tish . 
Ins tead of running the Wes t  Bank on a society-wide basis , he sought to 
28rbid , P · 3 3 . 
9 3 
ensure fragmentat ion to prevent Pale s t inian ove rthrow of his regime . 2 9  
The focus of Jordanian policy went back t o  the earlier O ttoman po licy 
of  al liances wi th local S hayks , resulting in physical and geographical 
fragmentat ion which prevented the rise of second-e chelon leadership so 
critical to an independent society . 
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1 948 Palesti ne Eastward Orientation  
Jordan ' s  inves tment po licy als o  res trict ed the eme rgence of 
leadership . The government fo cus ed on development of the Eas t Bank 
2 9Before the We s t  Bank wa s incorpo rated into Jordan , the popula t ion of 
Jordan was 400 , 000 . Af ter annexa tion , Pales tinians cons is ted of two 
thi rds of the Jordanian populat ion . 
9 4  
ins tead o f  the West  Bank . De spi te having a more li terate , skil led 
popula tion , the Wes t  Bank stagnated , and the economy reverted to self-
subs i s tence and service . In 1948 , the East Bank had no indus trial 
base ; by 1 96 5 , three-quarters of al l indus trial output in Jordan wa s  
1� the. Eas t Bank . 30 The result wa s  a popula tion outmigration from the 
Wes t  Bank to the East Bank and to other Middle Eas tern countries , 
especially of young men3 1 ( Map 1 8 ) .  
\ 
\ I I ' 
\ ( 
\ I I 
\ I 
\ I \ I 
\ 
/ 
_, .. ... .. . \ 
.\- . .... 
·,- .. _ _.,/ 
/ '. 
- ·· -· ·  
-· 
_,.,.,. . ..,.-�-----·-·---· ... To Gulf - · 
MAP 1 8  
1 965 Palesti nian Population outm igratlon 
,./-r-
By 1 96 7 , a new leadership began to eme rge in the Palestinian 
refugee camps , but wi th two impo rtant charact eris tics tha t prevented 
3�igdal , Palestinian Society and Po litics , p .  89 . 
3 1From 1 9 5 2-1961 , the Wes t  Bank po pulation grew at an average rate of 
. 8 5 percent , compared wi th 2 . 8 4 percent fo r al l of Jordan . The Wes t  
Bank does not begin po s i tive ra te of ye arly increase unt il 1 9 6 9  when 
I srael began its new economic inve s tments . Statis tical Abs trac t o f  
Israel ; Th e  Adminis tered Terri tories ( Jerusalem : Central Bureau of 
Statis tics , 1 97 9 ) ,  p .  7 1 7 . 
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i t  from es tabli shing power . Firs t ,  it  wa s  a leadership whos e only 
resource was education . It lacked a means to control material and 
social resources . Second , it wa s  a leadership based , fo r the mo s t  
part , outside the Wes t  Bank . In fact , it was ou tside mo s t  of the major 
Pale s tinian populat ion concentrations . 32  With leaders Lacking ma terial 
and social resources , unable to implement any po li tical un i ty ,  the 
frustrated Palestinians turned to fo rce to at tempt unificat ion and 
create a terri tory . 
3 2Migdal , Palestinian Society and Politics , p .  4 2-4 3 . 
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Rise of  the Pale s tinian Liberation Organization 
Resentment and frus tration contributed to the creation of 
numerous terrorist groups in the early 1 9 50s . Arab government s 
f inanced and trained groups of Pale s tinian gue rrillas . Egyptian 
intelligence establi shed the firs t ba ttali ons of "Pales tinian 
Fedayeen" from among Pale st inians in the Gaza S trip . 33 Their mi ss ion 
was to conduct sabotage and terror mi ss ions by 1 9 5 5-1 9 56 . Israel ' s  
decis ion to go to war in 1 9 56 was pr ecipi tated in their refusal to 
evacuate the Gaza S trip until assurances could be made that fedayeen 
action would halt . 34 After the war Egypt fo rmed regular Pale s tinian 
army brigades commanded by Egyptian of f icers . The Syrians , on the 
other hand , concluded that the bes t  way to fight the I sraeli s was not 
wi th conventional warfare , but wi th small guerrilla operations . 
According to Pale s tinian wri ter , Fawaz Turki , " the firs t clan-
destine organiza tion tha t was a truly Pale stinian expression" was Al 
Fatah ( conque s t ) , formed in Gaza in the early 1 9 50s by Palestinian 
s tudents who gradua ted from S tut tgart Unive rs i ty in Wes t  Germany . 35  
One of  these students and founders wa s  Yasir Arafat , alias Abu 
Ammur , who lef t  Jerusalem wi th his family af ter the 1 948 war and 
s e t tled in Gaza . Arafat became convinced tha t the Palestinians mus t 
look to themselves , not other Arab gove rnment s in orde r to recove r 
3 3More accurately , fida ' iyyun , meaning those who are willing to 
sacrif ice themselve s  for their cause . 
3 4safran , Israel the Emba t t led Ally,  p .  2 6 6 . 
3 5Fawaz Turki , The Disinheri ted : Journal of a Palestinian Exile (New 
York : Monthly Review Pres s , 1 9 7 2 ) ,  p .  1 00 . 
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their homeland . 36 
Terrorist at tacks by Al Fatah and other groups continued in the 
1 9 50s . By the early 1 960s a need fo r more developed poli tical act ion 
emerged in the form of the Pales t ine Liberation Organization (PLO ) . 
The recogni tion of the PLO actually came abou t due to confrontation 
concerning the Jordan wa tershed and its use . Early in 1964 Arab 
governments  and Pale s t inians became seriously alarmed by an I sraeli 
proj ect to draw wa ter from the Sea of Galilee to irriga te the Negev 
Desert . ( The 1 9 5 4  Eric Johnson plan ) . Nasser called an Arab summi t 
conference in Cairo to di scus s the Jo rdan wa ter problem . War wa s  
rejected because the Arab states lacked a unif ied command . Ins tead , 
three courses of action we re decided : ( 1 )  to divert  the sources of the 
Jordan in Lebanon and S yria ; ( 2 ) to es tabli sh a United Arab Command 
under an Egyptian commander ;  and ( 3 ) to recognize the new Palestine 
Liberation Organization as the representative of Pales tine resistance 
agains t Israel . 37 Al Fatah also became the mili tary arm of the PLO . 
Jordan and Egypt suppor ted the PLO fo r their own poli tical purpos es . 
Both Hus sein and Nas ser had decided , in advance ,  that the Arab world 
needed a group of Pale s tinians which could counteract the mili tant , 
emo ti onal Syrian Baathi s t  leaders who cons tantly provoked I srael and 
threatened to draw an unprepared Jordan and Egypt into war . Although 
the PLO became the mo s t  representative Pale st inian group since 1 9 48 , it  
3 6congress ional Quarterly,  The Middle Eas t , p .  29 . 
3 7Rinehar t ,  Jordan a Country S tudy , p .  3 3 . The technical plan to divert  
water from the I sraeli s  never ma terialized . 
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failed to  mo ld mass support or  the backing of al l Arab leaders . 38 
During the period be tween 1 9 48 and 1 96 7 , known as the 
Pale s t inian diaspora , the Pales t inians experienced refugee camp 
hardships ; they developed a concep t of "return" ; they developed sym-
bols of a national consciousness as evidenced in their song s , li tera-
ture , and textbooks . The refusal by other Arab states to assimilate 
them , fur ther forced the Pales tinians toge ther as one people . 
However , the pas t  policies of the Turks , British , Jews , and Jordanians 
res tricted the development of midd le-cla s s , or second echelon , 
leaders . Coupled wi th the cons tant movement from eas t to we s t ,  and 
then west to eas t , the Palest inians had no stable material assets  from 
which a middle class could grow even though they were well educated . 
Out of frus tration , the PLO became the only expression for poli tical 
act ion . The use of armed struggle seemed their only so lution to 
regain a territory . 
In the final analys is no genuine Pales tinian Arab nationali st  
movement exi s ted from 1 948 to 1 9 6 7 , but a Pale stinian consciousnes had 
been born . However , no centralizing leade rship emerged , and no 
coherent stratification of cla s s  society necessary fo r the structure 
o f  a nation materiali zed . The next chapter will explore the 
Pale s t inian at tempt at fo rming a nationali st  movement from the 1 9 6 7  war 
to the present . 
38Peretz , The Pales tine S tate , pp . 38-4 1 . King Faisal of Saudi Arabia 
ini tially boyco tted suppor t  fo r the PLO . 
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CHAPTER IV 
WAR AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF EXPATRIATE NATIONALIST GROUPS 
The S ix Day ( 1967 ) War 
Perpe tual tens ion be tween I srael and its Middle Eas t Arab 
neigh��rs flared into the third major  Arab-Israeli war . l During the 
Israeli-ini tiated , but Arab caused , Six Day war , Israel des troyed a 
subs tantial part  of the armed fo rces of Egypt , Jo rdan and 
Syria . 2 Israeli planes , in the firs t " preemptive " strike , des troyed 
the bulk of Egyptian air forces while still on the ground . Israeli 
ground troops in a lightning at tack broke the Egyptian blockade and 
o ccupied the banks of the Sue z Canal . In the eas t ,  Israeli fo rces 
defeated Jordanian fo rces , driving them from Jerusalem and the Wes t  
Bank . In the north I srael cap tured the Go lan Height s ,  the heavily 
fortified cros sroad s area linking Lebanon , Syr ia and Jordan . From the 
height s ,  guerrilla bands had harassed I srael ' s  Galilee area for two 
decade s .  The war lef t  three inde lible impr ints which affected the 
Pales tinian que s tion for the next decade and a half : territo rial 
boundary changes , the rebir th of Pale s t inian nationali sm , and U .  N .  
S ecurity Council Reso lution 242 .  
limmediate cause was the failure of diplomatic effo r ts to li f t  the 
Egyp tian blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba . Israeli shipping had been 
us ing the gulf since 1 9 56 guaranteed by the u .  N. Emergency Force 
s tat ioned at the Gulf ' s  mouth . Nasser demanded the u .  N. fo rces be 
removed from Gaza and the gulf ou tpo s t . Large Egyptian fo rces then 
moved into the Sinai . 
2Mos t  analys t s  believe that the cons tant terrorist  at tacks by the PLO , 
f inanced and encouraged by the other Arab states was the cause of the 
1 9 6 7  War . Israel made a pre-emptive at tack after the Egyptian Army 
cros sed the Suez , thus start ing the war . 
MAP 1 9  
1 967 War 
Palesti n ian Arab 
Territorial Losses 
\ NEGEV ' 
"-\ 
\ 
\ 
EGYPT \ 
\ 
\ \ \ 
Bill 
( 
I 
j I I 
I i 
I 
I 
r 
lllttee 
0 tO 311 30 
0 tl l2 .. 
Kl.......,.,. 
MAP 20 
I srael 's  vulnerable shape 
Aledl,.,.,_n S.. 
E GYPT r 
IIII-
O tO 311 30 
0 tl l2 .. 
Kl-
� 
0 0 
1 0 1  
Territorial Boundary Changes ( The Wes t  Bank) 
I srael ' s  shape is awkward and vulnerable (Map 2 0 ) . It looks like an 
irregular triang le standing on its apex , connect ed by a long , narrow , 
i rregular rectangle to a small , irregular square . Freezing the battle 
lines ·in 1948 produced clumsy frontiers fo r I srael . For a terri tory 
of 8 , 000 square miles , Israel had 6 1 3 miles of land frontier in addi­
t ion to 1 58 miles of seafront . At the tip of the triangle , the count ry 
was only 8 miles wide ; a t  the base , it spreads only 69 mile s from 
border to border . In the long , nor th-south rectangle , the wid th 
varied be tween 9 . 5 miles to 16 miles ; and in the north , the square wa s  
never wider thart 4 1  miles . The oddi ty of the boundaries , and the fact 
that the country connected wi th four Arab countries had much to do 
w� th the frequent border incidents which characterized the obse s sion 
which Israeli leaders had wi th national security . 
The 1967  cease-fire lines changed the boundary si tuation greatly . 
Wi th the S inai , Israel brought under its control 2 6 , 5 00 addi tional 
square miles , mo re than three times the original 8 , 000 . Oddly enough , 
the land demarcation lines became sho rtened by nearly 2 5  percent to 
47 1 miles . The shoreline increased two and a half time s to 5 6 4  mi les . 
Wi th the occupation of the Wes t  Bank , Israel ga ined control of 
the central mountain region which ave rage s an alt i tude of 3 , 000 f eet 
and extends fo r nearly 1 00 miles (Map 1 9 ) .  This region wa s  the 
heartland of the ancient Kingdoms of Judah and I srael . The coas tal 
plain during Muslim time s was general ly set tled by non-Jews . In this 
century , the si tuation reversed , making the We st  Bank almo s t  exclusive ly 
Arab While the Jews se ttled the plains and the coas t .  This Jewi sh 
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settlement gave rise to wha t is pr esently the core area or the I sraeli 
s tate . More wil l  be said about the signi f icance of the core area 
regarding securi ty in Chapter VI . Thi s indus trial and economic sub-
region is located between Haifa and Tel Aviv , inclusive . 3 
In the northern portion of the Wes t  Bank ( I sraelis cal l it 
Samar ia ) , the plateau so il has been eroded into valleys , many of which 
are fertile . In the south , ( which I sraeli s call Judaea ) ,  rainfall is 
reduced , streams are le ss frequent ,  and hil ls are mo re bare . The We s t  
Bank a s  a whole wa s  heavily popula ted even befo re it received several 
hundred thousand Arab refugees during the 1 9 48 war •' It produces enough 
agr icultural surplus fo r expo rt to the Eas t Bank and to neighbo ring 
Arab countries . 4 A chain of towns runs along the spine of the pla teau 
including Nablus ( Arab po pula tion , 5 0 , 0 00 ) and Ramalla (Arab population 
2 5 , 000 ) . In the South , the chain continues including Bethlehem , the 
s i te of Christ ' s bi rth , ( Arab po pula tion 35 , 000 ) and Hebron , the burial 
s i te of Abraham , Isaac , and Jacob (Arab population 4 0 , 000 ) .  
In the center of the plateau is , of cour se , Jerusalem . Its 
his to ry extends ove r four thousand ye ars . The name 100ans "C i ty of 
Peace , " yet no other ci ty has been fought over so much . It has been 
beseiged 40 times . It has served as a ho ly center fo r the three 
monotheis tic religions . To any vi s i tor , the ci ty brings  to mind the 
3Hans w .  Weigert , Pr inc iples of Political Geography , ( New York : 
Apple ton-Century-Crof t s , Inc . ,  1 9 57 ) ,  p .  147 . 
4In 1 9 7 7 / 78  the West  Bank produc ed 4 2 1 , 9 00 tons of frui t  and 
vege table s .  1% went to Gaza , 1 4% went to I s rael and overseas , and 
1 8% went to Jordan . ( The rest  was fo r local consumption ) . Abstrac t 
of  Israel 1 9 7 9 , p .  7 46 . 
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key figures of each religion . Here David founded the Jewi sh cap ital 
and Solomon built the famous Temple of the Lord . Here Christ was cru-
ci fied outside its ga tes . Muhammad is said to have made his night 
flight into heaven from the ci ty (Map 2 1 ) .  
- Despite its significance as the Holy City , the 1 9 48 War lef t  
i t  divided into tw o  iso lated part s .  The old wal led ci ty toge ther 
wi th the northeas tern suburbs became part of Jordan , while the new ci ty 
on the we s t  became the capital of I srael . Before 1 9 6 7 , according to 
Nadav S afran , 
Jewish Jerusalem wa s a curious ci ty : it was the center of 
government and the seat of many of the country ' s  mo s t  
important cultural and religious ins ti tut ions - - the Hebrew 
Univers i ty , the National Mu seum , the Chief Rabbinate , tens 
Jeremrolt's 
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Zion 
o f  religious colleges , and so on; but it  was a ci ty that 
led nowhere . The wo rld li teral ly ended at some mined 
ravine or ugly cement wall • • •  5 
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Being separated from the coas tal trade areas , Jerusalem neve r became an 
economical ly impo rtant ci ty . To speak of it  in terms of a regi onal 
core area fo r I srael prior to 1 9 6 7 , seemed only po s s ible in a psycho lo-
gical sense because of the religious appeal the I sraeli s placed on 
their ancient cap ital . Despi te its high bi rthra te , the Arab population 
in Jerusalem ac tually declined during Jordanian sovereignty from 
1 948-1 9 6 7 . 6 The number of Christians living in Jerusalem drop ped from 
2 5 , 000 to 9 , 000 . Four teen years af ter the unification of Jerusalem , 
this number increased to 1 2 , 000 , the firs t reve rsal since the large 
Chris tian exodus started about 1 9 00 . Since 1 96 7 ,  the Arab popula tion 
has increased by 90 percent , also a signi f icant reversal . 7 S ince the 
Israeli occupa tion in 1 9 6 7 , Jerusalem has become a di f ferent ci ty . It 
i s  now a growing cultural , economic , and sc ientific capi tal of Israel . 
The growth of the to tal po pula tion give s evidence to this . It grew 
from 1 7 0 , 000 Jews and 6 0 , 000 Arabs in 1 9 6 7 , to a total population of 
340 , 000 eight years la ter . 
Despite the I sraeli ini tiation of be tter living condi tions fo r 
Arabs in Jerusalem and the Wes t  Bank , Israel ' s  mili tary vi ctory and 
control over Palestine , produced a trauma tic effect on the 
Ssafran , Israel the Emba t t led Ally , p .  7 3 
6Limi ted economic oppo rtun i ties fo rced many Muslims and Chr is tians , 
part icularly the educated , to leave . 
7Teddy Kol lek , ·· Jerusalem : Present and Futur e , •• Foreign Affairs 5 9  
( Summer 1 9 81 ) :  p .  1 046 .  
Pale s tinians . They still had no terri tory to cal l their own . Over 
400 , 000 were di splaced from their home s ,  abou t half of these for the 
second time in twenty years . Mos t  fled to the Ea st Bank of Jordan 
1 0 5  
where condi t ions approximated thos e  i n  1948 : hopeles snes s ,  flimsy tent 
c i ties , and UNRWA operations . One aspect was di fferent . In 1948  
Israel only retained a small po r t ion of Arabs wi thin its borde rs ; 
however , in 1967 , almo s t  a million and a half fell unde r Israeli control 
( Gaza 400 , 000 , Wes t  Bank 800 , 000 , Arab- Israeli s 300 , 000 ) .  This meant 
that the Arab ci tiz enry ins ide I srael compr ised nearly half of  the 2 . 5 
million Pale s tinian Arabs then in the Middle Eas t . In Jordan the 
demographic population image also changed . In Eas t Jordan , at least 
three-fourths of the population became Pale st inian , half of them 
refugees . 8 The Pale stinian population was significantly large in both 
I srael and Jordan , ye t in 1967 the po s s ibili ty of a home land , a count ry 
to  belong to , seemed remo te and a sense of angui sh grew . 
Boon Peretz , A Palestine Ent ity? (Washing ton , D.  C . : the Middle Eas t 
Ins t i tute , 1 9 7 0 ) , p .  4 3 . 
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Rebirth o f  Palestinian Nationalism 
In Sep tember , 1 9 67 , an Arab summi t confr ence , held in Khartoum , 
Sudan , met to find alternative s fo r the Pale s tinians . The conference , 
however , produced no workable decisions fo r the Pales tinians other than 
some economic support fo r the " front line " Arab states . Pales tinians 
began to realize that they were alone . The charismatic Nas ser of Egypt 
and the pan-Arabic Baathi s t s  of Syria had failed . Conventional mili­
tary tact ics by large scale armies had also failed . At tempts to iso­
late I srael wi th economic and di plomatic me thods seemed only to toughen 
I srael ' s  reso lve . Encouraged by the successes of "wars of liberation·· 
in Vietnam and Africa , the Pale s t inians , mos tly ou tside I sraeli 
controlled territory , felt no other recours e  but to organiz e fo r 
prot racted guerrilla warfare . Alt hough the emerging leadership lacked 
social resources and a physi cal base , a new ideologi cal concensus 
regarding the na ture of the Pale s tinian problem took shape . 
This leadership and ideo logy came from the young Pales t inian 
intel ligent sia . They were not organized in any cohesive pa ttern or 
centralized structure . What they wanted was a means to redeem them­
selves fo r the di sgrace at the hand s of the I sraeli s . By 1968 , there 
were thirty-six groups ,  all asserting Pales tinian identi ty and seeking 
vengeance and the replacement of Is rael wi th a secular Palest inian Arab 
s tate . Mos t  of these groups were located in the Arab states ad jacent 
to Israel (Map 2 2 ) .  
When the ideological goal of eliminat ing Israel became accep ted 
by al l the di fferent Arab terrorist  group s ,  then the PLO emerged as an 
1 0 7  
MAP 2 2  
Palesti n ian Fedayeen Locat ion 
1 968 . 
Mediterranean Sea 
I 
I 
I 
I 
\ I 
\ ( \ NEGEV I . I 
I I "' \ 
\ I / \ \ E G Y PT \ 
\ I I 
\ I \ I I \ \ I 
;-\ I I M i les \ \ / 10 20 30 
Ei lat 16 32 48 
K i lometers 
equal among Arab states . Thi s  accep tance occurred in 1968 . The 
Pale s t inian National Charter , firs t adop ted at Cairo in 1964  and 
ammended in 1968 , reflected the mi li tant objectives of the PLO . 
Ar ticle 9 s tated that : 
. . Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine . 
Thus it is the overall strateg y ,  not merely a tact ical 
phase . The Pales tinian Arab people assert their abso lute 
determination and firm reso lution to continue their armed 
s truggle and to work fo r an armed popular revolu tion fo r 
the liberation of their country and their return to it . 
They also as sert their right to normal li fe in Palestine 
and to exercise their right to self-de termination and 
s overeignty over it . 9 
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The fedayeen (Palestinian guerril las )  proclaimed not only the liberation 
of  the I sraeli occupied terr itories bu t also the de s truc tion of I srael . 
Disagreement over the means of achieving the goals led to a great deal 
of confusion and divi s ion . Thos e  educated in Germany , France , and the 
Uni ted S tates had embraced the philosophies of Mao , Che Guevera and 
Franz Fanon . At tempting to conduct operations analogous to the popular 
liberation wars of Algeria , Cuba , and Vie tnam , the guerril las  failed to 
recognize the geography and topography di f ferences between the various 
models . They did not cons ider tha t their bases in Syr ia ,  Lebanon , and 
Jordan could be reached by Israeli fo rces . Also the lack of vege tation 
and cover permi tted the I s raeli s to quickly track down fedayeen when 
wi thdrawing from their operations . Unlike Vie tnam , where much of the 
countryside provided refuge and suppo rt fo r the guerril las , the popula-
t ion , including Israel proper , consi s ted of a Jewi sh ma jori ty not 
9Nyrop , Jordan A Country S tudy, Appendix D ,  p .  2 6 7f f . 
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dependent on a minori ty Arab populat ion . Nevertheles s  the fedayeen 
presented Israel wi th daily secur i ty problems partiularly in the Wes t  
Bank . 1 0  
B y  1 97 0 ,  signs of cohesive organization among the various com-
mando . groups became evident . The number had decreased from 36  t o  1 2  
(Appendix E ) . The mo s t  important of the fedayeen organizations wa s  the 
Pale s t ine National Liberation Movement called Fatah . 1 1  Initially , Fatah 
like other fedayeen forces , was small in number and carried out only 
limi ted opera tions . In March , 1 9 6 8 , Israel conduct ed an attack on the 
Fatah base at Karameh on the Eas t Bank in retaliation for Arab commando 
act ivi ties . Even though I srael de s troyed the base , Fatah fo rces , in 
concert wi th the Jordanian army , inflicted heavy casualties on the 
I sraeli fo rce and claimed a victory . 1 2  Karameh became a symbol 
throughout the Arab world . The Arabs needed a win de sperately ; as the 
once proud Arab people had no t won major mi li tary victories since the 
Crusades .  As a result of Karame h ,  volunteers fl ooded to Fatah and , by 
1 9 7 0 , their fo rces grew to approxima tely 1 0 , 000 armed men . The 
inf luence of thi s single engagement reached other commando resis tance 
organizations as well . Total es tima tes of trained vo lunteers ranged 
from 30 , 000 to 5 0 , 000 . 
An ef fo r t  to unify the numerous commando organizat ions took 
1 0safran , Israel the Emba t t led Al ly , p .  2 6 7 . 
1 1Meaning "conque s t " . It is a reve rsed acronym fo r Pales tine Na tional 
Liberation Movement -- Baraka t at-Tahrir al-Filas t ini . 
1 2Quandt , The Poli tics of Pales tinian Na tionalism , p .  5 7 . 
place at the Pales t ine Na tional Council in Cairo in 19 68 . A merger 
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took place between the PLO and Fatah wi th Yas i r Arafat ,  the Fatah com-
mander , appo inted as leader . The next ye ar mo s t  of the other commando 
organizations ag reed to coordinate their actions . However ,  the second 
mos t  ·singificant commando group , The Popular Front fo r the Liberation 
of Pale s t ine (PFLP ) led by Geo rge Habash , refused to join . 1 3  
Habash emerged as a dominant figure in the Arab Nationali s t  
Movement . He and the P FLP proc la imed a class-s t ruggle ideology calling 
for the overthrow of governments throughout the Middle East by revolu-
tionary means . Although sympathe tic to the inj us tice in Pales tine , 
Habash ' s  invo lvement in pan-Arab nationali sm contras ted wi th Arafat ' s  
distinctly Palestinian act ivi ties . Thi s  mo re general revolutionary 
theme was probably roo ted in the fact tha t Habash is not a Muslim ;  h i s  
parents we r e  Greek Or thodox . A shi f t  in PFLP ideology after the 1 9 6 7  
War toward the Marxi s t-Lenini s t  movement occurred . The more radical of 
these guerrilla groups spl i t  of f in 19 6 9  and fo rmed the third larges t 
guerrilla organization , The Popular Democratic Front fo r the Liberat ion 
of Pales tine (PDFLP ) . l4 Under the leadership of Naye f Hawatmeh , the 
PDFLP became the stronge s t  advocates at applying the pr inciples of 
revolution exported from Vie tnam and Cuba . 
The creat ion of the PFLP and the PDFLP demons t rated that there 
were more divi sive is sues in the mili tant Pale s tinian movement than 
1 3Peretz , The Pales tine S tate , p .  5 2  
1 4chaim I .  Waxman , "Varie ties of Pale s t inian Nat ionali sm , "  The 
Palestinians , Michael Cur t i s , ed . ( New Brunswi ck : Ame rican Academic 
As sociation for Peace in the Middle Eas t , 1 9 7 5 ) ,  p .  1 1 6 . 
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unifying ideas . In fact the only is sue they comple tely agreed on is 
the "hos tili ty toward Z ionism and the need fo r armed struggle to 
redress what they saw as the lUlbearable inj us tice to Pale s t inians . " l S  
There were conflicts between individual guerril la leaders , di f ferences 
between the groups  and other Arab states , and di sagreement over the 
nature of the de sired Pale s tinian state . 
Both the Habash (PFLP ) and Hawatmeh ( PDFLP ) groups beli eve that 
s truggle in Pales tine was linked wi th social and po li tical condi tions 
in the Middle Eas t . They maintained tha t the over throw of react ionary 
reg imes ( Saudi Arabia , Jordan , and Lebanon) wa s a prerequisite to 
liberation of Pales tine . They di sagreed between themselve s ,  on the 
other hand , on the means to implement the revolu tion . The PFLP wanted 
to  uni te the masses by armed conf lict ; the PDFLP placed ini tial impor­
tance on poli tical and educational strategy then fo llowed by armed 
s truggle . Fatah , however ,  has at temp ted neu t rali ty in internal mat ters 
of individual Arab states . They have tried to steer a middle ground 
path and not risk cu t ting of f their suppo r t  from other Arab 
governments . l6 · The excep tion wa s  in 1 9 7 0- 7 1  and 1 9 8 0-83 . 1 7  
A second ideological is sue separating the fedayeen wa s  the 
nature of the Pales tinian state . The PLO ' s National Covenant said 
their obj ect ive was a democratic , non-sectarian Pale stinian state . 
lS rbid . 
16Quandt , The Politics of Pale s tinian Nationalism , p .  6 2 . 
17 see Fedayeen Geographical Reloca tion 1 9 6 7-1 9 8 3 , this chapter . 
1 1 2  
There were many interpreta t ions part icularly on the fate of the Jews . 
Article 19 s tates that in the new state " the Jews who had normal ly 
resided in Palestine until the beg inning of the Zioni s t  inva sion wi l l  
b e  considered Pales tinians . " 18 Although the firs t Jewi sh �!grants 
arrived in the 1880 ' s ,  Pale s tinians have used var ious cut-of f da tes to 
I 
de termine Which Jews could remain : 19 1 7  t he Balfour Decla ration , 19 47 
parti tion . In other ar ticles the extermination o:f the Jewi sh peop le 
appeared to be a consis tent theme . Af ter examination of much 
Pales t inian material , one clear observa t ion is the fact that the PLO , 
the only recognized po l i tical ins t i tution fo r the Palestine people , 
only produced plans of react ion ; there were no proact ive or cons t rue-
t ive plans of government , law , or norms of so cial behavior . 
The fedaye en groups were no t the only ones Who expressed 
Pales t inian nationali sm af ter 1 9 6 7 . In the Wes t  Bank , many tradi tional 
leaders who had remained as par t  of the me rchant cla s s  cla imed to speak 
for the Pale s tinians . In reali ty their inf luence ext ended only as far 
as their town or ci ty , and they proved unable to organize any ef fective 
poli tical group s .  Israeli occupa tion and fear of being branded as 
poli tical collabo rators by the fedaye en ou ts ide of the Wes t  Bank 
limi ted thei r  inf luence . Therefo re , the organiz ed expression of 
Pale s t inian nationali sm remained almo s t  completely in the hands of the 
f edayeen resis tance movement . 
1 8Pales tine Nat ional Covenant ( 19 6 4 , 1 9 68 , 1 9 7 7 )  ci ted in Nyrop , 
Jordan A Country Study, Appendix D ,  p .  2 6 7 f f .  
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Resolution 2 4 2  and World Recogni tion 
On November 22 , 1 9 6 7 , the u .  N .  Securi ty Council unanimously 
approved a Briti sh reso lution called Reso lution 2 42 . Its  pr incipl e 
object ive was peace in the Middle Eas t . The reso lution ( see Appendix 
D )  called fo r wi thdrawal of Israeli fo rces from occupied Arab 
terri tories ; an end to hos tili ty between Arab nations and I srae l ;  
acknowledgement of and respect fo r the sove reignty and terri torial 
integrity of every nation in the area ; the es tabli shment of secure 
boundaries ; a guarantee of freedom of naviga tion in international 
waters ; and a just set tlement of the refugee problem . 
In spi te of a cons iderable deba te over the preci se meaning of 
"wi thdrawal from terr i tories " the reso lution provided a basis  fo r the 
es tabli shment of some fo rm of Pales tinian autonomy . The resolution 
ref lec ted the growing sympathy fo r the Pales tinian peop le . Empathy 
wi th the refugee problem has brought mo re es teem to the PLO , although 
they denounced the reso lution . Af ter the 1 9 7 3 war , the PLO picked up 
cons iderable world es teem . 19  They recognized the "refugee" problem as 
a fight fo r national ident ity . By 1 9 7 7 , the PLO had become the twenty-
f irst full member of the Arab League , and had ga ined recogni tion from 
1 00 countries . 
1 9The 1 9 7 3  Arab-Israeli War was specif ical ly caused by the de s i re to 
recover the Go lan He ights and the S inai by Syr ia and Egyp t respect 
ively . The Wes t  Bank wa s no t a goal fo r Jo rdan who mobilized , but 
generally stayed ou t of the war . 
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Fedayeen Geographical Relocation 1 967-1983 
Following the occupa tion of the Wes t  Bank by Israel , the 
guerrilla organi�ations were located in the urban areas of Gaza , 
northern Jordan , Syria , and southern Lebanon (Map 2 2 ) .  Dur ing the next 
s ixteen years the Fedayeen group s , organized loos ely around the PLO 
( Fatah) , increasingly los t their base of suppo rt in the countrie s  uti­
lized as staging areas fo r their commando raid s into I srael . 
Af ter Nas ser ' s  accep tance of the cease- fire in 1 9 7 0 , the 
fedayeen los t  Egyp tian support . Wi tness ing the decline of internal 
s tabil i ty in Jordan , the guerrilla fo rces shi fted their concentrat ion 
to Jordan in order to gain control of the country . Af ter ''Karamah , "  
the Arab victory which inspired such tremendous suppo r t  and vo lunteers 
for the resis tance , the fedayeen increased their guerrilla act ivi tes by 
controlling stra tegic po s i tions ( Az Zarqa oil ref inery ) , calling for a 
general strike , and organiz ing a civil di so bedience campaign . During 
the ten-day civil war known as "Black Sep tember , "  Syr ian President 
Jadid suppor ted the guerrillas wi th 2 00 T-5 4  tanks . King Hus sein of 
Jordan counter-a t tacked wi th his air fo rce and rou ted the Syr ians . 2 0  
While Fatah was trying to regain control of itself af ter their 
defeat in Sep tember , 1 9 7 0 ,  Hussein began driving the guerrillas from 
their strong po ints located in the towns . Fighting continued through 
the winter until guerril las los t  contro l of Jarash , Irbid , and Amman . 
By April , 1 97 1 , Fatah is sued a s ta tement contradicting their earli er 
20ainehar t , Jordan A Country S tudy , p .  4 1 . 
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policy of noninterference wi thin the internal af fairs of an Arab state 
and demanded the over throw of the Jordanian "puppe t separatist  
authority . "  It became evident that PLO leaders were seriously trying 
to fo rm a partial Palestine state ou t of Jordan . 2 1  Following the eva-
cua tion of Amman , the res i s tance fo rces in Jordan were conf ined by 
Hussein to a fo res ted region be tween Jarash and Aj lun . In early June 
1 9 7 1 , King Hussein di rected Prime Minis ter Tal to "deal conclusively 
and wi thout hesi tation wi th the plot ters Who want to es tabli sh a 
separate Palest inian sta te and de s troy the unity of the Jo rdanian and 
Pale s tinian people . " 2 2  After sharp fighting , the Jordanian army 
arrested 2 000 fedayeen , stopping the resis tance movement in Jordan . 
After the los s  of Jordan as a " secure base" another had to be 
found . 2 3  In Syria the government , fearing PLO interf erence in their 
internal affairs , wanted to contain the resis tance movement by creating 
their own guerrilla organiza tion ( Sa ' iqa ) , and simul taneously cur-
tailing the activi ties of other fedayeen groups . The Syrian government 
inf iltrated other PLO groups operat ing in Syr ia ( probably seve ral 
thousand in number ) .  
2 1Quand t , The Poli tics o f  Pales tinian Nationalism , p .  1 3 3 . 
22New York Times , June 3 ,  1 9 7 1  (La ter Prime Minister Tal was assass in­
ated for this operation . )  
23Fuad Jabber present s four prerequis i tes the PLO sough t in a secure 
base : ( 1 )  unde r to tal contro l of Resis tance , ( 2 )  near to I srae l to 
carry ou t operations , ( 3 )  in areas po pulated by large numbers of 
Pales tinians Who would be the main sour ce of suppo r t  and manpower 
denied them on the Wes t  Bank , and ( 4 )  in locations tha t would enable 
the PLO to resis t seige and annihilat ion operations of the enemy . 
The Politics of Pales t inian Nationalism, p .  19 0 .  
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M A P  23 
Fedayeen Relocate to Lebanon 
The Syrian res tric tions on guerrilla incurs ions into I s rael , fo rced the 
PLO to concentrate their main effo rts  in obt aining a secure base in 
Lebanon (Map 2 3 ) . 
Unwelcome in Egypt , Jordan , and S yr ia the PLO ' s control of 
southern Lebanon wa s  a ma t ter of survival . Sou thern Lebanon wa s  the 
one area in Wh ich the Pale s t inians could confront the I sraeli s openly 
wi thout interference from other Arab states . In fact , in 1 9 6 9 , Lebanon 
recognized the Pale s tinian autonomous pr esence in their coun t ry and 
their right to engage in opera t ions from Lebanese ter r i tory . 2 4  
However ,  the 400 , 000 Pale s tinians and their fedaye en leaders upset  the 
precarious balance of Chris tians , Sunni Muslims , Shi i te Muslims , and 
Druzes . The Maroni te Chris tians , in par ticular , have resented the 
11 7 
Pales t inians whom they blame for I srael ' s  retaliation strike s into  
Lebanon . The complex si tuation was summarized by a Beirut  news paper 
edi tor  quo ted by No rman F .  Howard in Current His tory :  " here we are 
wi th three armies , two po lice fo rce s ,  22  mili tias , 42 parties , nine 
Pales tinian organizations , four rad io stations , and two telev i s ion 
s tations . .. 25  This ethnic imbalance led to Lebanese civil war . 
The 1 9 7 5-76 Le banese civil war was caused by inequi table di s t r i-
bution of power be tween Christian and Moslems bu t was precipi tated by 
the Pale stinians . They were drawn into the conf lict in orde r to sur-
vive in a country in which they really did not belong . As a resul t , 
the PLO became an open antagoni s t  to the Syr ians , its fo rces were on 
the verge of to tal de feat , and its prestige among the Arab wo r ld suf-
fered greatly .  26 
In 19 7 8 ,  Syr ia took on the responsibili ty to ke ep peace in 
Lebanon , but could not keep the Palest inians out of sou thern Lebanon . 
The Israe li s strong ly ins i s ted they would not accep t  a retur n  of the 
Pale s t inian guerrillas to "Fatah Land " ( Sou thern Lebanon ) .  In March , 
1 9 7 8 , Israeli s invaded southern Lebanon wi th 2 0 , 0 00 t roop s in orde r to 
rid the area of the PLO which repeatedly attacked northern I srael from 
24Jabber , The Politics of Pale s tinian Nationalism ,  P •  1 9 3 . 
2 5Norman F .  Howard , " Tragedy in Lebanon" , Current Hi story ( January 
1 97 7 ) : 2 . 
26The Syrians did no t want a rad ical regime in contro l of Lebanon . 
The Syr ians were entrus ted by the Arab League to br ing peace . I f  
they failed , Syria ' s  prestige a s  a leader wi thin the Arab wo rld would 
have suffered . The PLO stood in the way of tha t peace trying to 
topple the Lebanese government .  
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its Lebanese camps . In 1 9 7 9 , af ter many raid s by Israeli s ,  the PLO 
forces we r e  again in shambles . Arafat announced the PLO would leave 
Lebanon and conduct i t s  raid s from Jordan ( even though it had been 
extricated from Jordan in 1 9 7 1 . )  The PLO didn ' t leave , however ,  and 
move4 to an area north of the Li tani River and south of the Syr ian 
lines where they could have rela tive freedom of movement to reorganize .  
In the next ten years the PLO r ebuilt its army , moved into 
Beirut , and became a pr inciple powe r  fac t ion in Lebanese poli tics . The 
Pale s t inians , in essence , crea ted a state wi thin a s tate , reali z ing a 
form of terr i toriali ty .  In his 1 9 82 r epo rt to the Sena te Foreign 
Rela tions Commi ttee , Senato r Charles P ercy , Chairman , indi cated that · 
mos t Lebanese were fearful that the I sraeli s , Syr ians , and Palestinians 
would fo rce the country to parti tion into religious terri tories . They 
suspected the Israeli s of a desire to control the wa ters of the Li t ani , 
the Syr ians of plo t ting to reas sert their his toric claim to Lebanon , 
and the Pales tinians of planning control and se t tlement in much of 
southern L ebanon . 27 
The PLO ' s bid fo r a Lebanese terri to ry came to an abrupt halt 
wi th I srael ' s invasion in June , 1982 . By Augus t ,  6 , 000 guerril la s  had 
become trapped in beseiged Wes t  Beirut . By Sep tember , the PLO was 
dispersed by the I sraeli s into nine di fferent �fiddle Eas t ern countries , 
the bulk of the guerril las going to Tun i s ia ( 1 100 ) , Jo rdan ( 2000 ) ,  
27u . s . , Congress , Sena t e , The Middle Eas t , A Report to the Commi t t ee 
on Foreign Relations , by Senator Charles H .  Percy , Chairman . 
97 th Congress , 2d sess . ,  1 9 82 . 
Syria ( 2000 ) , South Yemen ( 1000 ) , and S udan ( 500 ) (Map 2 4 ) . 28  
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By 1 9 83 , the Palestine guerrilla movement had only two countries 
to turn to , Syria and Jordan . The Syrian army , now trained and 
supplied by the Soviet Union , no longer feared Palestinian at tempts to 
dislodge their gove rnment wh ich wa s  prone to the coup d ' etat . 
Cons idered by the res t  of the Arab world as the las t  anti-Israeli , 
front-line state , Syria accep ted responsibili ty of "putting up " the 
PLO . Jo rdan , looking to reins tate their Arabnes s  and obt ain financial 
support , al so we lcomed the PLO . General Abdul Raz zak al Yahya , head of 
the PLO in Jordan , indi cated that the PLO would "make change s and 
28Time , December 1 3 , 1 9 82 . ( Half of the guerril las , it  is es timated , 
have returned to Jordan-Syria-Iraq by December . )  
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reorganize itself internal ly in accordance wi th the les sons of 
Lebanon . "  He fur ther pr edi c ted the PLO would launch terroris t raid s 
agains t  the I sraeli s . He said , "Jordan is the bridge fo r the Wes t  
Bank . " 29 In the view of the PLO senior mili tary commander ,  Abu Jihad , 
before their ous ter from B eiru t , the Pales tinians wi l l  "be fo rced to go 
back to the tac t ics of a decade ago . " 30 Translation : hijacking s , 
hos t age taking , and as sas s inations . Wi thout a s tate of their own , the 
PLO has returned to a po int in space and frame of mind i t  had ten years 
before . 
The ac t ive , recognized arm of the Pales tinians , the PLO , there­
fore , has not been success ful in me e t ing their stated goals of elimi­
nat ing Z ionism or mobilizing the We s t  Bank Pales tinians through popular 
armed struggle . However ,  the is sue of the Pale s tinian nat ional claims 
has been raised to the center of interna tional at tention as a Middle 
Eas t  peace prerequis i te (Camp David 1 9 7 7  and Reagan ' s  Plan 1982 ) .  
By 1 9 8 3 , the res i s tance movement has lef t  a mark on Pale s t inian 
terri to riali ty . The a t tributes of Pales tinian nat ionali sm and identi ty 
indeed include s such object ive cri teria as common language , cultural 
t rad i t ion , at tachment to a dis t inc t terri tory , and religious- social 
heri tage . Their unwelcomene s s  in neighboring Arab countries indi cates 
a di s tinctive ident i ty separat e  from their Arab bro thers . Perhaps the 
mos t significant cri teria as a di s t inct people is their recent hi s tory 
of rejection , war ,  and tribula tion . 
2 9Time , Sep tember 6 ,  1982 . 
30Time , June 2 1 , 1 9 82 . 
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The subvers ive alt ernat ives tried in the pas t  have failed . The 
tactic of going underground and seeking to ove rthrow Jo rdan kep t the 
PLO small and vulnerable to Huss ein ' s  mili tary . The at tempt to 
es tabli sh a foothold in a bid to create a state wi thin Lebanon also did 
not work . The fo rmation of a conventional army cons i s tentl y ran the 
risk of defeat by a superior force . In 1983 , the only untried alter­
na tive remaining , that of fo rming a broad ly-based po li t ical and di plo­
matic corps , seems to be the Pale s tinian ' s  only hope fo r a home . Thi s  
goal qui te naturally will require a tremendous amount o f  di sc ipline , 
fo rg iveness , and compromise -- cultural tra i t s  ext remely hard to come 
by in the Arab society , as shall be examined in the next chapter . 
CHAPTER V 
PALESTINIAN SOCIETY 
1 2 2  
The Pales tinians have emerged from a violent his tory of 
es trangement . Unassimila ted throughout the Middle Eas t ,  their stress­
ful .experience has thrown them toge ther under the name Palestinian . To 
the world , and perhaps even to themselves , thei r  so ciety has been an 
enigma . Efforts to de fine the Pales tinian society have proven di f­
f icult . Cons tant geographic di s pers ion , lack of an effective census , 
and di sagreement on who is to speak fo r them have contributed to the 
enigma of def inition . Thi s  chapter wi ll present the myr iad of ingr e­
dients tha t describe a society . Beginning wi th their location , popula­
tion , and livelihood , reconnai s s ance commi ssions and statesmen wi l l  
unders tand some of the Pales tinian struggle fo r a homeland . Elements 
of  cultural cleavage and cohesion among the Pales tinian peop le conclu­
des the chap ter . The mo s t contes ted areas are in the I sraeli occupied 
territories ; consequentl y ,  much of the di scuss ion is in the context of 
I srael and focuses on the Wes t  Bank . 
Over the las t  thirty-f ive ye ars , six Pales tinian groups have 
emerged according to Bernard Lewi s . Firs t are those Who remained in 
Israel when the sta te wa s  es tabli shed in 1948 , and have remained there 
ever since . These are I sraeli ci tizens and enj oy , in theory , many 
though no t all the rights of ci tizenship . The second group live s in 
the areas annexed by Jordan in 1 9 51 and conquered by Israel . in 1 9 6 7 . 
The third group resides in the Gaza Strip occupied and subseq uentl y 
los t by Egypt . The four th is found in Lebanon . The members of this 
body cons tituted the main support  of the mili tant fedaye en un t il the 
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guerrilla ous ter in 1982 . A fifth group compr ises thos e sc attered in 
various Arab countries , especially in the oil-rich Pers ian Gulf . Thes e  
Pales tinians cons ti tute What Arabs call the ghourbal and fo rm the 
intellectual and revolutionary eli te , hence the fedayeen leaders and 
autho rs ( Arafat , Habash , and many intellectual s ) . A sixth group , not 
often mentioned , bu t of sign i f icant impo rtance , is compos ed of 
inhabi tants of the East Bank . Nearly 6 5  percent of the Jo rdanian 
popula tion are Pale s tinians . In a sense , the peop le of the Eas t Bank 
may be regarded , accordi ng to Lewi s ,  as Pale s t inians jus t as thos e from 
the Wes t  Bank can be labeled Jordanians . "The di f ference between the 
two [ Banks ]  i s  ideo logical and programma tic rather than national or 
even geographical . . .  z In to tal , al l six groups compr ise approxima tely 4 
mi l lion Pales tinians (Table 3 ) .  S trange ly enough , the I sraeli Jewi sh 
population is about the same . 
lArab equivalent to the Jewi sh Diaspo ra ,  Fawaz Turki , "Po rtrai t of a 
Palest inian S tate , "  Toward Peace in Pales tine , Hatem I .  Hus sain! , ed . ,  
(Washing ton , D .  c. : Pale s t ine Inf o rma tion O f f ice , 1981 ) ,  p .  3 7 .  
2Bernard Lewi s ,  " The Pale s tinians and the PLO , "  Commentary 5 9  ( January 
1 9 7 5 ) : 37-38 . 
Table 3 . Di s tribution of Pale s tinians . 
Area 
Wes t  Bank 
Gaza S trip 
I srael 
Jordan 
Lebanon 
Syria 
Kuwait 
Saudi Arabia 
Other Gulf S tates 
Americas and E ur ope 
Total 
*includes Jerusalem 
Population 
82 5 , 000* 
450 , 000 
500 , 000 
1 , 1 00 , 000 
350 , 000 
250 , 000 
250 , 000 
50 , 000 
7 5 , 000 
1 7 5 , 000 
4 , 0 25 , 000 
Source : Congressional Quarterly , The Middle East , July 19 7 9 . 
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Population o f  the Wes t  Bank and Gaza 
The mo s t  signif icant of the six groups are the Pale s tinians in 
the I s raeli occupied areas of the West Bank and Gaza (Table 4 ) .  The s e  
two occupied areas have become increasingly impo rtant i n  the wo rld ' s  
eyes - in that their autonomy has been seen as a prerequisite  fo r Midd le 
Eas t  Peace . The final status of the Wes t  Bank and Gaza , the location 
o f  boundaries , and the natur e  of secur ity as well as self gove rning 
authority cons titute the "Framework fo r Peace " issued at Camp David in 
1 9 7 8  (Appendix A ) . The inc lus ion of these two territories into a 
Pale s tinian S tate or enti ty forms the la tes t propos al fo r peace to 
date . 
The Wes t  Bank and Gaza are almo s t exclusively Arab popula ted 
areas ( Table 5 ) . While the pre sent I sraeli adminis tration encourage s 
immigration into the Wes t  Bank , the Arabs stil l compr ise a 9 7% 
major i ty . 3 Half of the peop le are under the age of 1 4 , and while two-
thirds of the Wes t  Bank popula tion is rural , there are seven or eight 
large towns , where about 3 5 percent of the population live s .  Abou t 
5 0 , 000 refugees still live in camps . Only abou t 30 , 000 of the Arab 
inhabi tants  of the Wes t  Bank are Christians ; the res t are MUslim , 
mos tly from the Sunni branch . 4 
3Time , January 7 ,  1 9 8 3 . By the middle of thi s ye ar 6 , 000 new hou s ing 
unit s  will be comple t ed fo r an expected 3 5 , 000 Israeli s .  Of ficials 
predict 100 , 000 by 1 9 8 7 . 
4Amnon Cohen , "West Bank Sentiment s , " The Pales t inians , p .  8 8  
Figure 1 .  Compo s i tion of popula tion by age groups , 1 9 60 . 
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Sourc e :  S tati stical Abs t ract of Israel , 1 1 , 1 9 6 0 . 
Table 4 .  Estimated Popula tion in the Occupied Areas in 1 9 83 . 
Arabs Jews 
Gaza 450 , 000 500 
Wes t  Bank 82 5 , 000 30 , 000 
Golan 9 , 000 3 , 000 
Adap ted from G .  H. Blake and w. w. Harris ''Israeli s come to stay '" , 
Geographical Magazine 5 1  (November , 1 9 7 7 ) :  85 . 
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Table 5 .  Population in  the Wes t  Bank ( excluding Jeru salem )  19 4 4- 1 9 7 8 . 
( in thousands ) 
Mus lims Chr i s t ians Others Total 
1 944 406 . 3  2 5 . 9  0 . 3  432 . 8  
1 9 6 1  7 09 . 9  34 . 9  0 . 2  7 43 . 0  
1 96 7  5 6 5 . 9  29 . 4  3 . 3  598 . 6  
1 9 7 8  6 5 2 . 7  28 . 6  681 . 2  
Source : Daphne Tsimhoni , '' Demographic Trends of the Chr i s t ian 
Popula tion in Jerus alem and the Wes t  Bank 1 9 48-1 9 7 8 , " 
The Middle Eas t Journal 3 7  (Winter 1 9 8 3 ) : 58 . 
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The Palestinians , A Demographic Time-Bomb 
The I sraeli de s ire to incorpo rate the Arab terri to ries into 
Israel , portends future doom fo r the I sraeli state . If such an event 
occurs , the high Arab bi rth ra tes eventually wi l l  make the Jews a 
minority in their own country . Wi th the elect ion of the L ikud govern-
ment in June 1 9 7 7  led by Menachem B egin , Israel began a new national 
po licy,  the incorpo rat ion of the Wes t  Bank wi thin the I sraeli s tate . S 
Of ficial ly the occupat ion is fo r secur i ty reasons , but the present 
coali tion of conserva tive-r eligious  leaders considers thi s area to be 
Jewi sh hi storic S amaria and Judea . Begin pledged to the Knesset ( and 
rei terated numerous time s since ) that ''neve r again would settlements be 
di sbanded by Israel . " 6 
The numerous I sraeli se ttlements throughout the Wes t  Bank po r-
tend a new struggle fo r Pales tine . By January , 1 9 83 , the I sraeli s have 
managed to build 103  f airly mo de s t  condomi nium-s tyle set tlemen t s  in an 
extraordi nary crash program to colonize the We s t  Bank . By the middle 
of 1983 , 6 , 000 new housing uni ts  will be comple ted and 3 5 , 000 Israeli s 
are expected to move into thi s occupied terri tory , thus raising the 
Jewish populat ion to more than 6 0 , 000 . 7 I sraeli of ficials make no 
5The present I sraeli ruling government is the Likud Coali tion , compo s ed 
of the Na tional Religious  Par ty and other minor par ties . They are 
center-right and view the re tention of the occupied territories . The 
Labo r Par ty , entrenched for ten ye ars pr ior to the Likud , believed 
peace wi th the Arabs could be attained only by trading terri to ry . 
6Bos ton Sunday Globe 9 May 1 9 8 2 . He declared this af ter se t tlement s  in 
the S inai were di smantled to affect the peace process  be tween Egypt 
and Israel . 
7Time , 1 7  January 1 9 83 . 
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secre t of their plans . Their sho rt-range goal of placing 1 00 , 000 
Israeli s in the West  Bank by 1 9 87 wil l  make i t  much harder fo r mo derate 
Israe li s who oppo s e  annexa tion to give up the land fo r a Pale s tinian 
entity ( Map 2 5 ) . 
The I sraeli s have a his tory of conf iscating Arab property and 
immediately converting it  into I s raeli proper ty . Estimates in 1 9 48 
indicate that Jews owned only 8% of the total area of Pales tine , 
obtained primarily by purchase from Arab farmers . Mos t  of Pales tine 
before the 1948 war wa s  actually Bri tish administered property . As 
Arabs did not own this land , after the war , mo s t  of it went to Jewi sh 
immigrants . In addi tion to the state areas , the gove rnment of I srael 
also took control of the extens ive land ho ldings and other property 
abandoned by over 7 00 , 000 Arab refugees who fled the territory . 
Be tween 1948 and 1 9 53 , of the 3 70  new Jewi sh settlements , 3 50 were on 
Arab absentee property . 8 Re turning the conf iscated property after 
thirty years of Jewi sh ownership seems ou t of the que s tion and is not even 
considered as a viable alt erna tive to peace . Yet the fact that 
Israeli s  are living in fo rmer Pale s t inian homes increases bi t terne s s  
and animos i ty .  
Israeli public op inion also i s  strong ly moving in the di rect ion 
of the need to re tain the Wes t  Bank . Those who want retention bas e  
their case on a combinat ion o f  hi s torical and securi ty arguments . ( S ee 
Bnon Peretz , " Israeli /Arab E thnic Numbers Game , "  Ethnicity 8 ( S ep tember 
1981 ) :  248 . 
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Chap ter VI ) .  Many obs ervers bo th Arab and I sraeli , howeve r ,  are con-
cerned that peace wi l l  neve r come between the two peoples especial ly 
s ince their animo s i ty is so long-s tanding . 9 
Perhaps the mo s t  sign if icant impact of Israeli retention of the 
Wes t- Bank has been its creation of a "demographic time-bomb . • •  Wi th 
7 00 , 000 Arabs living in I srael proper and ano ther 1 . 3 milli on in the 
occup ied terri tories , Arabs are more than one- third the population of 
the I sraeli state including the Wes t  Bank . Hi storically the 
Pale s tinian Arab bi rth rate has been one of the highes t  in the world 
( 3 . 7-4 . 8% ) . They are expected to double their numbers in 1 7  years , as 
compared to 44 years fo r the Jewi sh po pula tion . lO Many Israeli s are· 
wo rried about a shif t  from the founding ideology of Zioni sm and Jewi sh 
identi ty .  They feel that the original goal of a Jewi sh state wi l l  be 
impaired . The state would no longer be founded on a religious 
ideolog y ,  but a secular one . By 1993 the pe rcent of Arab popula t ion of 
I srael will increase from the present 1 4% to 2 1 %  (not including the 
Wes t  Bank) , even wi th expected substantial Jewi sh immigration . l l  This 
means tha t Israel could eas ily become a de facto binational entity . 
Dwight James Simpson , pro f e s so r  of international rela tions at San 
Franci sco S tate Univers i ty , said , if the trend of the 1 9 70s continued , 
9u .  S .  Congre s s , Senate , A Report  to the  Commi ttee on Foreign 
Relations , by Sena tor Charles  H .  Percy , Chairman , Augus t  1 9 8 2 . 
lOTerence Smi th , ''Reflect ions on a Troubled People , "  Saturday Review 
5 February 1 9 7 7 , p .  18 . 
l lPeretz , " Israeli /Arab E thnic Numbers Game , "  p .  241 .  
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" Jews could be a minori ty in I s rael by the year 2 000 i f  I srael retained 
control of the Wes t  Bank and Gaza S trip . " 1 2  
1 2Dwight Simpson ,  " Israel After Thi rty Ye ars , "  Current His tory ,  
January , 1 9 7 9 , p .  4 .  
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Wes t  Bank Economic Changes 
Many sources sugge s t  that We s t  Bank and Gaza are no t vi able eco-
nomic enti ties . They ci te as proof the abs ence of natural resources 
and the dependence of subsis tence agr iculture by the working 
popula tion . 1 3 There are few minerals other than building ma terials in 
the Arab areas . Howeve r ,  sinc e I sraeli occupa tion after 1 9 6 7 , economic 
condi tions have improved dramatical ly . Expanding marke ts  and I sraeli 
technical assis tance has benef i ted Wes t  Bank ag ricultur e . While under 
occupation , a tenfold increase in the number of trac tors since 1 9 6 7  
( from 1 20 to 1 , 200 ) indicates a po s i tive change in commerical ag r i-
culture . Agricultural pro duc t ion has increased 1 2  percen t annually in 
real terms , and the Wes t  Bank ' s gros s  national product has risen by an 
average of 18 percent annually since 1 9 6 7 . 1 4 
The increase in agr i cultural productivi ty and gros s national 
product is due in large par t  to I sraeli economic policies . The mo s t  
s ignificant policy i s  the open border between the occupied terri tories 
and I srael for Pale s t inian day laborers . Slightly mo re than 3 0  percent 
of Gaza and we·s t  Bank Pales tinians wo rk in I srael . Because they are 
cheap workers , Pales tinians have become a vi tal part of the I sraeli 
economy . They receive abou t 4 5% le s s  wage than I sraeli s .  Wi thin the 
Wes t  Bank and Gaza , Israeli economi c and social po licies have prompted 
1 3Richard J. Ward , '" The Economics of a Pale s t ine Ent i ty , "  The Pales tine 
State (Port Washington , NY :  Kennikat Press , 1 9 7 7 ) ,  pp . 1 1 4f f .  
1 4These are the Bank of I srael ' s  figures . Brian VanArkadie , Bene f i t s  
and Burdens , ( New Yo rk : Carnegie Endowment fo r International Peace , 
1 9 7 7 ) ,  p .  38  tones down these figur es to 7 percent annual GNP r i s e . 
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a departure from subs is tence agr icultur e . In 1 9 69 , Moshe Dayan , the 
Cabinet Ifini s ter for the Occupied Terri tories , relaxed res trict ions on 
roadblocks , travel ,  and cur f ews . 1 5  He also implemented an economic 
po licy that fo rced some dive rs i f ication in the economy ( F igure 2 ) .  
In addi tion to opening up their own economy to Arab labor , the I sraelis 
utilized the Wes t  Bank as a marke t fo r I sraeli product s ,  opened up 
I srael to mo s t  Arab produc t s , and ins ti tuted an '"Open Bridge s "  po li cy 
that al lowed commerce between Jordan and the West  Bank . 1 6  Although the 
Pale s tinian standard of living increased , these policies actua l ly pr e-
vented the emergence of unif ied leadership and cohesion . 
These decisions produced an economic boom fo r the Wes t  Bank . 
This boom , however ,  did not create a Wes t  Bank economic infras truct ur e  
( out side the agricultural sector ) compo sed of financial ins t i tutions 
wi th cap i tal and middle managers wi th independent responsibi li ty .  
Fur thermore , contact wi th the I sraeli economy turned 40 , 000 
Pales tinians into a gi ant labor po o l . This inhibi ted the compr ehens ive 
s tratification of the Pale s tinian society . Joel Migdal expres ses the 
social situation as "a high technology,  managerial group ( Jews ) 
hierarchically si tua ted above a le s s  developed , working group 
(Arabs ) . 17  The pa ttern is remini scent of the Mandate when the wo rke rs 
1 5shabt ai Teve th , Moshe Dayan , ( Bos ton , Houghton Mi fflin Company , 
1 9 7 3 ) , pp . 346ff . 
1 6Migdal , " The E ffec ts  of Regime Po licies on Social Cohesion and 
Fragmen tation , "  Palestinian Society and Politics (Pr inceton , NJ ,  
Prince ton Univers i ty Press , 1 9 80 ) , p .  46 . 
17 rbid , P ·  47 .  
Figure 2 .  Employees by Selected B ranch of Pale s t inians Living in the We s t  Bank and Gaza , 
1978 . 
Percent Working in 
Arabs Percent Working in I srael Occupied Ter r i t o r i e s  
Living 
In Cons t r . Indus t .  Agri c . O ther To tal Cons tr . Indus t . Agr i c . O ther To tal 
We s t  Bank 46% 23% 1 1% 19% 36 , 800 1 1% 15% 34% 40% 94 , 000 
Gaza 44% 20% 23% 12% 31 4 , 000 7% 15% 2 1% 56% 48 , 7 00 
Source : S t a t i s t ical Abs trac t o f  I srael , The Admini s tered T e r r i t o r i e s  ( Je ru s alem : Central 
Bureau of S tat i s tics , 197 9 ) , p. 7 1 2 . 
� 
(,...) 
� 
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began streaming from the central hil l  country toward the urban coastal 
areas . Ins tead of a develop ing Arab entrepreneural class on the coas t 
as in the Manda te , the Arabs now commute back into the hills after 
work . Despite increased economic condi tions on the Wes t  Bank , 
Pales tinians continue to be frus t rated and feel repres sed . 
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Struggle and Repres sion 
The Pale s tinian struggle fo r terri tory and their  subsequent 
repression are perhaps  the common denominator Which bes t  de scribes the 
Pales tinian society . Struggle fo r sovereignty by Israeli s and 
Pales tinians in I srael has created cons tant tens ion and com pe t i tion fo r 
world approval . Once cons ide red an island of valiant but ou tnumbered 
underdogs surrounded by mi li tant fo es seeking their de s truc t ion , the 
I sraeli image has changed .  Nume rous article s  in the press  have 
recounted bi t ter , condi t ions in the West  Bank caused by harsh I sraeli 
mili tary policies . Wi th the 1 9 82 Israeli invasion into Lebanon , the 
unfortunate ma ssacre in the Sabra and S hatila refuge e camps , and the 
eroding u . s . -Israeli relat ionshi p ,  Israel has now at tained the image of 
the oppressor . 
Despite I sraeli effo r t s  to give more democra t ic freedom to the 
Pale s tinians including the ini tiation of the "village league s , " 
Pale s t inians in the West  Bank perceive themselve s  as being repres sed . 
The I s raelis des igned the vi l lage league s in 1978  for Arabs who do not 
want the PLO to speak fo r them . Howeve r ,  Elias Freij , the mode rate 
Pale s tinian mayor of Bethl ehem , said the vi llage league s are "a name 
wi thout a body . " l8 Frei j is the only elect ed Pales tinian mayor of an 
important town Who has no t been di smi ssed by Israeli occupation 
authori ties . He ins i s t s  that the I s raeli set tlement program has 
c reated an anxiety tha t stops jus t short of panic . "We are fighting 
agains t time . The I sraeli s want to grab as much land as they can . 
1 8Boston Globe , May 9 ,  1 982 ,  p .  2 4 . 
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They want to make i t  impos s ib le fo r us to have au tonomy , no t to mention 
a state . We are at five minu te s  to midnight , and thi s  is our las t  
chance . " 19  
Like the I sraeli grab fo r terri to ry , impingement on Arab 
academic freedoms has contr ibuted to a frustrated society . The acting 
p resident of Najah National Univers i ty ,  w. F .  Abboushi , an Arab 
American , recount s  the I s raeli oppressive po licies during schoo l  ye ar 
1 981-82 . Na jah is one of three Univers i ties on the Wes t  Bank 
( Bethlehem and B ir Zei t are the others ) .  He explains that the I sraeli 
mili tary fo rced the professo r s  to sign a pledge no t to aid the PLO . 
This raised a tremendous debate ( participated in by u .  s .  Secretary of 
S tate George Shultz ) over freedom of thought . The I sraeli s expel led 
twenty-two fo reign teachers and threatened 1 00 mo re because they 
refus ed to sign . 20 Moreover , Abboushi said , 
I was refused a work permi t .  When my three month vi sa 
expired , I had to leave the Wes t  Bank and come back to 
get ano ther vi sa . I did this three times in one ye ar . 
I was de termined to keep a low prof ile and not make an 
i ssue of my part icular si tua t ion . I remembered tha t three 
years earlier , When I taugh t at Bir Ze i t  Univers i ty ,  I 
made an is sue of a similar problem and was beaten by 
I sraeli so ldiers , along wi th ano ther American , right in 
f ront of the mili tary governor ' s  of fice . 2 1  
I n  addi tion , the universi ties could no t purchase books wi thou t approval . 
Many periodicals and books were denied or censo red because they were 
cri tical of Israel . The mos t pre s s ing problem was the rou tine beat ings  
1 9Time , January 1 7 , 1 983 , p .  2 2 . 
20washington Pos t , November 1 9 , 1 9 82 , p .  A28 . 
2 1chri s tian Science Moni tor , November 30 , 1982 , p .  23 . 
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of  Pale s tinian students . Abboushi indicates over one- third of the 
Najah student body had been in I sraeli jails , which student s  jokingly 
referred to as  "The Hilton . "  Dur ing the I sraeli inva sion of  Lebanon 
the mili tary authorities used real bulle ts  to di sperse student 
demons trations pro tes ting the invas ion . 2 2  
O ften protes ts  degenera te into violence wi th an eye fo r an eye 
be ing the only guideline . In the holy ci ty of Hebron , bi rthplace of 
King David and bur ial place of Abraham , Isaac , and Jacob , tens ions 
mounted in 1979 , when Arabs kil led six I sraeli s in front of a communi ty 
center occupied by Jewi sh squa t ters . 2 3 Nearly fif ty ye ars befo re ,  Arab 
residents massacred 6 0  Jews in the same ci ty . Af ter the murde r of the 
s ix Israelis the mili tary government bul ldozed the two Arab houses 
where the ambush was ini tiated . So it  goes ; one turn de serve s ano ther 
wi th the outcome only intens ifying hatred . 
The arrest  of hundred s  of students , the smashing of locks on 
s hops closed by strike s , and the es tabli shment of Jewi sh set tlemen ts in 
the territo ries , may appear to res to re orde r and give I srael s treng t h . 
A more careful analys is reveals that a percep tible growth of conf ide nce 
may finally be emerging no t from the PLO led Pales tinians ou t s ide 
the I sraeli borders -- but among Pale s tinians in the We st  Bank and Gaza 
who have remained relative ly quie t .  Vio lence does not seem to be the 
modus operandi of this new nationali sm condi tioned by Israeli 
repressive measures . A new inner- s treng th seems to be appearing . An 
2 2rbid . 
23Bos ton Globe , May 9 ,  1 9 82 .  
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o fficer of the mili tary gove rnment in November 1 98 0 ,  vi si ting B ir Zei t 
University , ordered the admini s tra tion to di smantle an exhibi tion of 
drawing s by Pales tinian prisoners on the grounds that "they ' re pri so-
ners , not artis ts . "  Despi te the I s raeli Defense Force ' s  reasoning fo r 
the .order , the exhibi tion organiz ers saw i t  as ano ther sign of I sraeli 
weakness . It appeared tha t the mil i tary government could be intimi­
dated by an art exhibi t . 24 An obs erver in the West  Bank saw an Arab 
girl who had been wounded in the leg by Israeli fire dur ing the breakup 
of a demons tration . She was hopping along on her other leg , calming 
her fr iends wi th shouts  of " I t ' s  OK , it ' s  OK ! "  Rafik Halabi , an 
Israeli Druze working fo r the Nat ional Telev i s ion News Service , noted 
the poise , presence of mind , and the look of triumph on her face 
despi te the pain . 2 5  The Pales t inians may be coming toge ther in 
response to I srael ' s  tough po licies . 
2 4Raf ik Halabi , The Wes t  Bank S tory, Ina Friedman trans . ,  ( New York : 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich , 1 9 8 1 ) ,  p. 282 . 
2 5Ibid . 
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The Holocaus t Complex -- Israeli Society 
An info rmed view of Pale s t inian terri torial i ty ,  or owned space , 
canno t be approached wi thout the regard fo r the compe t ing so ciety , the 
Israeli s .  The st rong terri torial convict ion of the I sraeli s has , in 
i t self , contributed to the response of the same convictions fo r the 
land in the Pales tinian society . The Israeli society ' s wi l l  to ma in-
tain control of Pale s tine through tough and of ten repre s s ive po li c ies 
has , in effect , placed the Pales tinian Arabs in the same stress 
s i tuation experienced by the Jew fo r 2000 years . The product of a 
society which survives under pressure has generally been shown to be 
s trong . The I sraeli so cie ty is one of the best  examples of this . The 
common so cie tal stress tha t the Jews underwent is termed the Ho locau s t  
complex . 
Whenever the subject of I srael and Arab des tiny is rai sed , the 
discus s ion seems to turn to the Ho locaust . To the Israeli s ,  their 
his tory of persecution throughout mil lennia has been more seve re than 
that of any people . A conviction has arisen among I sraelis that in 
order to prevent a recurrence of pogroms and the Ho locaus t ,  the Jews 
mus t  remain the mas ters of their own des tiny . The Israeli s com-
miss ion their new mili tary of ficers every year on the rock of Masada 
which has become a Jewi sh de f iance symbol ,  much like the Alamo was to 
Texans . The roo t to , "Masada shal l no t fal l again ! " ,  reveals the de ter­
mination to maintain sovereignty over the promi sed land . 26  In po li ti-
26soo Jewish Zealo ts  commi t ted mass suic ide in the de sert fo rtres s of 
Masada in A. D .  7 3 rather than surrender to cer tain execu t ion by the 
Romans . 
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cal terms , the Jews beli eve they can achieve secur ity only by the 
maintenance of a Jewi sh state where Jews cons titute an absolute and 
overwhelming majority . 27  
To unders tand the I sraeli national psycho logy , a cur so ry look at 
the · bis torical magni tude of the di aspo ra is  in order . Comprehending 
the Jewish mind and the sing ular impo rtance of the "chosen peop le" can 
be a massive pro ject requiring ye ars of research . Jame s A. }tlchener 
suggests  reading Deuteronomy five times over . 28 The warning given by 
Moses , recounted in Deuteronomy , to his people if they fail to 
acknowledge the Lo rd God , has taken place wi th amaz ing accuracy : 
And the Lord shall sca t ter thee among all people , from the 
one end of the ear th even un to the other • • •  And among these 
nations shalt thou find no ease , nei ther shall the so le of 
thy foo t  have res t : but the Lord shall give thee there a 
t rembling heart , and fail ing of eyes ,  and sorrow of mind : 
And thy li fe shall hang in doubt befo re thee ; and thou 
shalt fear day and night , and shalt have none assur rance 
of thy li fe . 29 
The rest  of the Old Tes tament depicts the Jewi sh failure to acknowledge 
God . As a result , the Jews have undergone di spersal and persecu tion 
for 2 500 years throughout the world . 
5 9 7-586 B .  C .  Nebuchadnez zar conquers Jerusalem and des troys the 
f irs t  Temple . A huge number of Jews we re taken into 
exile known as the Babylonian Captivi ty . 
2 7shai Feldman , " Peacemaking in the Middle Ea s t : The Next S tep , " 
Foreign Affairs 59 ( S pr ing 1 9 81 ) ,  p .  7 5 7 .  
2 8James A. Michener , The Source ( Greenwich , Conn . , Fawce t t  Publications , 
Inc . , 196 5 ) ,  PP •  1 9 3-1 9 7 . 
2 9neuteronomy 29 : 64-66 (King Jame s ve rsion ) . 
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Revo lt agains t Rome culminated in de struc tion of  the 
s econd Temple . Jo s ephus repo rts  1 mil lion Jews taken 
into the slave marke ts bound fo r all part s  of the 
Medi terranean . 
Bar Kokhba War resul t ed in the third major di spersal 
o f  Jews throughou t the Roman Empire . 
Byzantine Emperor Heraclius promulga ted a Law calling 
f or fo rced conve rs ion to Chris tiani ty of all J ews in 
the empire . 
Firs t Crusad e . Befo re leaving on the Crusade , some 
s oldi ers ma ssacred Jews in· Rhineland . 
Jews expelled from F rance , property conf i sca ted . 
After several de cades of persecution , including blood 
l ibel trials 30 Jews expel led from England . 
t-lassacres , forced conve rs ions , and expuls ions in ro s  t 
countries of Wes t ern Europe . Condi tions in Spain 
p erhaps wors t ,  culminating in the S panish Inquis i tion 
in 1 480 and expuls ion in 1492 . Jews expel led from 
S icily , 1 493 ; Li thuania , 1 49 5 ; Portugal , 1 496-97 ; 
Brandenberg , 1 5 1 0 ;  Naples , 1 541 ; Prague , 1 541 . In 
1 544 Mar tin Luther launched attacks on Jews on charge s 
o f  de ic ide . 
Estima ted 1 00 , 000 Jews killed and 3 00 c ommuni ties 
destroyed in the Ukraine . 
Expuls ions and pe rsecut ions common throughou t  Europe . 
In 1 7 1 5  Pope P ius VI  i ssued "Edict concerning the 
Jews , •• which al luded to de icide charge s and extended 
res trict ions on Chris tian-Jewi sh rela tions . 
Rus sian pogroms result ed in beginning mass Jewi sh 
emigration mo s tly to No rth America . Between 1880  and 
1 91 4 abou t 2 . 6 mi l lion Eas t European Jews fled to 
North America . 
30Blood libe l is the medieval Chr is tian beli ef that Jews engaged in 
ri tual murder of non-Jews ( usually you ths ) to obtain blood fo r 
pas sover . Trials and persecu tions on this issue we re cora.mon through­
out mo s t  west  European countries during the Middle Age s .  The idea 
lingered in Eas t European coun tries as late as the nineteenth century 
Naz i of f icials revived the be li ef . 
on May 27 , 1 967 , that the object of the war was " the de s t ruction of 
Israel , "  the effect on I sraeli ci t iz ens could be nothing other than 
fatali sm and survival . 33 
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As a result of the 1967 , 1 9 7 3 , and 1 982 Wars , only three Arab 
s tate s , Egypt ,  Jordan , and Lebanon , have given de facto recogn i t ion to 
Israel ' s exis tence . The refusal by the Arab League and the PLO to 
recognize the exi s tance of the Jewi sh state is the root issue which 
causes apprehension and fear in the I sraeli mind . Palestinian so ciety 
mus t  be unders tood in view of the Ho locau s t  Complex rooted in recent 
Jewi sh history . 
3 3Mei r ,  " Israel in Search of Las ting Peace , "  p .  4 5 1 . 
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Cultural C leavage and Cohesion 
Although the Pale s tinians po s sess a sense of terri toriali ty fo r 
Pale s tine , their failur e to obt ain the land ove r the pas t  7 0  years 
que s t ions their
. 
socie ty ' s  abil i ty to obt ain it . In the event of an 
impQs ed set tlement , the que s tion also arises concerning their abili ty 
t o  maintain a state s truc t ure . Thi s  sect ion considers the cultural 
cohesion and cleavage wi thin the Palestinian socie ty . 
Terri torial allocat ion fo r a Pales tinian state wi l l  prove di f-
f icult because the Pale s tinians lack coherent organiza tion wi thin their  
cultur e . Karl Deutsch def ines a society as  a group of  pe rsons Who have 
learned to work toge ther . He fur ther explains tha t a communi ty is com-
pos ed of persons Who are able to communicate informa t ion to each other 
effectively over a wide range of sub je ct s . 34  The nature of Pales tinian 
society , wi th its  deep , tradi tional sources of di s tru s t and divi s ion , 
i s  intros pective at the hamula or clan leve l and res ists  commun icat ion 
and cooperation outside of their " family space . "  
Many Middle Eas t  social ge ographers , such as S tephen Longrig g , 
have classified Middle Eas t ern so ciety as a mosaic of di s tinct , of t en 
conf licting groups . 3 5  There appears to be no consistent so cial sys tem 
or se t of atti tude s which bind a ma jo r i ty of the people into one uni t .  
The Pale s t inian si tua t ion is probably mo re fragmented than mos t because 
34Karl w .  Deut sch , " The Growt h of Na tions : Some Recur rent Pa t terns of 
Poli tical and Soc ial Integration , "  The Structure of  Political Geography , 
Roge r E .  Kas perso n ,  ed . ,  ( Chicago : Aldine Publi shing , 196 9 ) , p .  2 1 1 . 
35s tephen Longrigg , The Middle Eas t : A Social Geography , ( Chicago : 
Aldine Publi shing , 2nd ed . ,  1 9 70 ) ,  p .  9 .  
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of the di slocation endur ed by many . 
Although many students of Arab culture have overs tated the 
.
inf luence of the " spirit of the de sert , "  one cannot di smi s s  the many 
cultural tradi tions Which have come from the Bedouin tribe s . Even 
though mo s t  Pales tinians live in vi l lage s ,  towns , or me tropo li tan 
areas , the pr inciple organizing funct ion wi thin Arab society is cen­
tered around kin groups . In mo s t  vil lage s and even ci ties the de sc en­
dants of a common , rela tive ly di s tant ances tor form the hamula or clan . 
The hamula is the repos i tory of family honor and also tends to be endo­
gamous , tha t is , each person is expected to marry wi thin one ' s  lineage . 
Hence , the son or daughter of one ' s  fa ther ' s  brother is considered the 
mos t appropria te ma te . For centur ies the ibn am ( son of father ' s  
brother ) married hint am {daughter of father ' s  brother ) .  Although 
values are changing , par ticularly in the urban areas , the male still 
has the presumptive right to marry his firs t cousin and may be paid by 
the girl ' s  other sui tor to release her from this obligation . Even i f  
they are no t rela ted , a s  i s  the case in some urban centers , the husband 
and wi fe affec tionately cal l each other ibn ammi and hint ammi . 3 6  
Descent i s  held t o  be o f  utmo s t impo rtance . Reckoned through 
men , or patrilineal ly , the Arab society is founded on bloodlines . 
Allegiance wi thin the clan is much mo re important as a source of cohe­
s ion than job , ins t i tut ion , or even religi on . A man ' s  name include s 
his  paternal genea logy and of ten indi cates ei ther his family name , his 
ancient tribal affiliation , or his vi l lage . For example , a man 
3 6rrving Kaplan , Jordan A Country S tudy , p . 68 . 
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named Abd a1 Rahman ibn Qasim ibn Muhammad Al Quds would be recognized 
as the son of Qasim , the son of Muhammad from Jerusalem (Al Quds ) .  
Arabs value family so lidari ty highly;  being a good family member 
means automatic loyalty to kinsmen and obedi ence by children . There is 
not - a  similar feeling , however , of loyalty toward a job ,  employer , co-
worker , or even a fr iend . A wide s pr ead convict ion exi s t s  that the only 
reliable people are kinsmen . Po li ticians , guerrilla leaders , and minor 
officials will of t en appo int their kinsmen ove r ou t s iders ma inly because 
of a sense of respons ibi l i ty and trus t .  Comme rcial establi shments , 
small indus tries , and agr icultur al enterp rises are bas ically family 
operations . 37 
One par ticular illuminating concep t wi thin the Arab cultur e  is 
their pass ion fo r honor , ird , as it rela tes to po li tical execution . 
Any inj ury to a member of one clan is an inj ury to al l the members . 
Family reputation , therefo re , is der ived from the good repute wi thin 
the kin group , and inj ur ies can only be erased by appropriate revenge . 
In the pas t ,  bloody feuds between tr ibes and assassinat ions were com-
monp lace wi thin Arab culture . Even the Muslim schi sm between Sunni and 
Shia began wi th assass ination . 38 When Ali , Muhammad ' s  son in law , 
became the holy successo r , he wa s  murdered . Fratricide , according to 
Hurewi tz , became commonp lac e . He de sc ribes one Muslim Cali ph , Mehmed 
I I I  ( 1 5 9 5-1603 ) ,  who executed ni neteen brothers and two sons , to 
37Nyrop , Syria , a Country S tudy , pp . 7 0-71 . 
38The word , assass in , comes from an ancient Arab kil ler group called 
Hashashin . 
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reduce the number of claimants and ensure success ion of the throne . 3 9  
Peter Gubser , in a study of Al Karak , a Jordanian town , de sc ribes a 
special group called the Khamsah , fo rmed by Sharia Law , the Muslim law 
code . Thi s body wa s  respons ible fo r avenging the death of an indivi­
dual or collect ing compensation . 40 Although Jordan made the Khamsah 
i l legal in 1976 , the idea of honor and payback is deeply rooted in the 
Arab society , no t necessar i l y  as a social evil , bu t as a di s tinct 
characteris tic of their  cultur e . This  cultural trait explains why the 
reg ion accep ts terrorism and murde r as normal behavior wi thin its 
society . 
At thi s po int i t  mus t  be unders tood that the Pales tine resis tance 
movement and the right of armed struggle is not the is sue here . 
Reliance on armed struggle is  a fundamental pr inciple accep ted by mo s t  
societies . 41 The Uni ted S tates drew from such a pr inciple to jus t i fy 
i t s  revolution . The crux of the presen t  is sue de als mainly wi th the 
internal cooperative spiri t among the Palest inian Arabs and thei r  abi-
l i ty to fuse into a coherent organiza tion . 
It  is Unwi se to consider vio lence a culture trai t of a group of 
peop le regardless of the socio-his torical evidence . However ,  �ruslim 
39Hurewi tz , Middle Eas t Politics : The Mi litary Dimension , p .  1 9 . 
Mehmed was Ot toman and Mus l im ,  but no t an Arab . Nonetheles s ,  the 
taking of li fe became leg i t ima te throughou t the Middle Eas t . 
40Peter Gubser , Po li tics and Change Al-Karak , Jordan , ( New Yo rk : 
Oxfo rd Univers i ty Press , 1 9 7 3 ) ,  ci ted by Kaplan , Jordan , A Country 
Study , p .  7 1 . 
41Emile A. Nakhleh , " The Anatomy of V iolence , "  The Middle Eas t Journal 
2 5  ( Spring 1 9 71 ) :  18 6 .  
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religious tradi tion legi timize s  vi olence . Perhaps the earli s t  facto r 
which legitimizes violence is the religious tradi tion of MUslim 
mili tancy advoca ted in the Quran : "And fight in the way of Allah wi th 
tho s e  who fight wi th you and do not exceed this limi t . "  ( 2 : 19 0 )  "And 
f ight wi th them un til there is no pe rsecu tion and all religions are 
only fo r Allah ( 8 : 39 ) . "  "He it is who has sent His Messenger wi th the 
guidance and the true religion that  He may make it overcome all ( other ) 
religions . "  ( 61 : 9 ) . 42 The Manual of Hadi th, a companion book of expla-
nations to the Quran on what the P rophet said , did , or approved , 
described the Jihad or Ho ly War as carrying a two-fold significanc e ,  
a t tempting peaceful mi s sionary- type act ivi ties and , when necessary , · phy­
s ical force . 43 
Although the Quran emphasizes that the sword should not be used 
to fo rce I s lam on others ( 2 : 25 6 ) ,  many Imams , spiri tual successo rs to 
the Prophet , have used the sword fo r expanding the M.!slim Empires .  
Iran is us ing the term Jihad today in i t s  purge of al l ves tments of the 
Shah ' s reign . 
Vio lence , in the name of honor ,  is not the O Ltly cultur e  trait  
that produces cleavage . Individuali sm in the Arab leader also produces 
cleavage . Like the inward-o riented clan groups , Pales tinian leadership 
embraces the cultural value s centered on individual ism .  Two accep ted 
leadership sty les are prevalent among the Arabs . The firs t is the 
4 2rhe Holy Qur-an , Abdullah Yusuf Ali , trans . ( S tate of Qa tar : 
Presidency of Islamic Cour t s  and Affairs , 1946 ) .  
4 3A Manual of Hadi th , Maulana Muhammad Ali , ( Lahore , w .  Paki s tan : The 
Ahmadiyya Anj uman I Shaa t I slam) , pp . 2 5 2f f .  
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respected elder statesman wh o  usually uses an interpersonal sty le to 
consult wi th other notables to reach group concensus , shura . The other 
s tyle is the strong charisma tic leader , Za ' im ,  who goe s  over the head s 
o f  equals and deals di rectly wi th the masses . 44 William Quandt 
explains that the devo tion to thes e  two ext reme styles of leadership 
results  in the emergence of few di sciplined , second-echelon leaders to 
build coherent organiza tio ns in the society . 45 Joel Migdal agrees . 
Ins tead of finding the reason in his to ric society as Quandt has done , 
he shows the causes to be from economic , secur i ty ,  and mili tary po li c ies 
( Br i tish , Jordanian , and I sraeli ) . 46 ( See the Wes t  Bank and 
Gaza this chapter . )  Thus , the leaders who exi s t  to bring the society 
toge ther actually tear the so c i e ty apart by their individuali sm . They 
fail to produce second-echelon leaders necessary to uni te the 
Pales tinians . 
Other cultural characteris tics of Palestinian society res trict the 
creation of ef fective leadership , and produc e cleavage . A harsh cri tic 
of  Arab socie ty , Sadiq al-Azm ,  ma inta ins that Palestinians continue to 
demons trate a " tribal mentali ty "  where their  loyalty never goe s  beyond 
that of his own family . Thus Arab leaders are reluc tant to subordi nate 
themselves to the intere s t s  of a larger society . Al-Azm also condemns 
44Thi s leadership viewpo int resemble s the Blake-Mouton leadership gr id 
expressing di fferences be tween the autocratic mi s s ion-o rien ted and the 
democratic peop le-oriented leader .  Blake and Mouton , "The Mili tary 
Leadership Grid , "  Military Review 6 0  (July 198 0 ) : 13-29 . 
45Quand t , The Politics of  Pale s tinian Nationalism ,  p .  8 0 . 
46Migdal , Pales tinian Society and Politics , pp . 19-7 7 . 
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the "fahlawi , "  character o f  the Arab . The fahlawi i s  one wh o  ini tially 
may be attracted to some great ide a  and shows much enthus iasm fo r i t ,  
bu t When dif f iculties se t in , he frequentl y  backs down into apa thy . 47 
Revolutionary zeal is rarely sus tained and reflect s cyclic act ivi sm 
alternating wi th abandonment of the cause as has been shown in Chap ters 
II-IV . Karl w. Deutch po ints ou t tha t "when a union is ini tiated to 
counter an enemy , it tends to di s integrate as the threat passes . "  He 
fur ther sugges t s  fo r situa t ions "under threat"  that po li tical 
geographers and statesmen wi l l  have to examine condi tions fo r social-
uni fication other than when mili tary pr essure is exer t ed . 48 The 
Pales t inians were uni fied to a po in t  when confronted by Ottoman , 
British , Jewish,  and Jo rdanian po li cies , but di s integrated fo l lowing 
the outbursts  of vi olence . 
Wi th a defini te imbalance of leadership in the Pale s tinian 
society , is unification of the di slocated Pales t inian po s s ible ? Ami tai 
E tz ioni , Professor of Sociology at Columbia Univers i ty ,  explains that 
the necessary ingredients fo r un i f ication are communicat ion abili ty , 
integra ting pOwer , an effect ive di s tribu tion of pOwer concentration , 
and take-off momentum . 49 The lack of pOwe r  concentrated in the 
47 sadiq al-Azm , Self Cri tici sm After the Defeat ( in Arabic ) (B eiru t : 
Dar at-Taliah , 1 9 68 ) ci ted by Quandt , The Poli tics of  Palest inian 
Nationalism ,  p .  8 0 .  Thi s fahlawi parad igm resemble s Chris t ' s  
parable of the sower almo s t  exact l y ,  John 8 : 5-18 . 
48Karl w. Deutsch , Poli t ical Communi ty in the North Atlantic Area , 
( Prince ton , N.  J . : Pr ince ton Unive rs i ty Press , 1 9 5 7 ) ,  pp . 44-4 6 .  
4 9Ami tai Etz ioni , "A Parad igm fo r the S tudy of Poli tical Uni fication , "  
The Structure of  Political Geography , Roger E .  Kasperso n ,  ed . ,  
( Chicago : Aldine Publi shing , 1 9 6 9 ) ,  pp . 2 26-2 28 .  
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hand s of a Pales tinian eli te i s  evident by the absence of respo nsible 
s econd-echelon leaders . The complex communication sys tem of the 
Pale s tinians compos ed of radio  broad cas t s ,  school li terature , and family 
poli tical dJ. scussions , reache s down to even the ms t rural person . 
Deut-sch points out ,  however ,  the need fo r the recipient of the com-
munication to be able to dige s t  the info rma tion and respond 
e f fectively . SO The Pales tinians on the West  Bank have recognized the 
PLO as their spokesman . They have ei ther relied on the PLO to af fect 
the poli tical changes , or avo ided comment fo r fear of being branded a 
" quisling "  by fellow Arabs . The decision-making tmi t ,  the PLO , is 
therefore ideologically rigid , incapable of li s tening to feedback , and 
unable to conve rt Wes t  Bank sentiment into power . 
The la.ck of Etz ioni ' s " integ rating power , "  also res trict s  
Pale s tinian unification . Integra ting power has three face ts : iden-
ti fication , coercio n ,  and utili ty . Identi tive asse t s , composed of sym-
bols ( the black , red , and green flag , the Kafeyah head-wear , a shared 
hi s tory of conflict , Martyrs Day , etc . )  are defini tely present in 
Pale s tinian society . Coercive as sets  are weapo ns and manpower . 
Lacking however ,  are the ins talla tions or bases from which to ope rate  
( Jordan , los t  in  197Q-71  and Beiru t  los t 1 982-83 ) .  Meager utili tarian 
assets such as economic po s se s s ions , technical and admi ni s trative capa-
bili ties , etc . , reveal a di s tinct we akness in the Pales t i n ian abili ty 
S�ar l w. Deutsch , Polit ical Communi ty in the North Atlantic Area , 
P P •  1 2f f . 
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to exert integration . 5 1  
Take-off occurs when a " process has accumulated enough m:>men tum 
to continue on its own , wi thout the suppo rt of nonmember units . "  
Sustainment of the PLO by the U S SR,  the oil rich Arab states , and the 
ad jacent " front line" Arab coun tries has created an entrenched depen-
dence . Decision-making continues to be based upon the ideology of the 
supporting enti ty rather than upon the Palestinian concensus . One 
take-of f de terminant is that the flow of people , goods and com-
munications acros s  national boundaries increases pr ior and dur ing 
take-off . 52 Israeli rnili tary occupation has prevented significant 
exchange of this flow of shared act ivi ties between the Wes t  Bank , the 
PLO , and refugees . The Arab economic boycot t has contributed to thi s 
res trict ion of shared activi ties in the same way . 
Uni fication of Pale s t inians to fo rm a separate state has been 
resis ted by Israel , Jo rdan , Syr ia , and the USSR .  Talcott Parso ns in his 
Essays in Sociological Theory ins i s t s  tha t ou tsiders can hinde r the uni-
f ication proces s .  Their "utili tarian interes ts and identive commi t­
ments nx> t ivate them to suppo r t  the ma intenance of the status quo . " 53  
Israel hinders the process ou t of  a de s i re fo r West  Bank annexa tion and 
the need for national secur i ty ( see Chap ter VI ) .  Jordan also de sires 
recovery of the Wes t  Bank fo r economic and pr es tige purposes . The Wes t  
5 1Ami tai Etzioni , " A  Parad igm fo r the S tudy of Po li tical Uni fica tion , " 
P • 2 27 . 
52rbid . 
5 3Talcot t  Parso ns , E s says in Sociological Theory, ( New York : The Free 
Pre ss of Glencoe , 1 9 54 ) ,  PP • 1 38-1 4 1 .  
Bank ' s agricultural output would be a great asset to Jordan ' s  mo s tl y  
arid topography . King Hus sein ' s  pr imary fear of a Palestinian s tate 
centers around a po s s ible ( and probable ) chal lenge to his throne . 
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Syria also fears a radical government on its southern flank Which could 
cre�te internal di scord in Syr ian factionali zed poli tics . Any terri­
torial deci sion wi thout Syria to so lve the Palestine que s t ion would 
mean a los s  in pres tige in the Arab World , particularly since Syrian 
leaders wish to exhibi t an image of regional leadership in orde r to 
some day uni te all the Arab coun tries in one nat ion . The US SR also 
enjoys the frui ts  of ma intai ni ng the status quo . They reali ze that 
tension in the region wi l l  fo s ter dependence upon the U S SR fo llowed by 
an ou tle t fo r arms sale s ,  the expo rt  of communis t ideo logy , and the 
increase of Soviet regional pr e s t ige . Wi th a satis factory so lution to 
the Pales tinian problem the U S SR would los e the revolu tionary catalys t 
necessary fo r their doc trine to take root . 
Therefo re , the internal cooperative spiri t amo ng the Palestinian 
society and their abili ty to fuse into a coherent organiza tion is 
thwarted internally and external ly by so cial cleavage s  and poli t i cal 
maneuvering . Given the his torical pers pect ive of Palestinian social 
and po li tical events fr om 1 9 1 7 -1 9 8 3 ,  the present fragmentation of 
ideology ( 1 2 di fferent fact ions in the PLO) , the non-s tratified , 
leaderless infra s truc ture , and the general mi s trus t be tween age old 
famili es , the Pale s t in i an so ciety does not ye t contain the approp r iate 
chemis try to unite . 
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CHAPTER VI 
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIAL ALLOCATIONS 
Theoretical Solutions for a Palest inian Enti ty 
Given the development of Pales tinian terri toriali ty , there are 
s everal op t ions fo r a Pales t inian state , should it be impos ed on the 
region . These opt i ons , propos ed by Arabs , Jews , and international di plo-
ma t s , give those charged wi th recommending na tional fo rm and terri-
torial limits a wide scope of po li tical geographic ideas which may help 
reso lve this issue . The object ive of this chapter is no t to arrive at 
the precise state fo rm , bu t to contribu te to a bet ter tmders tanding and 
more reasoned at titudes concerning this controve rs ial issue . Three . 
pos s ible types of solu tion to the Pale s t inian pr oblem are the to tal 
Pales t inian state , the binational s tate , and repar ti tion . 
The firs t of thes e , the to tal Pale s t inian state , was put fo rward 
by the PLO . It is bas ical ly the creation of an Arab Pale stine state in 
the place of Israel . ! This state would compr ise all of Wes tern 
Pale s tine ( I srael ) and might include the Eas t Bank too . This implies 
the end also of the Jordanian monarchy . 2 Thi s proposal , embodi ed in 
the charter of the PLO and subs tantiated 1 2 t imes since its adop tion in 
1 9 68 , basically advocates the death of Israel and Z ionism ( the state 
1Yasser Arafat , " The Uni ted Na tions Appeal fo r Peace , "  Toward Peace in 
Pales t ine (Pales t ine Info rmation O f f ice , 1 9 81 ) ,  pp . 17-1 8 . 
2Maps which appear in the emblems of the PLO show Wes tern Pales ti ne 
o nly; but decisions of the Pales tine Na t ional Council indi cate an 
intentio n  of jo ining the Eas t Bank as we l l . 
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and al l ins ti tutions excep t religion ) and the rebi rth of Pale s t ine . 3 
Since no state wi ll volun tarily cooperate on its  own demi se , this 
solut ion can only be accomplished mili tarily , a plat fo rm repeated ly 
a ttempted by the PLO . To Wes t erners , such a plan may seem remo te , 
especially af ter hearing Arafa t ' s  speech to the Uni ted Nations General 
As sembly in 197 4 : I procla im befo re you that When we speak of 
our commo n hopes fo r the Pales tine of tomo rrow we include all Jews now 
living in Pales tine who choos e to live wi th us there in peace and 
wi thout di scrimination . " 4 Howeve r ,  obs ervers of the Arab medi a , 
relying on a knowledge of Arabi c rather than on transla tors , are mo re 
conscious of the seething hatred between Arabs and I sraeli s . S Wi thout 
another Arab-Israeli war in which I srael loos es completely , the state 
envisioned by the PLO c er tainly seems unlikely . 
A second theoretical so lution is a binational state compo s ed of 
Arabs and Jews . Israeli nat ionali s t s  and Pales tinian Arab commandos 
have of fered variations of the binational state idea (Map 2 6 ) .  The 
Israeli s envisage Pales tine as a Jewi sh state , whereas the Pales tinians 
proclaim their objective to be a secular democratic state . Walter 
Laqueur cautions agains t the li teral interpretation of the PLO fo rmula 
because it clashes wi th the Pale s tinians ' ins i s tance that the character 
of  the state mus t  be Arab and that the state should be integrated into 
3walid Khalidi ,  " Regiopo li t ics : Toward A U . s. Po licy on the 
Pales tine Problem , ·· Foreign Af fairs 5 9  (Summer , 1981 ) :  1060 . 
4Arafat ,  " The Uni ted Na tions Appeal fo r Peace , "  p .  17 . 
5Bernard Lewi s , Settling the Arab-I sraeli Conflict , "  Commentary 6 3 
( June , 1 9  7 7 ) : 52  • 
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the Arab Middle Eas t and not remain an "outpo s t  of the Wes t . " 6 
Addi tionally , the PLO id ea fo r the " secular , democra tic republic of 
Pales tine" never speaks of Arabs and Jews , only of Muslims , Chri s t ians 
and Jews . This redefines the Jews as a religious minori ty , not a 
national group . 
The Democratic Front fo r the L iberation of Palestine , one of the 
more radical guerril la groups , also urge s the es tabli shment of a new 
s tate wi th a federal or confederat ion struc tur e on the Yugos lav or 
Czechos lovak type . A s taff wri ter fo r Free Pales tine said he favored 
a largely binational sociali s t  sta te • • •  sociali sm is the 
cement which would have to bind the two groups .  When we 
talk about libera t ion what we real ly mean is the de s truc­
tion • • • if you want to say it  that way • • •  of the 
ins ti tutional s tructur e  of the state of Israel as it 
s tands today . But we also mean making every effort  
pos sible not to dis rup t the society of Israel . We would 
like to preserve I sraeli society because nobody , regard-
less if he is agains t the who le idea of Zionism , can deny 
that there is an I sraeli so ciety there which has its  own 
fabric and ins t i tutions . Howeve r ,  the state , the super­
s tructure , the Pale s t ine L ibera tion Movement aims at 
destroying . Wi thin the bina tional state the movement 
envisions two "e thnic "  groups  having their special 
ins ti tutions as far as they rela te to one group or ano ther . 7 
Moderate Jewi sh leaders have also supported the bina tional s tate 
idea . Moshe Dayan put fo rth the idea among I sraeli s in the early 1 9 7 0 ' s  
that Jews and Arabs should "l ive toge ther" from the Medi terranean to 
the Jordan . In an interview on 30 Apr il 1 9 7 8 , Dayan said , 
So now thi s time we come fo rward wi th an absolut ely di f ferent 
concep t about it , no t dividing the Wes t  Bank be tween Jo rdan 
6wal ter Laqueur , " Is Peace P o s s ible in the Middle Eas t ? " , Commentary 
6 1  (March , 1 9 7 6 ) : 30 . 
7Free Pales tine , Vol . II , No . 2 , June 19 7 0 ,  ci ted by Peretz , The 
Pales t ine State , P • 9 5 . 
and I srael , but living toge ther , both the Arabs and I sraeli s 
living in the Wes t  Bank the way we live in Jerusalem now 
( and no one really is now recommending dividing Jerusalem )  
so we say the same thing about the entire Wes t  Bank . 8 
This propo sal di ffered from the I sraeli Labor Par ty concep t ion of a 
1 59  
t erritorial divi sion of the Wes t  Bank betwe en I srael and Jordan leaving 
a fo rmal border between them . It  also di ffered from the Egyptian 
p ropos al : the crea tion of a formal borde r between pre-June 1 9 6 7  Is rael 
and a new Palestinian enti ty wi thin Jordan . Menachem B egin wa s  
inf luenced by Dayan ' s  approach ; this explains some of the complexi ty of 
the so-called Begin plan for Pales tinian " self-rule" stil l adhered to by 
the I sraeli Likud coali tion government . 
I sraeli vers ions of a binational Pale s tine are numerous . 
Generally , Arabs and Jews would share equal rights wi thin one uni tary 
s tate . Various blueprints range from a loos e federation of Jewi sh and 
Arab cantons , to fusion wi thin I srael , to even an Arab Palestine 
including Jordan under King Hus sein . This later plan envi sage s a Jewi sh 
Prime Mini ster under an Arab King and a sys tem of government in which 
Arab and Jewi sh of f icial s , including the Army , would be balanced . 9 In 
many respect s , this idea resembles the mul t i-e thnic state sys tem 
exi s ting in Lebanon . A problem , however , is that in Pales t ine ethnic 
groups are generally concentra ted in homogeneous territorial blocks , 
8ci ted by Theodore Draper , '" How No t to Make Peace in the Middle Eas t , .. 
Commentary 6 7  (March , 1 9 7 9 ) : 27-2 8 . 
9Thi s looks like King Hus sein ' s  propo sal of a Union be tween the Wes t  
Bank and Jordan wh ich inf luenced Reagan and Schultz . King Hus sein 
''A Jo rdanian Pales tinian Federation , "  Bulletin of Peace Proposal s , 
( March , 1 9 7 2 ) : 26 0 .  
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whereas in Lebanon they are mo re widely inters persed . 
The binational concep t has been suppo rted wi thin I srael fo r many 
years wi th po s i tive result s .  In the 1 9 50 ' s ,  two principal binat iona-
l i s t  groups emerged in I srael . Both stressed the need fo r accom-
modating the Arabs while building the Jewi sh nat ion . The Ihud advo-
cated numerical pari ty by controlling Jewi sh and Arab immigrat ion . 
They believed peace could never be reali zed as long as a majority could 
subordinate a minori ty . Hashomer Ha-Zair , however , saw no need to 
l imi t Jewi sh �igration , i f  a balance could be made through po li tical , 
s ocial and economic pari ty by rais ing Arab living standards to that of 
the I sraeli . During the years since 1 9 48 , the Arabs wi thin the s tate  
o f  I srael have , in  effect , given a type of  binational i s t  status to 
I srael . The Israeli-Arab populat ion has grown to 4 5 0 , 000 . They have 
become I sraeli ci tizens , wi th the right to vo te , hold of f ice , own pro-
perty , publi sh their own news pape rs , and send their children to schools 
where the ins truction is in Arabic . The il li teracy rate of I sraeli 
Arabs declined from 90 percent to less  than 10 percent . 1 0  I sraeli 
Arabs , fur thermore , did not take part in any of the strike s in the Wes t  
Bank and Gaza after the ou tbreak o f  the 1 9 6 7  war . They continued to 
t ake part in the economic li fe of Israel as produc ers and consumers in 
cooperation wi th Jewi sh ins t i tutions . 1 1  Dur ing the 1 9 6 7  and 1 9 7 3  wars , 
they remained surpr isingly loyal to I srael . 
lOTerrence Smi th,  " Reflect ions on a Troubled Peop le , "  p .  18 . 
1 1Yochanan Peres , " Some Obs erva tions on the Nat ional Identi ty of the 
I sraeli Arab , "  p .  2 3 1 .  
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While many po s i t ive changes i n  the live s of I sraeli Arabs 
occurred over the las t  3 5  years , po s s e s s ion of Israeli ci tizenship has 
not raised their level to the Jewi sh ave rage . 1 2  In fact , full integra-
t ion has not been achieved . Mos t live in 1 07 exclusively Arab vil la-
ges .  They rarely mix wi th Jews . They comprise  1 5  percent of the popu-
lation , but only hold 5%  o f  the seat s in the knesset . Final ly , they 
are considered second cla s s  ci tiz ens by the majori ty of the Jewi sh 
population . Thus far in the region , binationali s t  government , based on 
balanced ethnic representation , has proven unmanageable . The cas e  of 
Lebanon ( a  Muslim-Chris tian binational Arab state)  wi th its  Chri s tian 
President and Muslim Pr ime Mini s ter represents the obs tacles facing 
s uch a government . 
There is some hope fo r the future , however ,  fo r union among 
group s of heterogeneous people s . Ami tai E tzioni sugges ts tha t a large 
number of nations such as Swi tzerland and Canada are highly divergent 
in terms of ethnic origin , cultural trad i tion , language ,  and religion . 
Cultural homogeneity is nei ther a prerequis i te nor a sufficient con-
d i tion for unification . 1 3  However , the record of regional federa tions 
i s  qui te  poor . Karl Deut sch advanced five bas ic predict ions which have 
been made for regional federa t ions since 1 9 4 5 : 
1 .  Federations , if they take the place of smal ler sovereign 
s tates , will make their po pula tions more pros perous . 
( Economic Growth will be fas t er if the marke t is larger . )  
2 .  Larger federations are more open to world trade and 
culture . ( Federali sm would help reduce prejudices ) .  
1 2Peretz , The Pales tine S tate , pp . 9 6 f f . 
1 3Etzioni , " A  Paradigm fo r the S tudy of Po li tical Uni fication , " p .  2 2 4 . 
3 .  The federation will make poli tics more stable . 
4 . Federations are more favorable to cons titutionali sm 
and democracy,  to individual liberty , and to tolerance 
for religious and racial minori ties . 
5 .  Federa tions teach people wi thin to be more peaceful . 1 4 
Deutsch shows these 5 popular po ints are not always true . 
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Examining the main sources of evidence in Europe , America , Afr ica , and 
As ia over the last  hundred ye ars , he concludes that marke t siz e has 
li ttle effect on economic growth . Ins tead of being mo re open to inter-
national contact , mul ti-national states insulate themselve s  very 
rapid ly from the res t of the world . Stability of federa tions is doubt-
ful also as evidenced by the Ame rican Civil War . The Federations of 
Germany and Aus tria were anything but stable between 1930 and 1 9 45 . 
Moreover ,  there is a long li s t  of abortive federations . Malay s ia 
failed because federali sm wa s incapable of ke ep ing the Chinese of 
S ingapo re and the Malays of the peninsula toge ther;  Paki s tan wa s  a 
federa tion of Muslims which quickly tore up its cons t i tution , due to 
d i sag reement ;  Nigeria could no t ho ld the al legiance of the Ibo tribes ;  
Syria and Egypt broke away after 6 years of a Uni ted Arab Repub li c . 
Final ly Greeks and Turks on Cyprus have repeated ly fought each other 
for contro l .  The four th expectation of individual liberty is also 
que s t ionable . The Repub lic of South Africa is a federation , bu t the 
record shows it to be into le rant as far as race relations are con-
cerned . Pakis tan is not to lerant to Hindus and India no t to MUslims . 
As to fede ralism inducing peace , jus t as many examples can be given to 
1 4Karl w. Deutsch , Nationali sm and Its  Alternatives , ( New York : Alf r ed 
A .  Knopf ,  1 9 6 9 ) , p .  1 1 5 . 
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reflect di scord in mult inational states like Iraq and Lebanon . l S  There 
have been both success ful and unsuc cess ful binational states throughou t  
the wo rld . Whether o r  not this fo rm is feasible i n  Palestine , i s  
dependent upon the backing given by both Israeli s and Pale s tinians . 
The binational state presently has no strong suppo rt  either 
among Palestinians or I sraeli s . A continuance of the status quo (more 
I sraeli se ttlements in the Wes t  Bank) wil l  inevi tably create such a 
poli t ical form . According to S aid Hammami , a PLO spokesman in the 
Wes t ,  " if he waved a magic wand and said , ' Le t  all the Pales tinian 
Arabs and all the I sraeli Jews live tomo rrow in a democratic , secular 
Pale s tine , ' this "WOuld mo re or les s  immediately lead to a civil war ·: 
' Al l  these years of conf lict and tens ion are not a good background for 
the es tabli shment of a peaceful and harmonious coexi s tence be�een two 
communi ties . ' " l6 
The third pos s ibili ty fo r a Pale s t inian entity , and the mo s t  
prevalent in the 1980 ' s ,  i s  a new and final par ti tion of the terri­
tories Which were once placed unde r the Bri tish Mandate . The 
Pale s t inian parti tion idea has two al ternative s (Map 2 7 ) .  One is the 
c reation of a new Arab s tate to be cal led Palestine which would cons i s t  
o f  the Wes t  Bank and the Gaza S trip . The other so lution , recently 
brought forward by President Reagan on Sep tember 1 ,  1 9 82 , is to 
have no t three but two s tates in the area . One would be I srael ; the 
o ther would be an Arab s tate on bo th banks of the Jordan , the 
1 5rbid . ,  P · 1 1 6ff . 
1 6said Hammami , quo ted in New Out look , October-November , 19 7 5 .  
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Pale s tinian entity being a sub-s tate wi thin the Kingdom of Jordan . 1 7  
The firs t territorial par t i tion op tion fo r a Palest inian home-
land is the so-called "We s t  Bank , •• the area annexed by Jordan in 1 9 5 1 , 
and la ter occupied by Israel after the 1 9 6 7  War . This alterna tive 
co��d include the densely po pulated Gaza reg i on wi th an eas ement 
t hrough Israel connecting it  to the We s t  Bank ( Map 28 ) .  Eas t Jerus alem 
might be either included or excluded . 1 8  This actually is a separate 
" mini-s tate" idea which al lows ful l independence for a country cal led 
Pales tine . This entity would , mos t  likely , be led by PLO intel lectuals 
MAP 28 
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1 7Reagan ( and S ecretary Schult z ' s )  propo sal is no t original . It has 
been put fo rth by Israeli and Arab alike . Arie Eliav in Land o f  
Splendor , 1 9 7 3 , propo sed ei ther an independent Pales t inian S tate of 
the Wes t  Bank and Gaza or in some fo rm of association wi th Jo rdan . 
King Hussein has also advoca ted res toration of Jordanian sove reignty 
in the West  Bank wi th a large me asure of au tonomy . 
1 8Peretz , The Palestine State , p .  8 0 .  
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and fedayeen , who would take of f their gue rril la uni fo rms and return 
from exile . Gaza would be included in this structure . Wi th a popula­
t ion of 450 , 000 , Gaza is 45  miles long and 1 5  miles wide . It s large 
c i trus industry and po tential as a po r t  facili ty would be nece ssary for 
the· mini-state to become economically viable . The state would then 
cons i s t  of two parts . One par t  would be the Gaza S trip . The other 
would be the We s t  Bank bounded on the eas t by_ the Jordan River 
including Samaria and Judaea ; the we s tern border would run we s t  of 
Tulkarm and Kalkilya ,  eas t of Lod and Ramla , from there to Jerusalem , 
then south to Hebron and the Dead Sea . Altoge ther , the state would 
compr i se some 2 , 305 square miles . 
The economic viabili ty of such a s tate would be in que s t ion . 
Annual rainfall in the northern part  of the Wes t  Bank ( Samaria ) is  
fairly high ( 600 mm or 2 4  inches per year) and has favorable local 
agriculture , but in the sou thern lobe of Judaea , rainfall dramatically 
f alls to 400 mm or 16  inches per ye ar (Map 2 9 ) . 19  The futur e  fo r 
indus try is not promis ing . It  is almo s t  non-exi s tent excep t fo r some 
light indus try in the fo rm of olive oil and soap facto ries in Nablus 
and wooden souvenires and a gla s s  factory in Hebron . Economic po ten­
t ial in Bethlehem and Ramallah is also poor . Their chief source of 
capi tal come s from tourists  and Holy Land vi s i tors . Given thi s  di smal 
economic si tuation , the new state would not be able to absorb mo re than 
a token number of returning Pal e s tinian refugees , particularly in the 
1 9The Atlas of Israel , p .  2 1 0 . 
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Gaza S trip , Which has one of the highes t  population densi ties in the 
wo rld . 20 
Israel ' s  Foreign Mini ster Yigal Allan , propos ed another par-
t i tian plan in the October 1 9 7 6  i s sue of Foreign Affairs . Like the 
mini-s tate idea ,  he advocated an autonomous Arab enti ty on the Wes t  
Bank . 2 1  According to this plan the I s raeli s would release mili tary 
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o ccupa tion duties allowing the Palestinian mayors to assume civil func-
t ions such as social wel fare , heal t h ,  education , agriculture , and even 
local po li tics . Israel would set up mili tary bases along the Jordan 
and other strategic po ints . 
The strength of Allan ' s  argument lies in geographic term s . One 
does not have to be a mili tary tact ic ian to unders tand the cri tical 
s ecur i ty defect s fo r I srael in the armi s tice lines which exi s ted pr ior 
to  the 1967 war . Mos t of these lines have no topographic secur i ty 
value as they are located in low areas . Thei r  geos trategic location 
a lso restric ts Israel from having a minimum amoun t of strateg i c  dep th .  
The mo s t  serious problem i s  tha t Wes t  Bank is ad jacent to I srael ' s  core 
area (Map 3 0 ) . There are three reasons why this is ext remely sen-
s i tive . The firs t is its proximi ty to I srael ' s  population and 
indus trial centers . The strip between the pre-1967  lines and the 
Medi terranean Sea is only eight to 1 3  miles wide , and contains 6 7  per-
c ent of I srael ' s  po pulation and abou t 8 0  percent of its indus trial 
2 0walt er Laqueur , " Is Peace Pos s ible in the Middle Eas t ? " , p .  2 9 . 
2 1Yigal Allon , " Israel : the Case fo r Defensib le Borders , "  Foreign 
Affairs 5 5  (October 1 9 76 ) :  pp . 38-5 3 . 
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capaci ty . 2 2  Thi s puts  mo s t  of I srael ' s  cities wi thin medium art il l e ry 
range of the Wes t  Bank ( Map 3 1 ) .  As two-thirds of Israel ' s mi li tary is 
f rom the civil ian secto r ,  secur i ty is  dependent on ample wa rning . The 
Arab surprise attack in the 1 9 7 3 Yom Yippur War revealed I srael ' s  we ak 
link to be her abili ty to mo bilize  the reserve s in time . S trategy for 
survival , the refore , is  bas ed on four prerequis i tes : maximum di s tance 
be tween Arab mi litary fo rces ; proper s trategic warning ; the abili ty to 
mobilize wi thout interfe rence ; and the po tential to delay the at tacking 
forces . 23 
2 2shai Fe ldman , "Peacemaking in the Middle East : the Next S tep , " 
Foreign Af fai rs 5 9  ( S pring 1 9 8 1 ) :  757 . 
2 3 rbid . , P· 1 6 9 . 
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Allan ' s  plan i s  a po li tical compromi se (Map 3 2 ) . As a strong 
Labor Party advocate and one who believe s that incorpo rating more Arabs 
into I srael would be a de triment to I srael ' s  Jewi sh charac ter , he advo­
cates no addi tional Arab po pula tion annexa tion . Therefo re , moving the 
pre-1967  lines eas tward (which might seem mo s t logi cal to gain key 
mili tary terrain ) i s  out of the que s tion . However ,  a powe r  does not 
have to actually occupy an area in order to control it . He propos e s  
s e t ting up mili tary ou tpo s t s  in the arid area on the eas tern side of 
the Wes t  Bank . This area is  almo s t  devo id of popula tion and runs from 
the Jordan River to the eas tern chain of the Samarian and Judean moun­
t ains . A corridor cut ting this zone could run from Jordan to the Wes t  
Bank via Jericho permi tting circula tion between Jordan and the Wes t  
Bank . 2 4  Pales tinian ident i ty would be maintained because the popula­
t ion of both banks are generally Palestinian Arab and mo s t  of them 
carry Jordanian passports . ( Two- thirds of Jordan ' s  inhabi tants are 
Pale s tinian . )  The Allan plan wa s  an idea to trade territory fo r peace . 
I sraeli reaction in 1 9 7 7  at the po lls , reso lutely denounced this con­
cep t . The emergence of the L ikud government was a signal indi cat ing 
I sraeli rej ection of a po s s ible radi cal state in the hear t of Israel . 
Although the plan had the me r i t s  of compromi se , it lacked economic 
viabili ty ,  like the mini- s tate idea . 
Another part i tion so lution , advanced by Hany A. Hilmyy , an 
Egyp tian professo r at Nehru Univers i ty ,  New Delhi , envi sions a separate 
2 4Allon "Israel : the Case fo r Defens ible Borde rs , "  p. 46 . 
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Pales tinian state compr i sing mo re than jus t the We st  Bank and Gaza . 2 5  
As the se tw o  terri tories only cons t i tute 2 2 . 6 %  o f  Pales t ine , economic 
viabili ty and living space is que s t ionable for such a limi ted area . 
Hilmyy proposes a Pale s t inian s ta te compos ed of abou t 40% of the 
British Manda te we s t  of the Jo rdan . The Jewi sh state would compo s e  6 0% 
(Map 33 ) .  The basic idea is to sat i sfy the es sential po ints needed by 
both sides . For the Pales t inians , the new terri to ry is almo s t  double 
the amount lef t  in Arab hands af ter 1 949 .  The creation of such an 
entity might also reverse the bi t ter sense of humi lia tion . This par-
t i tian also represents  a mo re equi table di s tribution of land according 
to population . To satisfy the I sraeli s ,  this plan would represent , fo r 
the firs t time , an accepted and recognized Jewi sh sta te in the Middle 
East . 
In the Hilmyy propo s al , the northern part of Israel would become 
part of the Pale s tinian state to act as a buf fer between I srael and 
Syria . The partition boundary ( Plan A) would run from the Lebanes e  
borde rs southward pas s ing we s t  o f  Safad to the northwe s tern t i p  of the 
Sea of Galilee . The previously narrow coas tal plain , Israel ' s  
industrial core , would be enlarged giving a sense of secur i ty and mo re 
room for se ttlement . From the Sea of Gali lee the borders run we s tward 
to Nazareth then southward incorpo rating the large Arab towns of Jenin , 
Nablus , and Ramallah . Jerusalem , according to Hilmyy , would remain a 
2 5aany A. Hilmyy , " Re-Part i tion of Pale s t ine : Toward a Peaceful 
Solution in the Middle Eas t , "  Journal of Peace Research ( International 
Peace Research Ins ti tute , Oslo : 19 7 2 ) ,  pp . 1 33- 1 44 . 
uni ted , demili tarized , and open ci ty under jo int admini stration by 
I srael and Pales tine . The Jewi sh Ho ly Places would fly the I sraeli 
f lag , the Moslem and Chris tian Ho ly Places would fly the Pale st inian 
flag . Jewi sh and Arab resident s of the ci ty would have Israeli and 
Pal�s tinian ci tizenship, respective ly . 26 
1 7 5  
F rom Jerusalem , the borderli ne would continue south and we s t  of 
Bethlehem and Hebron , south to Beersheba , then eastward to the Dead S ea . 
This would give I srael access to the valuable minerals al ready being 
ext racted . The border line from the northern tip of the Gaza S trip 
southward to the Gulf of Aqaba would allow the Palestinian state to 
develop a Red Sea harbor .  Thi s  ini tiative would require Egypt to cede a 
small piece of Sinai terri tory we s t  of Aqaba . Since the I sraeli s have 
ini tiated large agricultural deve lopments in the Negev , they may prefer 
t o  keep this area undivided . Acco rding to plan B ,  an enlarged Gaza 
S trip wi th a corridor through I srael to Aqaba may be arranged .  
In another repar ti tion propos al , Donald w. Davi s of Wes tern 
Michigan Universi ty sugge s t s  that only by creating a "new structur e" in 
which normali za tion may occur can peace be at tained . 27  Like Hilmyy ' s 
terri torial par ti tion , Davi s adheres to the idea that a Pale s tinian 
s tate compo sed of only the Wes t  Bank and Gaza is unworkable . The 
small siz e of such a s tate only crea tes new complicat ions of po li tical 
26Ibid . ,  p .  14 1 .  
27nonald w .  Davi s ,  " Pale s t inian Arab Sovereignty and Peace in the �fiddle 
Eas t : A Reasses sment , "  Journal for Peace Research ( Interna tional Peace 
Ins ti tute , Oslo : 19 7 4 ) ,  pp . 9 5f f .  
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and economic geography rather than reso lving exi s t ing ones . Davi s ma in­
t ains the only feasible site is a combination of the eas tern po rtion of 
the S inai , the Gaza Strip , and a smaller ve rs ion of Samaria linked to 
the rest  of the state through Jordan (Map 3 4 ) . 
The we s tern boundary would run from the Red Sea coast north at  
340 east longi tude to coordinates 3 40 E ,  30° N;  from there to  intersect 
the Medi terranean coas t at coo rdi nates 3 3° 30 ' E ,  3 1° N. The eas tern 
boundary would remain the 1 949 cease-fire line between Egypt and I srael . 
Communication between the S inai and the Samarian enclave ( the 
northern part of the Wes t  Bank ) would not be through the Negev , where 
I srael is the widest , but through Aqaba to Amman to Jericho . Davi s '  
principal reasoning for this arrangement , like Hilmyy ' s ,  is  in the 
hopes of es tabli shing the Gulf of Aqaba as a focal po int fo r great eco­
nomic and poli tical importance to help sus tain the Pales tinian s tate 
economy . 28 A further advantage to this idea is the phys ical separation 
of Egypt and I srael . The consolidation of the Wes t  Bank ' s area through 
the reduction of the Hebron , Latrun and Jenin Sali ents ,  fur thermo re , 
places I srael ' s  borders in a mo r e  def ensib le situa tion . Davi s seems to 
mi nimize , however ,  the strategic role played by Sharm el Sheikh , the 
city from which the Egyptians blocked the S trait  of Tiran ini tiat ing 
the Wars of 1 9 56 and 1 9 6 7 . Reali s tical ly , as Egypt , Jordan , and 
Israel , as well as the Pale s tinians lay claim or pos sess land envi s aged 
in this so lution , the like lihood of agreement appears remo te . 
2 8rbid . ,  P ·  1 04 . 
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A di fferent approach , ye t similar to the Allon plan , is founded 
on the premise that I srael ' s problems wi th the occupied terri tories 
center on returning population , not territo ry , to Arab control . Colonel 
Merril l A .  McPeak in a Foreign Affairs art icle , " Israel : Borde rs and 
Security , "  sugge sts  that "demography is of far greater significance than 
geography . " 29 If Israel de termines to annex al l the Wes t  Bank and Gaza 
S trip , this act ion would add over a million peop le to the 5 00 , 000 Arabs 
already living in I srael . Considering the high rate of Arab natural 
popula tion increase and the li t tle near-term like lihood that the Arabs 
can "drive Israel into the sea , ·· McPeak reaso ns there is a significant 
pos s ibility that they might submerge I srael demographically wi thin pre-
s ent defens ive perimeters . 
In an area wi thin I srael where Arabs compose mo s t  of the popula-
t ion , there can be no doubt that to give Arabs ful l ci tiz enship rights 
would mean the eventual end of a Zioni s t  state . On the other hand , if 
I srael ins ti tuted repres s ive measures to control the Arab populat ion , 
I srael would come to an end as a democracy . McPeak propos es a formula 
for  returning as  much of  the population and as  li t tle of the terri tory 
as po s s ible . The plan vi ews I srael ' s  retention of the Gaza S trip . In 
the West Bank only a string of towns (Nablus , Ramallah , and Hebron ) 
along the Samarian-Judean hil ltops toge ther wi th a link to Jordan at 
Jericho should be returned to the Arabs . As these towns are large Arab 
popula tion centers , McPeak believe s that Israel might take in only a 
2 9colonel Merrill A .  McPeak , " Israel : Borde rs and Security , "  Foreign 
Af fairs 54 (Apr il 1 9 7 6 ) :  432 . 
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half a million fewer Arabs leaving a manageable population fo r a long 
t ime . 30 Although this pers pective is rather one-sided , i t s  success  is 
founded on the requirement that all returned terri tory be demili­
tariz ed . With this action , he says , " these problems could be seen for 
what they are : a variety of di sputes invo lving his tory , emotion ,  reli­
gious belief , and property rights ,  not secur ity . " 3 1 
30rbid . ,  P ·  4 33 . 
3 1rbid . , P ·  4 4 1 . 
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Partition and Amalgamation 
The preceding terri torial ideas present the statesmen and mem-
bers of reconnais sance commi s s ions wi th several alternative s .  Of  the 
two ma jor concept s , a binat ional state or par ti tion , world op inion 
indicates preference fo r partition . Influenced by a delicate po li tical 
balance of peace between the superpowers , an unso lved Pale stinian refu-
gee que s tion , and internal I s raeli expansion poli tics , the Uni ted 
Nations has recently called for the so lving of this interminable 
Pale s tinian ques tion . Although numerous at tempts have been initiat ed 
to rect ify the problem by boundary so lu tions and poli tical decisions , 
world leaders now demand the formation of a po li t ical area , a 
Pale s tinian entity . On November 2 4 ,  19 7 6 , the Uni ted Nations General 
As sembly in a 90 to 16 vote cal led fo r the creation of a Pales t inian 
s tate . 32  However ,  wi thou t  unders tanding the nature of parti tion , wor ld 
leaders may make inappropriate decis ions . 
Parti tion is a fo rm of di s integration . Both Deutsch and E tz i oni 
sugge s t  that it is actually integra tion in reverse . ( The binational 
s tate concep t assumes that integration take s place . )  Par ti tion can be 
def ined as " the process  of dividing property and giving separate ti tle 
to those who previously had jo int titl e  . .. 3 3  The process has been used 
generally to solve �ediate and seemingly irreconcilable problems . 
Examples in this century are Ireland , Germany , Korea , Vietnam , India ,  
3 2There were 30 abs tentions . 
3 3webs ters New World Dict ionary ( New York : World Pub li shing Co . ,  
1 96 6 ) .  
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and Pale s tine . Part i tion has also been cons idered as a so lution to the 
communal conf lict in Cypress and the religious conflict in Lebanon . 
However ,  parti tion may no t reduc e conf lict , and may in fact per-
petuate it . All the above s tates , which were partitioned original ly on 
a temporary basis , are curren tly areas of world tens ion . 3 4  In 
"Partition as a Poli tical Ins trument , "  Ray Johns ton demons tra tes , 
t hrough a survey of li teratur e , " that there has not been one ins tance 
of the parti tion of a nation that was not fo llowed by fur ther 
conf lict . .. 35  Johns ton produced an empirical concep tion based upon nine 
variables which were cons idered requis i te funct ions to the nation-
f orming process . This proces s  could be ei ther parti tion or tmi f icat ion 
( binational state ) .  
1 .  Some level of cultural homogenei ty and value concensus 
mus t  be at tained . 
2 . An unknown scope and intensi ty of ·· social communication" 
i s  required . 
3 .  This social communication is achieved by what has become 
social mobilization Which is a process of breaking down 
old tradi tions and making the people available for new 
pat terns of socialization , especially po li tical sociali za­
t ion . 
4 .  A unifo rmi ty of message content and cogni tive agreement 
mus t  be produced by ma s s  media and educat ional ins t i tutions . 
5 . Economic interdependence between agrarian and urban 
people mus t  be achieved by the development of a "c ommon 
marke t place" or "nat ional marke t place fo r di s tribution . "  
6 .  The government mus t  mani fes t a de termination and abili ty 
to use its  power to carry ou t its policies ( authori tarian 
e li te ) . 
7 .  A po li tical class  mus t  be wi lling and able to lead the 
non-coale sc ing ma jority ( paternalism of eli te ) . 
3 4Kasperson and Minghi ,  The Structure of Political Geography ( Chicago : 
Adline Publi shing Company , 1 9 7 1 ) ,  p .  2 03 . 
3 5Ray E .  Johns ton , "Partition as a Po li tical Ins trument , " Journal of 
International Af fairs , Vo l . 27 , No . 2 ,  1 9 7 3 , p. 1 6 3 . 
8 .  A mutual identi ty between the po li tical class  and the 
governed mus t come to frui tion ( identific eli te ) .  
9 .  The po li tical clas s  mus t  be united and the hegemony of 
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this po li tical class  cannot be  threatened by a counter-e li te 
( consensual eli te ) . 36  
Applying these precep t s  to the Middle Eas t ,  we can def ine 
national par ti tion as the po li tical and legal divi sion of people into 
s eparate Arab and Israeli terri tories , who , pr ior to divi s ion , showed 
low ,  negative scores on each of these functional requisi tes 
( variables ) .  Conversely , national amalgama tion , a binational state , 
would be the political binding of a people who , prior to claims of 
national au tonomy , showed high scores on these same variables . 
The statesman can vi ew the empirical concep tion (Table 6 )  from 
two perspec t ive s using sub jective analys i s  based on his torical and 
poli tical facto rs . The black curve depic t s  only the internal 
Pales tinian Arab socie ty and their po t ential fo r amalgama tion . Thi s  
curve represents a mixed variation o f  internal uni ty and di sunity .  The 
red curve represents  the internal I sraeli so ciety , indi cating a cohe-
s ive peop le . The blue curve reflect s the Arabs and I sraeli s toge ther . 
The general ly negative scores indi cate an inabili ty on the par t  of the 
two peoples to culturally integ rate . This gives some suppo rt fo r par-
t i tian . 
One can draw other conclus ions from Johns ton ' s  empirical 
t ool . If parti tion we re to occur , the Israeli curve indi cates so li-
dari ty and strong na tional cohes ion . The Arab curve , howeve r ,  
3 6These eight variables are derived from the works of Karl Deu t sch , 
Claude Ake , c .  J .  H .  Hayes , and Francis Wi lson . 
Table 6 .  Pos i t ions of Arab and I srae li Potent ial for Par t i t ion and Amalgama tion by S t ru c t ural 
Requi s i tes of Na t ional Integrat ion Variable s . 
S t ruc tural Requi s i tes Na tions Po s i t ion 
( Par t i t ion ) (Ama lgama t io n )  
Cultural Homogenei ty Nega t ive I I 
Social Communicat ion Nega t ive I I 
Commonali ty of Poli t ical Social i z a t ion Nega t ive I I 
Uniformi ty of Message and Agreement Nega t ive I I 
Economic Interdependence Nega tive I I 
Au thori tarian E l i te Nega t ive I I 
Pa ternalis tic Eli te Nega tive I I 
Ident i f ic E l i te Nega t ive I I � I� I 
� Consensual E li t e  Nega t ive I I I 
Black Curve represents the Arab communi ty in Pale s t ine . 
Red Curve represents the I s rae li communi ty in Pale s t ine . 
B lue Curve represent s the combined I sraeli and Pales tinian people in Pale s t ine . 
Pos i t ive 
Pos i t ive 
Pos i t ive 
Pos i t ive 
Po s i tive 
Pos i t ive 
Pos i t ive 
Pos i t ive 
Pos i t ive 
Adap ted from "Par t i t i ons as a Poli t i c al Ins t rument " by Ray E .  Johns ton , Journal of Int erna t i onal 
Af fairs , Vol . 2 7 , No . 2 :  19 7 3 , p. 1 6 7 . 
..... 
(X) 
w 
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reflects  weaknesses , par ticularly in commonali ty of po li tical sociali­
zation and consensual eli te .  Thi s  sugge s t s  that if a Palestinian s tate 
wa s created by part i tion , the state gove rnment could have di ff iculty 
unifying and establi shing central authority .  Furthermore , Israeli s 
fear the rise of a Pales t inian state composed of radical elements ad ja­
cent to their borders . 
This model can prove to be invaluable to reconnais s ance com­
mi s sions tasked wi th determining the op timum s tate fo rm wh ich would 
have the bes t  chance of suc ce s s . The need fo r time ly ,  quanti fiable 
data such as plebeci tes , cultural surveys , cash flows , and vo t ing pat­
terns would make this mode l  a strong tool not only fo r parti tion -
amalgamation decis ions , but also for speci fic locations to delimi t 
boundaries . 
A word of warning is appropr iate concerning the dividing of 
s tates . The use of parti tion , even temporarily , to solve irrecon­
cilable problems , tends to create impos ed boundaries which become rela­
t ively impermeable barriers between contras ting and hos tile po li tical 
sys tems . Hos tili ty ,  consequently , endures as a long-term imprint on 
the region as a who le . The boundaries between East and Wes t  Germany 
and North and South Korea conf i rm  the prolonged hos tili ty created by 
the parti tion so lution . The only hope fo r parti tion lies in a change 
of at titude . Lord Caradon , former Bri tish representative to the Uni ted 
Nations and sponso r of the 1 9 6 7  Secur ity Council reso lution on the 
Middle Eas t , emphasized the need fo r a new concep t in parti tion , 
" secure and recognized boundaries are vi tal , but it is now realized 
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that boundaries need not and should not be regarded as  barriers . .. 37  
37Lord Caradon , " To Map Fair Boundaries , "  Bulletin of Peace Proposals , 
1 9 7 1 , p .  169 . For a comple te di scuss ion of boundaries in contac t but 
not in conf lict see Jones ' Kinne tic and dynamic borders in  "A  Unified 
Field Theory of Poli tical Geography " . Annals  of the AAG 45 ( 19 45 ) :  
1 1 9 . 
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Warnings to S tatesmen and Reconnaissance Commissions 
Diplomats seem to have gone full circle fo r the four th time this 
century . ( 1 ) Choices between par ti tion and union were debated after 
World War I by the League of Nations wi thout conclusion . ( 2 ) The 1 9 36  
Peel Commi s s ion ' s inve s t igation said a so lution could only come through 
partition . ( 3 )  The subsequent Woodhead Commi ssion in 19 3 7 , rej ected 
this advocating parti tion impract icable . ( 4 ) The Uni ted Nations advo-
cated parti tion in 1947 only to result in war . Today the same cho ices 
lie before the par tic ipants in I sraeli-Arab po li tics . Statesmen should 
be warned not to allow his tory to repeat itself . Some so lution mus t be 
attempted , ei ther parti tion or un ion . If his tory we re truly cyclical , 
then this di lemma would remain unso lved . 
In cons idering po s s ible so lutions , reconnais sance commis s ions 
mus t  so rt through the complexi ties that have taken shape over the las t  
6 0  years . Today the his torical , social , and di plomatic gulf s  that 
s epara te the Pales tinians and the I sraeli s seem to exi s t  in as vi ru lent 
form as ever . Terence Smi th , re turning from four ye ars as the 
Jerusalem correspondent fo r The New York Times , notes that : 
I came home from those  ye ars deeply skeptical abou t the 
pros pects fo r an early set tlement in the Middle Eas t . It 
i s  not that the po li tical problem is beyond so lution . 
That is basically a que s t ion of sovereignty versus security 
that two di spass ionate lawyers could reso lve • • •  But the 
human obs tacles -- the deep-s eated mi s trust  on both sides , 
the fear of annihilation , the wounded national honor - ­
these are the real s tumbling blocks . They are the elements 
that have prevented a so lution in the past and will continue 
to make one di ff icult to achieve in the future . 38 
38Terence Smi th "Israeli Journal : 19 7 2-1 9 7 6 . Reflect ions on a Troubled 
People , "  Saturday Review , 5 February 19 7 7 ,  p . 8 .  
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Reconnaissance commi ssions mus t be careful not to  fall into the 
s ame trap as those  who have become concerned wi th the cons equences , 
rather than the causes of conflict in this region . Diplomacy in 
Pale s tine has indeed centered on the resul t s  of war rather than the 
circums tances which led to war . This is evident in the fact that the 
only legal boundary delimi tation of I srael ' s  frontiers has been between 
Egypt and I srael in 197 4 . Even though I srael has exi s ted as a s tate 
s ince 1948 , this is the only internationally recognized borde r . The 
o thers consis t of armi st ice and cease-f ire li nes . Mos t  of the arbi tra­
t ion over place lnl.fo rtunately centers around the "c onsequences of war'' . 
Reconnaissance commis sions mus t  also be aware that at temp t s  to 
impos e  a unilateral reso lution fo r a peace se t tlement wi l l  fail wi thou t  
Arab o r  I sraeli part icipa tion . Only Palestinian and I sraeli leaders 
can reso lve the profound issue s . If the is sue is as it  has been fo r so 
l ong , the exi s tence of Israel , then obviously no di plomat could ge t an 
I sraeli to even participate in a di scussion . If , however ,  the issue is 
no longer the exi s tence but the size of Israel ' s borde rs , then nor­
mal i zation wil l  begin and the oppo r tun i ty for fur ther di scus sion will 
open . 
In order fo r normali za tion through mutual recogni tion to suc ceed , 
a new leadership must  emerge in both the I sraeli and Pale s t inian com­
muni ties . The righti s t  Likkud party of Menachem B egin Which has suf­
f ered internal critic ism due to the Lebanese mas sacres and Wes t  Bank 
settlement po licies , may soon be rep laced by the moderate Labor Par ty 
which has supported the fo rmation of a Palestinian entity . The 
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Pale s tinian leadershi p , as well , mus t somehow shed the influence of 
their extremi s t  groups and adop t an alt ernative path in the di rection of 
diplomacy . Addi tionally,  the Palestine resis tance movement mus t  mini­
miz e  its dependence on other Arab regime s and the many guerril la orga­
nizations whos e  ideologi es cons tantly contradict each other . Thi s  
dependence wi ll mo s t  likely continue a s  long a s  the Pale s tinians lack 
s tructural unity and central pro-active leadership . Once the emergence 
of some progressive Palestinian Za ' im ( charisma tic leader ) occurs , 
coupled wi th an equal ly progressive I sraeli government de s iring a 
comprehens ive settlement , the opportun i ty fo r equitable terri torial 
allocation will be at its  greate s t  po in t  fo r success . 
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Conclusion 
The Pales tinians have developed a sense of "owned space" over 
the pas t  fifteen hundred years of their tenure in the Middle Eas t . 
However , not un til the Pale s t inian diaspora began wi th the creation of 
the state of Israel in 1948 , did they develop a po li tical sense of 
terri to riali ty . This sense was leg i timized by the Uni ted Na tions pro­
posal fo r the fo rma tion of two states , Arab and Jew . Over the next 3 5  
years , three mo re wars occurred caus ing fur ther di splacement and los s 
o f  terri tory . Dur ing this time the identification wi th the land wa s  
aided and impeded by external interf erence and internal divi sion . Arab 
neighbors did not permi t ass imi la tion into their coun tries and refugee 
camps grew into di smal shantytowns . Out of hopelessnes s ,  the 
Pale s tinians fo rmed numerous , expatriate national i s t  groups whos e  fun­
d amental objective was to liberate  Palestine from the I sraeli s . 
This sense of terri toriali ty is a central issue in the 
Arab-Israeli confronta tion . Alt hough the Palestinians pos sess an iden­
t ificat ion wi th par t  of the region , the continuing social and po li t ical 
d ivis ion wi thin the Pales tinian people thwart a singular expression of 
terri toriali ty . In view of the dep th of cultural feeling be tween Arab 
and Israeli , nei ther fo rced part i tion nor amalgamation of states seems 
hopeful . The added demand of Israeli secur ity renders the reali zation 
of a Palestinian state problematic of this time . 
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APPENDIX A 
Framework fo r Peace 
Following are key provisions of the "Framework fo r Peace in the 
Middle Eas t "  agreed to by Egyptian President Anwar Sada t and I sraeli 
Pr�me Mini ster Menachem Begin , Sep t . 1 7 , 1 9 7 8 ,  at Camp David , Md . :  
*The final s tatus of the Wes t  Bank and Gaza , the location of boun­
daries and the nature of securi ty arrangements will be det ermined by 
Egyp t ,  Israel , Jordan and elected representatives from these terrri­
tories after a five-year transi tion period . 
*During the trans i tion period , an elected self-governing autho ri ty 
wil l  replace the exi s ting Israeli mili tary government . 
*Israeli armed fo rces wi l l  be wi thd rawn to specified securi ty loca­
t ions as soon as the self-governing authority is elected . 
*Jordan wi ll be invi ted to jo in in negotiating the de tails of the 
t rans i tional agreement . 
*The "modali ties " for admi tting Palestinians di s placed from the· 
We s t  Bank and Gaza by the 1 9 6 7  war wil l  be decided by a commi t tee of 
representatives of Egyp t , Israel , Jordan and the self-governing 
authority . 
*Arrangements fo r internal and external secur ity wi l l  include a 
s trong local po lice fo rce which may include Jordanians . 
*The Uni ted S tates is invi ted to part icipate in nego tiating the 
implemen tation of the agreement .  
Source :  Congres s ional Quarterly , Inc . ,  The Middle Eas t , 4th ed . 
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APPENDIX B 
1 9 1 9  Paris Peace Conference Preparation 
1 .  Po li tical Hi s tory . 
a .  Hi storic . right s ,  including suf fr age laws . 
b .  Religious development and cus toms . 
c .  Rights of minority peoples in compo s i te populations ; subordinate 
nationali ties . 
2 . Diplomatic His tory . 
a .  Recent po li tical his to ry related to diplomacy . 
b .  Public law , cons t i tutional refo rms . 
3 . International Law . 
a .  Reconciliation of present and fo rmer practices . 
b .  Study of treaty texts . 
c .  Geographical interpretation of problems of terri torial wa ters , 
frontiers , etc . 
4 .  Economics . 
a .  International : raw ma terial s , coaling stations , cable stations , 
port works , tarrifs , etc . 
b .  Regional : indus tr ial developmen t ,  self-sufficiency , traff ic 
routes in rela t ion to boundaries and ma terial resources , inc luding 
food , mineral s ,  wa ter powe r , fue l , etc . 
5 . Geography . 
a .  Economic geography : strategic frontiers ; topographic barriers . 
b .  Poli tical geography : s trategic frontiers ; topographic barriers . 
c .  Cartography : maps on every kind of di s t ribution bearing on peace 
problems , such as peoples , minerals , hi s torical limi ts , railways 
and trade rou tes , crop s and lives tock , ci ties and indus trial 
centers , religions . 
d .  Irrigation : pr esent development , pos s ibili ties fo r general 
recons truct ion . 
6 .  Educat ion . 
a .  S tatus in colonial po s sessions . 
b .  Condi tion in backward state s . 
c .  Oppo rtuni ties of oppressed minorities . 
APPENDIX C 
Minutes of the Frontier Meeting 
1 0  Sep tember 1 9 1 9  
at Manoir de Clair fontaine-Hennequeville , 
Trouville , France . 
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Present a t  the meeting were Prime Minis ter Lloyd George , Arthur 
Bonar Law who was Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House , Field 
Marshal Lord Allenby , High Commi s s ioner in Egyp t , Major-General S ir 
John Shea , Colonel w. A. Gribbon , Colonel A .  M.  Henniker from the War 
Office , and S i r  Maurice Hankey , Secretary to the Cabinet .  The 
discuss ion tha t took place wa s  recorded in the fo llowing Minu te s : 
LORD ALLENBY , referring to the boundaries of Pale s tine , said 
that the place now known as Banias had been identified as the orig inal 
Dan . He had repo rted this to the War Office Who had recognized its 
accuracy . 
THE PRIME MINISTER asked whether it was propo sed to include 
Mount Hermon wi thin the boundaries of Pales tine . This appeared to him 
to be rather excess ive . 
LORD ALLENBY agreed and gave a fur ther explanation of the line 
which he would like to draw fo r Palestine , wh ich would exclude Mount 
Hermon . He said that the railway rou te now under survey ran from Abu 
Kemel on the Euphra tes to Haifa . In the de sert the country wa s  very 
easy-going . The Jebel Druse had not been reconnoi tred on the ground , 
as this was cons idered impo li tic in view of our pr esent relations wi th 
the French . He had , however , carried ou t a reconnaissance by aeroplane 
and one of the aerop lanes had come down and the pilo t had been rather 
roughly treated by the Druse s . 
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COL . GRIBBON urged the great importance o f  including the head-
wa ters of the Jordan in Palestine . 
LORD ALLENBY agreed , and po inted ou t that the River Yarmuk 
supplied two-thirds of the wa ter of the Jordan . He said that the 
Zionists  stretched Pales t ine far to the north and would like to include 
Hama . Their idea was to fix the boundaries similarly to tho s e  of 
Solomon ' s  empire . He thought , however , that the proper boundary of 
Pale stine on the coas t was probably jus t south of Tyr e . The 
Syke s-Picot Agreement drew the line jus t north of Haifa and lef t  Lake 
Tiberias to the French . In his view , however ,  the Yarmuk Valley wa s  
e ssential to the welfare o f  Pales tine . He po inted out that the French 
l ine was drawn cons iderably south of Basra so as to include Deraa Wh ich 
had been on the Syke s-Picot line • • •  
THE PRIME MINISTER ins truct ed S ir ��ur ice Hankey to telephone to 
London to ask fo r the fo llowing documents to be sent to meet him in 
Paris : 
Adam Smi th ' s  Book on Pales tine 
Adam S�i th ' s  Atlas ( containing the boundaries of Pale s tine 
at dif ferent periods ) 
A large scale ma p  of the Syke s-Picot Agreement 
( At this point there wa s  an ad journment to enable Colonel Gr ibbon to 
draw roughly the Syke s-Picot line on a large scale map containing the 
French line . )  
THE PRIME MINISTER po inted ou t tha t the Syke s-Picot Agreement 
and the French line included Lake Tiberias wi thin the French zone . 
MR .  BONAR LAW asked What was the value of Lake Tiberias ? 
THE PRIME MINISTER said it  was essential for the irrigation and 
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development of Pale s t ine . 
COL . GRIBBON sugge sted that the line ought to be drawn along the 
edge of the Lebanon . 
THE PRIME MINISTER said that M .  Clemenceau had promi sed that the 
Brftish should have the manda te fo r Palestine . He wanted a map showing 
what actually cons ti tuted Pales tine . He wa s  convinced that this would 
include Lake Tiberias . 
COL . GRIBBON in rep ly to a que s tion by Sir M. Hankey as to the 
value of Lake Tiberias to the French , said that the French had drawn up 
s chemes for fo rcing wa ter up fo r the irrigation of the south of Syria , 
and that the Zioni s t s had a scheme fo r connecting the Jordan wi th the 
river Li tani . 
COL . GRIBBON said that there had been so many di f ferent boun­
daries to Pales tine that he doubt ed Whe ther anyone would agree to 
recognise any one authority , even Adam Smi th �  
THE PRIME MINISTER sugge s ted that the French would accep t some 
o f  the American religious  autho r i ties on the boundaries of Palestine . 
MR. BONAR LAW sugges t ed that President Wilson should be asked 
to arbi trate as to the boundaries of Pales tine . 
LORD ALLENBY said that an American expert , Dr . John Finlay , had 
been in Pales tine and had walked from B eersheba to Dan : he thought 
perhaps his authority would be recogni sed . 
THE PRIME MINISTER ins truc ted S ir M .  Hankey to telephone to 
London ins tructions to consult the Society fo r the Propaga tion of the 
Gos pel and Mesrs . Hodder and S toughton as to the American au thorities 
in regard to Pales tine . He said he was inclined to make an of fer on 
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Mr . Bonar Law ' s lines to accep t as an arbi trator someone nominated by 
Pre sident Wi lson as regards the boundaries of Pales tine . 
MR. BONAR LAW asked what was the value of Pales t ine ? 
LORD ALLENBY s aid that it had no economic value whatsover . I ts 
r etention by the Bri t ish would keep our minds act ive fo r the next 
generation or two . He anticipated great trouble from the Zioni s t s . 
There had been so much Zioni s t  propaganda tha t Jews who had been 
dispos ses sed in Poland and Russ ia were actually march ing now to 
Pales tine . 
THE PRIME MINISTER po inted out that the manda te over Palestine 
would give us great pr estige . He asked Which the Field Marshal would 
prefer , Pales tine in Bri tish or French hands ? 
LORD ALLENBY s aid that if the French were in Syria they might 
almos t as well be in Pales tine . In any case they would give us great 
t rouble . 
GENERAL SHEA said that from the po int of view of the air he 
thought it was ess ential to have Pales tine . The neces s i ty for this was 
to enable us  to  break up  an air  attack on the Suez Canal . Unless our 
frontier was pushed we l l  out this would be di f ficult . 
THE PRIME MINISTER , reverting to the land defence , asked 
whether , if the defiles from the Lebanon were held , any ma rch on Egyp t  
would be impossible ? 
LORD ALLENBY agreed tha t this was the case . It would be di f­
f icult to ho ld a line fur ther back as the flank was liable to be 
turned . He did no t think we could now give up Pales tine wi thou t  great 
los s of prestige . 
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COL . GRIBBO N  po inted ou t that it would focus the who le de fence of 
Egyp t in these narrow de files ins tead of spr eading i t  ou t over a wid e  
f ield . It wa s  ess ential fo r the British to b e  as tride of the Hed jaz 
railway . If the French could use this railway it would cau se us great 
trouble . Moreover ,  he was impressed by the danger of the air threat on 
the Canal , which made it essential to push fo rward our aerial de fence . 
THE PRIME MINISTER sugges ted that anyhow it wa s  now impo s s ib le 
for us to give up Pales t ine . 
LORD ALLENBY agreed . 
THE PRIME MINISTER said that we could nei ther give up Pales tine 
nor take Syria . 
LORD ALLENBY agreed . 
From Palestine Papers by Doreen Ingrams , pp . 7 5-78 . 
The _ Secur ity Council 
APPENDIX D 
U .  N .  Secur ity Council 
Reso lution 242 , Nov . 2 2 , 1967  
Expressing its continuing concern wi th the grave si tuation in the 
Middle Eas t ,  
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Emphasizing the inadmi ssibili ty of  the acquis i tion of  terri to ry by war 
and the need to wo rk fo r a jus t and las ting peace in which eve ry S tate 
in  the area can live in secur ity ,  
Emphasiz ing fur ther that al l Member S tates in their accep tance of the 
Charter of the Uni ted Nat ions have undertaken a commi tment to act in 
accordance wi th Article 2 of the Char ter , 
1 .  Affirms that the ful f illment of Charter principle requi res the 
e s tabli shment of a jus t and las ting peace in the Middle Eas t which 
s hould inc lude the applicat ion of both the fol lowing pr inciples :  
( 1 )  Wi thdrawal of Israeli armed fo rces from terri tories occupied in 
the recent conflic t ; 
( ii )  Termination of all claims or states of bil ligerency and respect 
for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty , territorial integ r i ty 
and poli tical independence of every State in the area and their 
r ight to live in peace wi thin secure and recognized boundar ies free 
from threats or act s  of fo rce ; 
2 . Af f i rms fur ther the necessi ty 
( a) For guaranteeing fr eedom of navigation through international 
waterways in the area ; 
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( b ) For achieving a jus t se t tl ement of  the refugee problem ;  
( c ) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolabili ty and po li tical 
independence of every State in the area , through measures including 
the es tabli shment of demili tarized zones ; 
3 . Reques t s  the Secretary-General to des ignate a Special Representative 
to proceed to the Middle Eas t to es tablish and maintain contact s wi th 
the S tates concerned in order to promo te agreement and assis t effo r t s  to 
achieve a peaceful and accepted set tlement in accordance wi th the pro­
vi sions and pr inciples in thi s reso lution; 
4 .  Reques t s  the Secur i ty-General to repo rt to the Secur i ty Council on 
the progress of the effo r t s  of the Special Representative as soon as 
pos s ible . 
Name 
*Al-Fatah , the 
Pale stine National 
Liberation Movement 
*Pales tine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) ; 
Palest ine Liberat ion 
Army ( PLA) ; 
Popular Liberation 
Forces ( PLF ) 
*Popular Front for 
the Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP ) 
*Popular Democratic 
Front for the Liberation 
of Palest ine (PDF )  
( Broke away from 
PFLP ) 
*Popular Front for 
the Libera tion of 
Pales t ine -- General 
Command 
( Broke away from 
PFLP ) 
Estima ted 
f ighting 
APPENDIX E 
PRINCIPAL PALESTINIAN GUERRILLA GROUPS 
( July , 1 9 70 ) 
strength Main leaders Arms sources Income sources Ideology 
1 5 , 000 
10 , 000 
4 , 000 
1 , 000 
500 
Yas i r  Arafat 
Salah Khale f  
Khaled al-Hassan 
Mohammed Naj jar 
Hanni al-Hassan 
Zouhei r  al-Alami 
Farouk Kaddomi 
Yasir Arafat 
Brig . Gen . Abdel 
Raz zak Yahia 
Shaf iq al-Hawt 
Abu Mahmoud 
George Habash 
Ahmed al-Yamani 
Hevtam Ayoub! 
Naj i f  Hawatmah 
Salah Ra ' afat 
Adi b  Abd Rabu 
Bilaad al-Hassan 
Ahmad Jabril 
Fadel Chrorou 
Communis t  
China 
Open marke t 
Captured 
Israeli arms 
Rocke ts of own 
manu facture 
Same as 
Al-Fatah; 
East Europe 
and Arab 
governments 
, 
Eas t Europe 
Iraq 
Open market 
Captured 
I sraeli arms 
Syria 
Eas t Europe 
Open marke t 
Captured 
Israeli arms 
Miscellaneous 
Mainly Pale s t i nian 
priva te individuals 
channeli ng payments 
through gove rnme nts 
of Saudi Arabia ,  
Kuwa i t ,  Libya , 
Abu Dhabi 
Same as 
Al-Fatah, plus 
Arab gove rnment 
subsidi es 
decided by 
Arab League 
Iraq 
Priva te 
Misce l laneou s 
No po l i t ical ideology 
excep t liberat ion of 
Palest ine through 
armed struggle and 
creation of a 
democratic , secular 
Pales t inian state 
Same as Al-Fatah 
Marxi s t-Leninis t  
in sense similar to 
Asian parties  
Trotskyi s t ;  
commi t ted t o  tot al 
revo lu t ion in 
Arab po li t ics and 
socie ty 
None excep t mi li tary 
strugg le . Pan-Arabi sm 
f i rs t  then na tional 
s tate . � \0 
Name 
*Al-Sa ' iqa 
(Thunderbo lt ) 
*Arab Liberat ion 
Front (ALF ) 
Popular Organization 
for the Liberation 
of Palest ine (POLP) 
*Popular Struggle 
Front (PSF) 
*Arab Pales tine 
Organizat ion (AP )  
( Broke away from 
PFLP) 
*Act ion Group for the 
Libera tion of Palestine 
( Broke away from 
Al-Fatah) 
Ansar (Part isans ) 
( Newly formed 
communist group) 
Estimated 
f ighting 
s trength Main leaders Arms sources Income sources IdeQ�ogy 
7 , 000 
3 , 000 
100 
200 
100 
50 
50 
Zouheir Mohsen 
Daf t  J ' mani 
Ahmad S hahabi 
Yusuf al-Berji 
Zayd Haydar 
Muni f  al .... Raz zaz 
Not available 
Baja t abu 
Gharbiya 
Ahmad Zarour 
Dr . Isam Sartawi 
Fuad Nasr 
Khaled Bagdash 
Syria 
Soviet Union 
Open market 
Captured 
I sraeli arms 
Iraq 
Commun i s t  
China 
Priva te 
Uni ted Arab 
Republic 
Iraq 
Egypt 
Soviet Union 
Syria Baathis t  (Syr ian 
branch ) 
Iraq Baathis t  ( I raq i 
branch ) 
Mainly refuge es in Maoist  
camps in Syr i a  
Pr ivat e  
Uni t ed Arab 
Republic 
Egypt 
Sovi e t  Union 
Forme r ly Baath i s t ;  
now devoted ent irely 
to clandes ti ne act ion 
in� ide I sraeli­
occupied lands 
Nasserite Sociali s t  
Nasserite Social i s t  
Sovie t  Commun i s t  
*Members o f  Uni f ied Central Commi t tee . 
Note : The APO and the Action Group supported accep tance of the Augus t 1 970 UN cease fire by other organiza t ions . 
From Don Peretz , The Pales tine State , p .  5 6-5 7 . 
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